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I
INTRODUCTION
When the legal history of the 1970's is written, it will note a significant
shift in the way courts perceived shareholder litigation. Only a generation
ago, the Supreme Court described the derivative action as "the chief regulator
of corporate management."' Even into the 1960's, those issues involving
shareholder litigation that percolated up to the Supreme Court were typically
resolved so as to extend the availability of a litigation remedy by removing
arbitrary or overbroad barriers to the plaintiff.2
During the 1970's, the pendulum swung sharply in the other direction. In
particular, the Supreme Court tilted the balance of advantage against the
plaintiff in securities litigation by (1) declining repeatedly to imply private
causes of action under the federal securities laws, at least absent a clear
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1. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
2. This period is well summarized in Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 16 U. PA. L. REV.
74 (1968). Dykstra reports that between 1956 and 1966, the number of reported derivative suits
increased significantly over the previous decade and that courts perceived the derivative suit as an
important mechanism for ensuring corporate accountability. Among the Supreme Court decisions of
the era that simplified the burdens facing the plaintiff in a derivative action were: Surowitz v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966), which in effect trivialized the verification requirement in FED. R.
Civ. P. 23.1 (providing that "the complaint shall be verified"); Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957),
which clarified the issue of the corporation's status as a defendant and thereby facilitated the
plaintiff's ability to establish diversity jurisdiction; andJ.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), which
permitted a shareholder to assert federal proxy rule violations in a derivative action. Probably the
last of these expansive decisions was Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970), which
strongly endorsed the private attorney general concept. Lower federal court decisions of this era
reveal a similar tendency toward enabling the plaintiff to evade statutory obstacles. See McClure v.
Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961) (holding state security for
expenses statute inapplicable to derivative action asserting a federal cause of action); Gottesman v.
General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959) (demand held unnecessary where action charged
illegal acts); Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297, 317 (3d Cir. 1962) (majority ratification held
ineffective where complaint alleges acts that "are public wrongs").
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statement of congressional intent;3 (2) reading a scienter requirement into
Rule lOb-5;4 (3) limiting standing under Rule lOb-5 to actual purchasers and
sellers of securities (thereby excluding defrauded holders);5 (4) curtailing
suits for corporate mismanagement under the federal securities laws;6 and (5)
recognizing broad exemptions and reducing the damages under § 16b of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.7 Likewise, in decisions over the same period
not involving securities litigation, the Court also constrained the effectiveness
of private attorneys general by (a) tightening the procedural requirements
applicable to class actions; 8 (b) reaffirming the American rule on fee awards
under which the successful plaintiff still must generally bear his own legal
expenses; 9 and (c) accepting the special litigation committee as a means by
which derivative actions could be quickly terminated with only minimal
judicial review.' 0 None of these decisions was particularly surprising, and
each had an understandable doctrinal logic. Yet, in the course of reaching
these results, the Court also articulated a philosophy that was profoundly
skeptical of the plaintiff. This attitude was most clearly displayed in 1975,
when in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, I1 the Court refused to allow any
exception to be grafted onto the well-recognized rule that only a purchaser or
seller had standing to sue under Rule 10b-5. It justified this result on the
grounds that narrow limitations on standing were necessary to reduce the
leverage that a strike suit otherwise gave the plaintiff to harass management
and disrupt "normal business activities."' 2  The same perception of the
plaintiffs underlying motives was also apparent a year earlier in Bangor Punta
Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostock R.R., 13 when the Court seemingly called
into serious question the traditional deterrent rationale for the derivative
action. The deterrent justification, it said, proved too much and might result
3. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); cf Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
4. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
5. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
6. Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
7. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Kern County Land
Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co.,
404 U.S. 418 (1972).
8. The critical decision was Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), which required
individual notice to all class members whose address could be ascertained. In addition, other
decisions have tightened class certification requirements. See, e.g., East Texas Motor Freight Sys.,
Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) (denying
class certification).
9. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
10. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
11. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723.
12. There has been widespread recognition that litigation under Rule lOb-5 presents a danger
of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general.
The very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal business activity of the defendant
which is totally unrelated to the lawsuit.
Id. at 739.
13. 417 U.S. 703 (1974).
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in an excessive rate of litigation.' 4 In overview, the common denominator
between these and other decisions throughout the 1970's was consistently the
fear of hyperlexia-the sense that unless litigation remedies were stringently
limited, the lid on Pandora's box would be lifted and a torrent of frivolous
litigation might be released.
An ideological interpretation can, of course, account for all these decisions
by glibly explaining that the "good" Warren Court had given way to the
"bad" Burger Court. Yet, although ideological shifts may have played a
significant role, the decisions cannot be explained this easily, both because the
pattern has not been uniform 5 and because some of the Justices who
composed the majority during the Warren era have since sided with the new
majority as it shifted the balance of advantage against the plaintiff.' 6
What else then can account for the pattern? Not surprisingly, multiple
theories can be offered. First, the shift toward "independent" boards of
directors may have convinced the courts that there is less justification to rely
on shareholder litigation as a monitoring device.' 7 Corporate governance, it
can be argued, has improved, and thus needs less judicial oversight. Second,
to a lesser extent, courts may today believe that market remedies, including
the hostile takeover, are adequate to hold managements accountable.' 8
Third, public enforcement agencies, most notably the SEC, but also U.S.
Attorneys, have increasingly undertaken to monitor sensitive areas of
corporate conduct where previously only private enforcement was available.
Fourth, caseload pressure may have forced courts to begin to ration justice,
14. Id. at 717-18 ("Our difficulty with this argument is that it proves too much. If deterrence
were the only objective, then in logic any plaintiff willing to file a complaint would suffice. No injury
or violation of a legal duty to the particular plaintiff would have to be alleged."). This language
surely indicates little sympathy on the part of the current Supreme Court for the lawyer as bounty
hunter.
15. For example, in Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984), the court dispensed
with the demand requirement in the case of shareholder suits against the management of an
investment company. This decision overturned the majority of the precedents that had required
demand on the board. See, e.g., Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982).
Although Daily Income cited special congressional policies underlying the Investment Company Act,
*these policies had not convinced lower federal courts. Another explanation is that the special
structure of investment companies and the inherent conflict of interest surrounding the
compensation of their investment adviser by a board that the adviser typically appoints may have
convinced the Court of the relatively greater need for judicial oversight in this context (as compared
with that of the typical industrial corporation).
16. For example, Justice Marshall concurred in the decisions in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1972), Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), and Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), and Justice Brennan authored the Court's opinion in Burks
v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
17. Several surveys have reported that a substantial majority of large publicly held corporations
have boards composed of a majority of "outside" or nonmanagement directors. See A.L.I.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
3.03 comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) (reviewing studies by Korn/Ferry, New York Stock
Exchange, Heidrick & Struggles, and Financial Executives Institute).
18. In Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982), the Court at least recognized that a
market discipline enforced through the mechanism of the hostile takeover tended to protect
shareholders of those companies whose stock underperformed the market. Others believe that the
Supreme Court has increasingly taken on an economic perspective. See Cover, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (citing Easterbrook).
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with shareholder litigation receiving only a low priority. Finally and.most
relevant to the concerns of this article, courts may have come to doubt that
the litigation remedies available to shareholders achieve in practice any useful
end.' 9 On this last question, courts have a first-hand perspective, and to the
degree that they see few real plaintiff victories (either by way of judgment or
settlement), they may conclude that such actions impose costs on
shareholders in excess of their benefits. Given that our legal culture has
always had an uncomfortably ambivalent attitude toward the plaintiff's
attorney in the derivative action, this last hypothesis of judicial frustration
with shareholder litigation makes more understandable the turn of the tide
against the plaintiff.
To state the foregoing explanations for judicial deference to corporate
management is not to accept them as adequate justifications. All mechanisms
of corporate accountability potentially can be frustrated, and an extensive
literature has analyzed the inherent limitations on each of these modes. 20
Although the relative merits of these rival mechanisms could be explored at
great length, this article will focus instead on the last explanation given above
for judicial disenchantment with shareholder litigation-the sense that it may
today be doing little good and some harm. Whatever the shareholder's need
for legal protection, there is no doubt that a bad remedy benefits no one.
To acknowledge this possibility that a remedy can be worse than the
disease it was meant to cure may seem mean-spirited and ill-timed at a
moment when the very survival of the derivative suit appears to hang in the
19. For highly skeptical assessments of the antitrust and securities plaintiffs' bar, see In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir.
1984); In re Armored Car Antitrust Litig., 472 F. Supp. 1357, 1381-82, 1388-89 (N.D. Ga. 1979);
Barnett v. Pritzker, 73 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp.
907, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 1138 (3d Cir. 1977). It is not only courts
which have grown wary of the confident premises of the theory of the private attorney general. Some
empirical studies have also reported little evidence that the class action is today achieving its
deterrent objectives. See DuVal, The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago Experience
(Part 11), 1976 A.B.F. REs. J. 1273, 1327 ("Judged by results, the class action has proved a rather
feeble engine of antitrust enforcement."); Kennedy, Securities Class and Derivative Actions in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas: An Empirical Study, 14 Hous. L. REV. 769 (1977);
Rosenfeld, An Empirical Test of Class Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (1976); Wolfram, The
Antibiotics Class Actions, 1976 A.B.F. RES.J. 273. For a general overview that focuses principally on the
antitrust class action, see Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as
Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983).
20. The academic literature has emphasized the time and informational constraints under which
the outside director functions. See, e.g., Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1976). Professor Brudney has
also criticized the overly facile assumption that the outside director has the requisite incentive to be
an effective monitor. Brudney, The Independent Director: Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 597 (1982); see also Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise ?,
76 MIH. L. REV. 581 (1978). Few today would argue for shareholder voting as a significant
protective remedy, or analogize the shareholder to a citizen in a democracy, in view of the high
transaction costs and the "free rider" problem that cripples shareholders' activism. Finally, whatever
the potential of the hostile takeover to serve as a mechanism of accountability, it is evident that the
currently high level of takeover premiums (roughly 40% to 60% above the market price) limits its
reach and shelters a considerable margin for managerial failure. For a review of this and other
problems, see Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's
Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984).
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balance, as courts continue to defer uncritically to the decisions of special
litigation committees. 2' Still, a candid assessment of the impact of the
derivative action today cannot ignore the plain fact that derivative actions
seldom result in litigated victories, but rather tend overwhelmingly to be
resolved through settlements, a substantial percentage of which produce little
tangible benefit for the corporation. 22 Although it is never surprising in any
area of law that settlements tend to predominate over litigated outcomes, the
derivative action is distinctive in that, within the category of litigated
outcomes, reported decisions tend to favor the defendant by an overwhelming
ratio.23 This pattern seems to conflict with recent theory, which predicts that
litigated outcomes normally should split in a roughly equal manner between
plaintiff and defendant victories. 24 To the critics of shareholder litigation, this
disproportionate ratio between defendant and plaintiff victories has long been
seen as evidence that such actions are typically "strike suits" brought to extort
a payment from the corporate treasury. 25 Proponents have replied that the
high rate of settlement shows to the contrary that the corporation does
21. For an overview of the rise of the special litigation committee as a means for dismissing
derivative litigation without substantive review, see Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative
Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981). For recent cases
declining to review the substance of the committee's findings, see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805
(Del. 1984); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
22. According to the fullest empirical study done to date, approximately 70% of all class and
derivative actions filed against corporate officers and directors are settled; in another 5%, some relief
is obtained following the commencement of the action, even though no formal settlement results.
Only in 1% was a litigated judgment in favor of the plaintiffs observed. This result implies a ratio of
over 20:1 in favor of the defendants. See Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder
Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. REV. 542 (1980).
23. See supra note 22. Of course, the 20:1 ratio observed by Professor Jones is affected by the
defendant's ability to win a pretrial judgment through a motion to dismiss, or a motion for summary
judgment-a motion that the plaintiff can also make in theory, but can almost never win. In effect,
the defendant can take multiple bites at the apple. This procedural anomaly appears not to have
been discussed by the theorists discussed infra note 24; in part, it affects their conclusions because
such motions have a signaling function as the court hints through them its view of the merits.
24. These theorists argue that trials occur only in those cases in which the litigants have
different expectations about the outcome, because if the adversaries have the same view of the
litigation odds, the case will be negotiated to avoid the needless expense of trial. See Priest & Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). But see Cooter, Marks, & Mnookin,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982);
Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985). What appears to have
been overlooked in this rather abstract discussion of litigation is that where client control of the
attorney is weak, the attorney is the relevant decisionmaker and has little interest in effecting cost
savings by avoiding a trial. That is, if the attorney is effectively unconstrained by any client (as he
classically is in the derivative action), he may prefer to go to trial, at least when he is compensated on
the basis of his time expended because an early settlement is not as profitable to him. In this light,
the pattern of collusive settlements discussed in this article might arguably be seen as bribes by the
defendant to make the plaintiff's attorney behave as would a normal attorney who is constrained by a
client.
25. This was the principal conclusion of the "Wood Report" prepared for the Chamber of
Commerce of the State of New York in 1944. F. WooD, SURVEY REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS'
DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944). Wood found recoveries for plaintiffs in only 13 cases out of 573 derivative
suits involving publicly held corporations; in addition, some 33 other cases resulted in court-
approved settlements. For a fuller review of Wood's findings and the criticisms by others of his work,
see Garth, Nagel & Plager, Empirical Research and the Shareholder Derivative Suit: Toward A Better-Informed
Debate, LAw & CoNTEMp. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 137.
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benefit.2 6 In fact, this debate has been more ideological than empirical,
because neither side has satisfactory data about the adequacy of the
settlement in the typical derivative action. 27
This empirical void is unlikely soon to be filled. Although some efforts
have been made to measure the stock market's response to the termination of
a derivative suit,2 8  the methodology underlying these studies seems
26. See Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DUKE L.J. 895, 901
n.21; Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders'Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 127-
28 (1944).
27. The most extensive recent empirical study is Jones, supra note 22. Although Jones' work is a
useful study, it unfortunately made no attempt to distinguish between class and derivative actions or
to collect data systematically about the size of the settlement fund. For a reanalysis of its findings,
see Garth, Nagel & Plager, supra note 25, at 145-47.
28. See Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (forthcoming). Fischel and Bradley computed the daily
abnormal return to the shares of firms in whose name a derivative action has been brought following
either a judicial termination of the derivative suit or a judicial decision to permit the action to
continue. Their data show that market reaction was consistently negative for all the time periods
studied, but they interpret these results as not statistically significant. In contrast, the abnormal
returns following a decision to permit the action to continue were consistently positive, but again
they view these results as not statistically significant. In the absence of statistically significant results,
they conclude that derivative actions have negligible effects. However, others believe that, properly
read, their results have statistical significance.
Above all, the Fischel and Bradley data do not adequately address the issue of general deterrence.
The most plausible theory under which the derivative action benefits shareholders is by deterring
certain forms of managerial misconduct that other mechanisms of corporate accountability do not
deter as effectively. The derivative action would thereby reduce the "agency costs" associated with
the manager/shareholder relationship. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (defining the term "agency cost" to
include the cost of monitoring plus any residual loss that cannot thereby be prevented). Yet this
thesis is difficult to test because general deterrence is hard to observe. If one examines only whether
the stock price of a corporation in whose name a derivative action is brought rises or falls in the wake
of the action's filing or settlement, one overlooks the general deterrent impact on corporate
managers generally. Quite possibly, the stock price could fall because the market expected that the
costs of the action that the corporation would bear to exceed any likely recovery to it. To conclude
from this fact that derivative actions injured shareholders, however, would be as naive as to measure
the effect of the criminal law on its intended audience by comparing only the mean costs of
apprehending, convicting, and imprisoning offenders in relation to the mean costs the same
offenders would have imposed on others had they remained at liberty. The fallacy in any such
oversimple comparison lies in the confusion of specific deterrence with general deterrence. Even if
every derivative action invariably caused its subject corporation a net cash loss, it would remain
possible in theory that the institution of the derivative action benefitted shareholders as a class,
because shareholders, to the extent that they were at least partially diversified, could gain on balance
if corporate managers (other than the actual defendants) were deterred from unfair self-dealing.
In theory, one might solve this problem by studying the stock prices of corporations incorporated
in different jurisdictions having contrasting legal rules concerning the availability of the derivative
action. If a decision in one jurisdiction broadened or limited the availability of the derivative action,
one would look to see if the share prices of stocks incorporated in that jurisdiction rose or fell on
average. Those having perfect confidence in the efficiency of the market will in time predictably
report what their computer tapes on stock prices show as happening in the wake of recent decisions.
Still, a host of problems again confounds any such attempt. First, there may be less difference today
between the governing legal rules in the principal state jurisdictions than is generally thought. After
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), it is today doubtful that the laws of New York and
Delaware are significantly different with respect to the power of a litigation committee. Second, even
if apparently substantial differences exist among jurisdictions in terms of the legal rules applicable to
derivative actions, the market's failure to capture these differences by revaluing the securities of
corporations incorporated in these jurisdictions could be explained in one of several ways that
confuse any attempt to draw useful conclusions about the derivative action's overall impact: (1) the
market may have been too insensitive to detect the real differences in effect between different legal
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profoundly flawed for three principal reasons: First, if we make the standard
assumption that stock market prices anticipate future events, unless they are
unforeseen, then it follows that a negligible market reaction to the judicial
termination of a derivative action need imply no more than that the market
expected that the action would be terminated; only the unexpected decision
should not have been discounted in advance. Because such studies tell us
principally what the market expected the court would do, it is only in cases
where the market is surprised that we can decipher its judgment as to the
wisdom of the result from an event study. Second, most derivative actions
seek recoveries that are trivial on a per share basis. This fact does not mean
that the action is valueless, but only that the principal benefit is a preventive
one because, absent an adequate deterrent, the same de minimus violation
might recur until a significant loss resulted. Finally, econometric "event
studies" of the effect of a suit's filing or termination on the stock price of a
single firm cannot measure the general deterrent effect of such actions. To
measure this, one would in theory need to compare over the relevant period
the market prices of all corporations incorporated in the jurisdiction whose
legal rule changed with the market prices of other corporations incorporated
in other jurisdictions having different rules.29
By no means does this claim assert that empiricism has no value; rather, it
suggests the need to focus empirical studies more selectively. What can and
should be studied are the sources of pathology: namely the incentives (or
disincentives) that legal rules today hold out to the plaintiffs attorney and
that cause him to perform his function as a private enforcer marginally better
or worse. Such an inquiry limits itself to relative questions (better or worse)
and avoids the bottom line issue of the potential utility of shareholder
litigation. Put differently, because severe limitations exist on the ability of
empirical research to resolve the potential of the derivative action as an
effective monitoring mechanism, we are at the stage when the real need is not
for more, inherently ambiguous empirical data, 30 but instead for a clear
rules; (2) corporate managers may have been too insensitive to the nature of these legal rules to
detect any differences and so were deterred to a roughly equivalent degree, regardless of whether
they were in fact subject to a realistic threat of successful litigation; or (3) the infrequency of
derivative actions, see infra note 45, may have made their impact, whether positive or negative, too
insignificant for the market to consider. Only a process of inference could tell us which conclusion to
draw.
Finally, it should be remembered that empirical data inform us at most only as to current
operation of a legal rule in the eyes of the market, and do not address whether a legal remedy could
(or should) be redesigned to improve its operation.
29. To date, I am aware of only one such study that attempts to do this with respect to any set of
corporate legal rules. This study, now being completed by Professors Elliott Weiss and Lawrence
White, follows the stock market price of Delaware corporations as a group following several
important recent Delaware decisions on corporate law (which decisions Professor Fischel has
vigorously criticized). To date, I am informed by Professor Weiss that this study has found no
statistically significant market movement following any of these cases.
30. In so arguing, I do intend only a mild disagreement with the agenda for research proposed
by Professors Garth, Nagel, and Plager elsewhere in this volume. I am not optimistic about their
proposal for the in-depth study of special litigation committees, because the overriding fact is that
the outcome of the special litigation committee process is almost invariably a recommendation for
dismissal. In this light, a close empirical study seems more likely to produce a report on the subtle
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model by which to predict how changes in legal rules enhance or reduce the
ability of private enforcement to reduce agency costs. Specifically, the model
should seek to predict how the plaintiffs attorney as the key actor in any
strategy of private enforcement will adapt to these rules.
In pursuit of this goal, this article makes three basic claims: First, the legal
doctrines that have been formalized over the last two decades (including
therein both the liberal 1960's and the more conservative 1970's) have in
combination moved us closer toward the worst of all worlds: one in which the
possibility of a significant corporate recovery in a derivative action is
minimized, while the likelihood of costly and time-consuming litigation
remains high. Second and more paradoxically, any attempt to rehabilitate the
private attorney general concept can succeed only if we move from viewing
the plaintiffs attorney in exclusively normative terms as a fiduciary who must
faithfully serve his clients and instead analyze him from an ex ante perspective
as a risk-taking entrepreneur who predictably will act to maximize his
expected return and to minimize his risk. Third, there exist some relatively
simple and costless reforms that could better align the interests of the
plaintiff's attorney with those of the shareholders he represents.
The claim that we should view the plaintiffs attorney as a risk-taking
entrepreneur will seem offensive to some and must be explained in greater
detail as a threshold matter. If we view the plaintiffs attorney in derivative
and related shareholder litigation as a rational decisionmaker who acts
according to the same utility-maximizing criteria as do other businessmen,
this implies that the decision to bring a derivative or class action is a capital
budgeting decision that will be assessed in terms of the lawyer's opportunity
costs, his expected return, and his level of risk aversion. This perspective is
descriptive, rather than normative. It assumes neither that we should tolerate
substantial conflicts of interest between the attorney and the class he
represents, nor that all attorneys will act in a purely self-interested fashion.
Rather, the only assumption underlying this perspective is that economic
incentives will have a marginal impact upon the behavior of private enforcers
and that therefore the law should seek to fashion the incentives that it holds
out so as to align better the interests of the plaintiff's attorney with those of
his clients.
tactics of rationalizing a foregone conclusion. Greater priority should be given, I submit, to studying
the calculus of factors that the plaintiff's attorney balances, but at an earlier stage than they suggest:
namely, at the stage when the plaintiff's attorney decides whether to "invest" in an action not yet
commenced. Because litigation is a continuing investment decision, see Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner,
Kritzer, & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 72 (1983), it would be also
useful to follow plaintiffs' attorneys as they make subsequent decisions about discovery, settlement,
or appeal. On the defendant's side of the aisle, the principle that "man bites dog" is the more
interesting story suggests that the focus should be on studying the dynamics in those instances where
the board or committee has not rejected the plaintiff's action (or has itself sued). My own
understanding of these few cases, however, is that they principally involve actions against departed
executives (usually at the middle-management level) where the real party in interest is the insurance
carrier.
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This article is divided into four parts. Part I offers an economic analysis of
why frivolous actions are worth bringing. This issue is not as simple as it
sounds, because the conventional theory of the strike suit is incomplete and
some "reforms" intended to eliminate nuisance actions may in fact increase
their incidence. This section presents the argument that to understand the
behavior of the plaintiff's attorney we cannot look simply at the individual
case, but rather must consider the portfolio of actions in which he has in effect
"invested." Part II then focuses on the issue of the appropriate fee formula
that can best align the attorney's self-interest with that of his client
shareholders. Part III examines the financing and organization of the
plaintiff's action and the relationship among competing plaintiffs' attorneys.
Again, the focus is on how public policy should increase the expected return
to the private enforcer and reduce his level of risk aversion. Part IV addresses
the special problem of a remedy by which to preclude collusive settlements.
Finally, brief consideration is given to the possibility of a more radical
alternative for the reform of class and derivative actions: the use of an auction
procedure.
II
UNDERSTANDING THE "STRIKE SUIT": THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
NUISANCE ACTIONS
The standard theory of the "strike suit" was succinctly stated by Justice
Black when he characterized the "strike suit" as one brought "by people who
might be interested in getting quick dollars by making charges without regard
to their truth so as to coerce corporate managers to settle worthless claims in
order to get rid of them." 3' The assumption is that it is cheaper to settle than
to fight so long as a cheap, quick settlement is possible. Yet this premise is
not self-evident; the problem with this theory is that the plaintiff cannot
litigate costlessly. In fact, discovery and pretrial skirmishing are not clearly
less expensive for the plaintiff's attorney, who does, after all, bear the burden
of proof and who is typically underfinanced in comparison with his
adversaries. Nor is the plaintiff's attorney invulnerable to counterattack.
Today, under recently amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a federal court may hold the plaintiff's attorney liable for the
defendant's costs (or some portion thereof) if he is found to have brought an
action that lacks factual or legal merit.32 Other state and federal procedural
rules concerning pleading requirements and security for expense bonds also
31. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966).
32. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I. Rule 11 provides that an attorney must sign the complaint and that
such signature constitutes his certification that he has investigated the allegations and believes them
to be well-grounded. The court may award attorney fees on its own motion under Rule 11. A trend
appears to be developing toward more frequent awards under this rule. See, e.g., Gordon v.
Heimann, 715 F.2d 531 (11 th Cir. 1983); Taylor v. Bear Sterns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 683 (N.D.
Ga. 1983); see also Note, Pleading Securities Fraud with Particularity under Rule 9(b), 97 HARV. L.REv. 1432,
1441 (1984) (noting such a trend).
The court may also assess attorney fees under the "bad faith" exception to the American rule. See
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
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enable weak cases to be dismissed at an early stage, thereby further reducing
the plaintiff attorney's ability to bring a strike suit for its nuisance value. 33 As
a result, it may seem puzzling that defendants do not behave strategically by
seeking to resist frivolous derivative actions in order to reduce their future
incidence. Such a strategy of reciprocal escalation might make considerable
sense over the long run, even if it would be cheaper in the short run to settle
the individual case. Accounting firms in particular seem to behave in this
fashion and strive to maintain their reputation as tough, hard-nosed litigators
who will not settle weak cases. 34 Given that the defense bar often proclaims
its view that derivative actions represent a form of legalized extortion, the
anomaly is that defendants do not act as they talk by adopting the logical
countermove to attempted extortion: a strategic policy of adamant resistance
in order to make the meritless case appear a less attractive opportunity to the
plaintiffs' bar. The simple reality is, however, that the rate of settlement in
derivative actions appears higher, while the rate of litigated plaintiffs victories
is strikingly lower, than in other forms of contingent fee litigation.35 Once an
action survives the preliminary motions to dismiss, there is a strong
probability that it will be settled, even though plaintiff's verdicts remain
statistical rarities.
A more complete theory of the strike suit thus seems necessary. One
possible explanation for the high rate of settlement was advanced by the
Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 36 In that case, Justice
Rehnquist distinguished two components of an action's settlement value, one
"legitimate" and the other not:
33. With respect to the special pleading requirements applicable to securities and other actions
alleging fraud, see Note, supra note 32. The rule is frequently invoked when corporate directors are
made defendants in actions alleging bias or fraud. See Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir.
1972); Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
For an overview of the effect of security for expenses bonds, see Note, Security for Expenses in
Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 50 (1968).
34. See Klott, Uneasy Period for Anderson, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1984, at DI (noting that other "Big
Eight" accounting firms were concerned that the willingness of Arthur Andersen to settle large
actions against it in the wake of several large jury verdicts would adversely affect them by convincing
plaintiffs that the industry would no longer take cases to trial; previously, Arthur Andersen "had a
reputation for taking cases to the mat [but] had become gun-shy" in the wake of these verdicts,
according to these other firms).
35. According to the empirical survey made by Jones of cases brought between 1971 and 1978,
plaintiffs won litigated verdicts in less than 11% of the 531 class and derivative actions he studied.
Yet, in some 70% of the cases, there was a settlement, and in 75% of the cases some form of relief
was recovered. Jones, supra note 22, at 544-47. In other forms of tort litigation, the breakdown
between plaintiffs and defendants in terms of the rate of litigated verdicts has been much closer and
sometimes in the plaintiffs' favor. Thus, one study of accident cases litigated to judgment in New
York City found that the defendant won in only 40% of the cases that went to verdict. See Franklin,
Chanin, & Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14 (1961). This close-to-equal victory rate is consistent with the standard
economic theory that the parties will settle any case as to which they can agree on the litigation odds
and will go to trial only when they have different perceptions as to the likely outcome at trial. See
Priest & Klein, supra note 24. The experience with derivative actions is an aberrational exception to
this pattern, which is probably best explained by the fact that the stakes are asymmetric with the
plaintiff's attorney having less to gain than the defendants have to lose.
36. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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[1]n this type of litigation ... the mere existence of an unresolved lawsuit has
settlement value to the plaintiff not only because of the possibility that he may prevail
on the merits, an entirely legitimate component of the settlement value, but because of
the threat of extensive discovery and disruption of normal business activities which
may accompany a lawsuit which is groundless in any event, but cannot be proved so
before trial .... 37
Translated into a more economic terminology, this argument becomes a
plausible claim that defendants have a higher opportunity cost than do the
plaintiffs. Because their time is worth more, defendants can less afford to
waste it in litigation. Indeed, the calculating plaintiff's attorney may even be
able to arrange his discovery schedule so as to maximize this interference.
Still, this thesis cannot by itself supply an adequate explanation of the relative
difference in settlement rates between derivative actions and other forms of
class and contingent fee litigation. The same corporate officials appear to
behave differently in antitrust, securities, and products liability litigation,
which collectively interfere at least as much with their time and may disrupt
business planning to an even greater degree.
In this light, another possible interpretation is simply that the strike suit is
a mirage--"an over-the-hill dragon, puffed into life to frighten the courts
away from deciding substantive issues." 38 This view has been essentially
taken by those who point to the high rate of settlements in derivative actions
and infer that there must have been merit associated with the majority of
these actions. Once again, this type of "where-there-is-smoke-there-must-be-
fire" reasoning assumes what is to be proved. The high rate of settlements in
proportion to the low rate of plaintiff victories is the puzzling variable that
must be explained, rather than, itself, the explanation that resolves all public
policy issues. Thus, although self-interested rationalizations by defendants
should be viewed skeptically, it is too simple to conclude that the strike suit is
an illusion if a realistic scenario can be offered under which plaintiffs would
bring actions having little prospect of eventual success and defendants would
settle them, even though they expected to win at trial.
In fact, several coherent explanations are possible for the apparent
empirical pattern of few plaintiff victories but many settlements. As
background, it is useful to understand the unique rules on fee shifting
applicable to derivative actions. Theorists have observed that the effect of our
"American rule," which requires that each side normally bears its own legal
expenses, 39 is to maximize the frequency of suits having little prospect of
success at trial, because the plaintiff is not generally exposed to liability for
37. Id. at 742-43.
38. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 888 (5th ed. 1980). There
is some undeniable merit to this claim, and I do not doubt that legislative and judicial overreactions
have occurred (both in the common security for expenses statute and in the degree of judicial
deference given to litigation committees). Nonetheless, I doubt that this is an adequate explanation.
39. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). There are, of
course, numerous statutory and judicial exceptions to this rule. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
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the defendant's legal expenses. 40 Under the converse "English rule," which
shifts the victor's expenses to the loser, the less the chance of a favorable
verdict, the more the reciprocal possibility grows that the plaintiff will be held
liable to the defendant for the latter's legal fees. In effect, the English rule
encourages the plaintiff to bring an action having a high prospect of success,
while the American rule might discourage him (to the degree that his own
expected legal costs reduced the size of the net recovery). Conversely, the
American rule encourages actions having a lower prospect of success that the
English rule would discourage, because the plaintiff need not fear liability for
the defendant's costs if he is unsuccessful.
Although this contrast between the effect of the two rules applies across
the landscape of American litigation (and thus provides no special
explanatory power with respect to the derivative action), the derivative action
is governed by a unique set of procedural rules that amount to a compromise
of the English and American rules. In effect, fee shifting is authorized for
both sides, but not necessarily against the opposing party. Under settled
precedent, the successful plaintiff's attorney is entitled to look to the
corporation for his legal fees. 4 1 Standing alone, this feature of the derivative
action does not significantly enhance the incentive to bring a nonmeritorious
action, because the plaintiff must still discount his likely expenses from the
action by the possibility of an adverse judgment. If, for example, the plaintiff
sees only a ten percent chance of success, he has a reciprocal ninety percent
chance of bearing his own expenses. In addition, under legislation in effect in
many states, the plaintiff must post a security for expenses bond to cover the
corporation's reasonable expenses from the action.42 This provision in effect
amounts to a partial adoption of the English rule. To the extent such a bond
is required, the plaintiff knows that the defendants will have indirect recourse
against him if an adverse judgment is entered. Thus, we have a strange
hybrid: the defendant can have partial recourse against the plaintiff, while the
plaintiff can shift his fees to the corporation in both cases if the outcome is
favorable to the side seeking recovery of its expenses. 43 In contrast, if there is
a settlement, both sides can shift their reasonable fees and expenses to the
40. Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation
of Legal Costs, I IJ. LEGAL STUD. 55, 59-62 (1982); Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the
Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. REV. 26 (1969).
41. See Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1939);
Sugarland Ind. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980); Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n,
101 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 1960).
42. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6 (1969); TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(c) (1980). See also Note, supra note 33. The enforceability of these statutes
in a federal diversity action was upheld in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949).
43. Under the typical statutes covering indemnification of litigation expenses incurred by
officials and directors in connection with a derivative action, a corporate official may not receive
indemnification for these expenses if there is an adverse judgment under which he is "adjudged to
have breached his duty to the corporation .... ." See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. § 722(a); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 317(c)(1) ("adjudged to be liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his
duty to the corporation .. "); see alsoJ. BIsHoP, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS:
INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE 6.03[3] (1981). Because a settlement does not adjudge the
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corporation-a fact that obviously helps explain the prevalence of
settlements.
Against this backdrop, the factors that distinguish the derivative action
from other forms of contingent fee litigation can be grouped under four
headings.
A. The Cost Differential
The costs that plaintiff and defendant will typically incur are asymmetric,
with the defendant's costs being considerably greater than the plaintiffs. This
cost differential may make it cheaper for the defendant to settle than to fight.
Several factors support the assertion that the plaintiff can litigate more
cheaply than the defendants. First, the financial burdens associated with
discovery fall more heavily on the defendants. Without much time or effort,
the experienced plaintiffs' attorney can prepare a voluminous list of
interrogatories and demand production of crates of documents. Responding
to these requests takes more time; files must be searched, answers drafted,
and objections made. Witnesses must also be prepared for deposition, and
this can involve a rehearsal process that exceeds the length of the actual
deposition. Second, the defendants will frequently need to engage multiple
counsel: one for the parties involved in the specific transaction, another for
the outside directors who approved it, and special counsel for the corporation
(and possibly another for its special litigation committee).
Overhead is a third difference. Typically, the principal defendants will be
represented by the corporation's normal outside counsel (because it is
familiar with the transactions at issue); this institutional firm will typically have
expensive hourly rates and a professional tendency toward meticulous
preparation for any litigation, whatever its size. In contrast, because the
plaintiffs attorney is the engine that runs the derivative action, he is better
able to minimize his own out-of-pocket expenses and may engage in only
minimal pretrial preparation when his real goal is an early settlement. The
contrast here is between extensive pretrial preparation on the defendant's
side and a form of feigned litigation that sometimes occurs on the plaintiffs.
Although the plaintiffs side may make extensive discovery requests, it does
not follow that the plaintiffs attorney will always review carefully the
documents he requests. To be sure, he must appear to be serious about the
case or he will sacrifice 'some negotiating leverage, but the distance between
appearance and reality can be considerable. Meanwhile, defense counsel, who
is typically paid by the hour, has considerable monetary incentive to spend a
great deal of time preparing his client's case. In short, the real time and
expense that the plaintiffs attorney expends may be less than he claims,
particularly because he will be the master of the discovery program with the
defendants largely responding to his requests.
defendant liable to the corporation, litigation expenses may be indemnified by the corporation after
the settlement.
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Although this disparity in costs will not be a significant factor if the
defendant can be certain of indemnification from the corporation, most states
by statute preclude indemnification of litigation expenses by the corporation
if the defendant is adjudged liable to the corporation. To illustrate the effect
of these rules, let us assume an action where the plaintiff has only a twenty
percent chance of success at trial. If the defendant has incurred (or will incur)
$1,000,000 in legal costs, he faces a discounted legal cost of $200,000 if he
goes to trial; conversely, if he settles, he can typically expect to be fully
indemnified, thus yielding an expected cost of zero and a net difference of
$200,000 in favor of settlement. Meanwhile, the plaintiff may have incurred
out-of-pocket expenses of only $100,000, which amount reduces to an
expected legal cost of $80,000 (on the same assumption of a twenty percent
chance of victory). Although this disparity in expected legal costs depends
upon an extreme disparity in the costs each side must actually incur before
trial, it realistically describes at least some cases in which the plaintiff expends
little time or effort because he believes the action has only a low prospect of
success if litigated to a finaljudgment. Indeed, to the extent that the law chills
derivative actions by, for example, giving the corporation's board the ability
to terminate the action without close judicial review, the plaintiff's attorney
will by definition see only a limited prospect of success and so should be more
prepared to engage in "feigned" litigation at low cost to himself, while
actually pursuing a settlement.
This example also illustrates a related factor pressuring the defendant to
settle: litigation costs can overshadow his settlement cost. If the margin
between the defendant's expected legal costs incident to a settlement and
those applicable to a trial exceeds the difference between the amount he
would have to pay to negotiate a settlement and the expected loss he would
sustain at trial, he is better off settling, even at a price that exceeds the
expected recovery at trial. For instance, on the facts in the foregoing
example, there would be a $200,000 margin between the defendant's
expected legal costs incident to a settlement (zero, because of the near
certainty of indemnification) and those applicable to a trial ($200,000). Even
when the expected discounted recovery at a trial would be only $200,000, the
defendant would be best advised to settle the action for $300,000, if
necessary, because in the case of a trial, his total expected outlay would be
$400,000: the $200,000 expected legal costs plus the $200,000 expected
recovery. In short, even a risk neutral defendant would sometimes be
logically willing to pay more to settle a case than he would expect to lose at
trial.
B. Risk Aversion
A second basic explanation for the strike suit is a differential in risk
aversion between plaintiffs and defendants. If we examine first the plaintiff's
attorney as the real party in interest, persuasive arguments suggest that he is
more likely to be risk neutral than the defendant. By definition, he is a
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professional, a repeat player who is accustomed to facing litigation risks and
who probably has a portfolio of other actions that diversify his risks.44
Moreover, the potential gain and loss is asymmetric. For the plaintiff's
attorney, his maximum gain is only a portion of the recovery that the class or
corporation will receive, while his maximum exposure to loss is the sum of his
opportunity cost for his own time and his out-of-pocket expenses (unless
sanctions are imposed by the court or a security for expenses bond is
required). In contrast, the individual defendant may face a catastrophic loss
(only some of which may be either insured or indemnifiable) plus reputational
injury. If we assume that there is a declining marginal utility to money, the
possibility of this greater loss should make him more risk averse. In addition,
defendants are not repeat players; the available empirical evidence suggests
that the average public corporation is a party in a derivative action or
securities class action only once every seventeen years. 45 Although directors
may serve on multiple boards, it is doubtful that many directors are
experienced "repeat players" at derivative litigation, simply because it would
be irrational to remain an outside director in return for relatively modest
compensation if one were recurrently sued. This factor distinguishes the
defendants in a derivative action from, for example, the corporate defendants
in the typical products liability class action where each side has played the
game before.
Although it may be thought that the availability of insurance alters this
conclusion (because the insurer is a repeat player by definition), the correct
analysis should be that the insurance available to corporate officials actually
heightens the contrast. Either by statute, decision, or industry practice,
insurance does not cover any "personal benefit" that the insured is found to
have improperly received. 46 In consequence, the defendant sued in a duty of
loyalty case (i.e., one alleging in effect that he received such an improper
benefit) faces a serious risk that insurance will not cover his loss if he is found
liable, but this risk is substantially lessened if he settles.47 Even in a due care
44. Professor Galanter has made the important point that "repeat players" at litigation should
be less likely to act in a risk averse fashion than "one shotters." See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come
out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc. REV. 95, 99-100 & n.1 1 (1974). See also
H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 214
(1970).
45. See Jones, An Empirical Evaluation of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action
Lawsuits 1971-1978, 60 B.U.L. REV. 306, 312-13 (1980). Only about 30% of the large publicly held
corporations surveyed by Jones were involved in any form of shareholder litigation during the eight-
year period he studied. After adjusting such data for multiple actions, he estimated that such
corporations would be involved in shareholder suits on the average of once every 17.6 years.
46. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 727(b) (1984) (insurance may not cover payments if judgment
established that insured "personally gained in fact a financial profit or other advantage to which he
was not legally entitled"). There are also common law limits on the enforceability of insurance for
intentional misconduct. See, e.g., Portaro v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 210 F. Supp. 411, 416
(N.D. Ohio), afd, 310 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1962). Most standard "D&O" policies have similar
exclusions covering "dishonesty" and "personal benefit," even when not required by statute. SeeJ.
Bishop, supra note 43, at §§ 8.03-04; see also Hensey, The New Lloyd's Policy Form for Directors and
Officers Liability Insurance-An Analysis, 33 Bus. LAw. 1961 (1978).
47. Once again, a settlement means that there is no "judgment or other final adjudication
adverse to the insured" that under N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw. § 727(b) would preclude payment of
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case, the coinsurance provisions and dishonesty exceptions applicable to most
"D&O" (directors' and officers') insurance policies may still leave the
defendant facing a significant loss (although in such cases, it would be difficult
to say that the defendant had more at stake than the plaintiff's attorney).
C. Risk Spreading
A third and less obvious explanation for the possible prevalence of strike
suits involves the behavior of the plaintiff's attorney. If we view him as a
rational entrepreneur who is deciding whether to invest his time and money in
a high-risk investment, such as a derivative action, then we should expect that
he will rationally seek to hedge his bets by diversifying his portfolio.
Potentially, the attorney can reduce his exposure to risk in several ways: (1)
by seeking other legal business on a noncontingent basis; (2) by joining a firm
that has a diversified practice and will accept his high-risk practice on a basis
that is satisfactory to him; or, finally, (3) by spreading his risk over a
substantial number of actions and avoiding significant investments of time or
effort in any single action. As a matter of choice, the plaintiffs' attorney might
prefer to spread his risks by either the first or second technique described
above, but these options do not appear to be generally possible. Almost
invariably, plaintiffs' firms are significantly smaller than firms that specialize in
defense work. By one reasonable recent estimate, there were 250 firms in the
United States having 80 or more attorneys.48 Yet, as of the end of 1984, the
largest firm regularly representing plaintiffs in class and derivative actions had
only 37 attorneys, and even it had relatively little noncontingent business. 49
Why is it that sophisticated plaintiffs' attorneys who typically handle
complex class and derivative actions are not organized in larger firms? This
question is particularly puzzling when one recognizes that the large firm offers
the plaintiffs' attorney a desirable means of spreading his risk; indeed, it
seems the tailor-made answer to the cash flow fluctuations that the solo or
insurance. Similarly essential is the common law's limit against insurance covering "intentional"
wrongdoing. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Existence of intention is not established by a
settlement. Nor in an action having multiple causes of action is it clear which legal theory justified
the settlement. Although the insurance company could in theory resist payment on these grounds,
its reputation would be adversely affected by any discretionary refusal to pay. For them, it is easier to
raise the premium prospectively.
48. See Reed, The Use of Permanent Staff Attorneys, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 25, 1985, at 14.
49. The largest plaintiffs' firm specializing in the complex field of securities and derivative
litigation is generally agreed to be Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Spectrie & Lerach, a New York firm.
Fortune Magazine describes it as "king of the class action domain." See Lawsuit Fever, FORTUNE, Nov.
26, 1984, at 151. Yet, it had only 37 lawyers at the end of 1984 (up from 29 lawyers in the prior
year). Id. at 152. According to a New York Times profile of the firm, only about 20% of the firm's
work was not on a contingency basis. See Lewin, Class Actions Pay for Some Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
1983, at Dl. As a result of this heavy dependence on contingent fees, even Milberg, Weiss is left "in
an uncertain cash-flow position." Id. at D2. The New York Times story then makes a connection that
seems obvious but is actually illogical: "Because of the financial uncertainties, firms that specialize in
contingency-fee work have traditionally remained small." Id. According to the Fortune article, the
overall compensation level at Milberg, Weiss for the partners appears to be as high as at most large
New York firms. Although profit and stability do not necessarily coexist, this article will argue that a
larger plaintiffs' firm actually provides a superior mechanism for risk sharing and evening out the
fluctuations in cash flow.
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small firm practitioner unavoidably confronts if he pursues a time-intensive
case over an extended period. A partial answer probably involves the social
stratification of the American bar; the plaintiffs' attorney is viewed by many
within the institutional firms as their natural enemy. The very epithet "strike
suit lawyers" is intended to suggest a social outcast, operating at, or beyond,
the periphery of the established bar. Another possible answer is that the
plaintiffs' attorney might be substantially disabled if he were to affiliate with
an institutional firm, because legal ethics would prohibit him from suing the
firm's clients. Ex ante, the plaintiffs attorney does not know whom he will
want to sue in the future and, to preserve his options, he must avoid
entanglement in the web of potential conflicts of interest that the institutional
firm represents.
Yet, this explanation does not account for why plaintiffs' attorneys do not
themselves affiliate into large permanent firms composed only of other
plaintiffs' attorneys, instead of the ad hoc groupings that they today form to
litigate a specific case. One possible answer is that plaintiffs' attorneys face
complex organizational and monitoring problems, which to date they have
been able to resolve only within the short run context of a particular case. To
establish a firm there must be agreement on either a formula or an
institutional structure by which to divide the firm's earnings. Reaching such
agreement is a particularly difficult process in a plaintiffs' firm where some
attorneys are sharing earnings they realized during the current period with
other attorneys who are devoting all, or most of, their time to pursuing an
expected, but risky, return in the future. The allocation process is further
complicated by the basic fact that the value of an expected future return
depends on one's level of risk aversion, and here the firm's partners may not
agree. In addition, there is a monitoring problem: Is the partner shirking
who claims to be working on a major action, which he predicts will yield a
substantial return in the future? It is difficult for anyone not close to the
action to know. As a result, because the partners cannot easily monitor each
other or agree on the level of risk associated with the expected return from a
major action, the only practical solution may often be to split up the firm and
thereby spin off the risky asset to those who value it most highly.50
50. Small firms frequently experience difficulty and sometimes dissolve over the issue of how to
compensate those attorneys who have undertaken a long-term litigation on a contingent fee basis.
See, e.g., Lewin, Belli Says Law Firm Thrives Despite Fights, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1984, at DI (noting
internal dissension and fission with Melvin Belli's firm). An even better example is supplied by the
Corrugated Container antitrust litigation (which ultimately resulted in a record recovery), in which the
lead counsel, Stephen Susman, and several of his partners were obliged to separate from their
original law firm and form a new firm to continue the case. See Lempert, Antitrust Lawyer Hopes Fee Will
Confirm Vision, Legal Times, May 17, 1982, at 1, 11. The new firm invested 75% to 80% of its time on
the Corrugated Container case during its first year. Thus, if these same partners had expended a similar
portion of their time in their former firm, they would have represented a severe cash flow drain for
such a firm. Nor would their former partners, who may not have been experienced in antitrust
litigation, have necessarily been in a position to monitor them. Absent an adequate monitor, no firm
can in theory prevent "shirking." Cf Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. EcON. REV. 777 (1972).
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Finally, the institutional cement that holds large firms together appears
not to exist in the case of plaintiffs' firms. In the language of economics, this
cement is known as "firm specific capital"; it exists when the expected future
returns to the firm as a whole are greater than the aggregate of the future
returns that each partner could expect individually. 51 Such a surplus may
arise because of a firm's reputation; the prestige of a Cravath or a Sullivan and
Cromwell is greater than that of all their partners individually. Yet, in the
world of the plaintiffs' bar, reputations are personal. Hence, there is little to
deter a "star" partner from moving laterally to another firm, taking his
pending actions with him. This greater lateral mobility in turn makes it more
difficult to convince partners to invest in each other's long term projects. To
be sure, the law governing partnership affairs may give the firm some right to
an accounting if the partner who has been so subsidized later attempts to
"steal" this action by moving to another firm, but at present the nature of the
property rights in this area has been inadequately specified. In consequence,
a reasonable conjecture is that plaintiffs' attorneys are reluctant to make other
than transaction-specific deals among themselves, and they thus resist the
longer term commitment that the establishment of a firm represents.
Whatever the reason, the empirical reality is clear: most plaintiffs'
attorneys are either solo practitioners or are associated with relatively small
firms. This state of affairs matters little in the context of most tort litigation,
where, for example, personal injury cases are quickly resolved and a high
volume practice is characteristic. But, within the context of shareholder
litigation, the plaintiffs attorney must make a substantial commitment of time
and money to an individual case and has no assurance that any settlement will
result. As a result, the plaintiffs attorney specializing in this area needs to
diversify his risks by some other technique. Put simply, he cannot afford to
devote all or nearly all his time to a single large case which, if litigated to a
final judgment, has a high probability of being decided adversely to him
(given an overall plaintiff victory rate that appears to be under one percent for
derivative actions that are litigated to judgment.)52
One risk-minimizing course of action for the plaintiffs attorney is logical,
but not socially desirable: rather than invest significant amounts of time in a
single action, the plaintiffs attorney can spread his risk by litigating a large
number of actions, devoting little time or energy to any one, in the hope of
settling a reasonable percentage of them for a modest amount per case. In
effect, he hedges his bets and invests in a broad portfolio of actions. Of
course, this description is also the classic profile of the strike suit: a slapdash
action, inadequately researched as to either the facts or the law, brought by an
51. See Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, Stanford Law and Economics Working Paper No. 16,
at 44-62 (1984) (arguing that "firm-specific" capital precludes or restrains partners in large firms
from transferring laterally if they feel they are undercompensated). In contrast, a plaintiffs' firm
might break up more easily over compensation disputes if it lacked such "firm-specific" capital (such
as a reputation highly respected by institutional clients).
52. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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attorney who is currently the attorney of record in a large number of similar
pending actions. In courtrooms in New York, Philadelphia, and Wilmington,
where derivative actions are frequently litigated, it is common knowledge who
these attorneys are, and they represent a distinct subspecies of the plaintiffs'
bar who typically are held in low regard even by their colleagues.
Still, the key point is that this refusal to invest heavily in a single case is
rational behavior in economic terms. Here, private and social welfare can
diverge. What is rational, and indeed optimizing, behavior for the attorney
can be injurious to society, because such nuisance actions consume scarce
social resources, produce only an unfocused form of deterrence, and yield
little, if any, compensation to the corporation.
D. Joint Fee Shifting: The Derivative Action as a Non-Zero Sum Game
In any class or representative action, there is always the possibility that the
plaintiff's attorney will exchange a cheap settlement for a high award of
attorney fees.53 Yet, largely because the adversaries are wary of each other, it
is unrealistic to expect that a blatant offer will be made by either side to
exchange a high fee award in return for a low settlement. Instead, the process
typically involves a subtler form of body language as the defense counsel
offers a low settlement and the plaintiff's attorney expresses resistance-until
a generous fee award is thrown in.
This conflict of interest is endemic to class actions generally, but there is a
special twist in the case of the derivative action. Although under the
American rule each side normally pays its own legal fees, a standard exception
to this rule is recognized when a common fund is created as a result of the
plaintiff's efforts; in such instances, principles of unjust enrichment require
that the plaintiffs legal fees come out of this common fund. 54 The law
applicable to the derivative action carries this doctrine one step further: a
successful plaintiff is entitled to be awarded his legal expenses from the
corporation. 55 Correspondingly, when there is a settlement, the defendant
can also safely anticipate that he will be indemnified for his legal expenses
incurred in connection with the action by the corporation. If the defendant is
53. In Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting), afd
per curtam en banc by equally divided court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 28 (1966),
Judge Friendly put the matter succinctly:
The plaintiff stockholders or, more realistically, their attorneys have every incentive to accept a
settlement that runs into high six figures or more regardless of how strong the claims for much
larger amounts may be. . . . [A] juicy bird in the hand is worth more than the vision of a much
larger one in the bush, attainable only after years of effort not currently compensated and
possibly a mirage.
See also Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 899-900 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.):
There can be no blinking at the fact that the interests of the plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative
suit and of his attorney are by no means congruent. . . . The risks in proceeding to trial vary
even more essentially. For the plaintiff, a defendant's judgment may mean simply the defeat of
an expectation, often of relatively small amount; for his lawyer, it can mean the loss of years of
costly effort by himself and his staff.
54. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
55. See supra note 41 and sources cited therein.
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adjudged liable to the corporation, however, statutes typically preclude
corporate indemnification of the defendant's legal expenses. 56 Thus, an
expensive settlement could be more attractive to the defendant than a lesser
judgment, if his legal fees will exceed the margin between the two amounts. 57
The upshot is a situation unique to the derivative action whereby both sides
have a right to be reimbursed their legal expenses when there is a settlement,
but not when there is an adverse judgment. These rules obviously create a
strong pressure for settlement and explain why even a plainly frivolous action
may sometimes be settled.
Of course, the defendant's calculus must include not only his legal
expenses but also the contribution he must make to the settlement fund.
Here, again, a special doctrine applicable to the derivative action increases the
potential for collusion. Over the last twenty years, a "liberal" rule has
evolved that a nonpecuniary settlement can justify an award of attorney fees in
a derivative action. 58  Typically, such nonpecuniary settlements involve
"therapeutic" reforms, such as revised auditing systems, corrective
disclosures, or changes in the structure and composition of the board. 59 This
doctrine can, however, be easily exploited. If the two adversaries are so
minded, they can reach a nonpecuniary settlement under which the
defendants do not make any cash contribution (or only contribute a nominal
amount). 60 Each side can then shift its legal fees to the corporation through,
respectively, a fee award or indemnification. For the adversaries, this is a
painless way to resolve litigation-if they can convince the court to approve
such a settlement. Of course, the court may sometimes resist acceptance of a
settlement in which the corporate recovery seems trivial or out of proportion
to the requested fee award. Nonetheless, the possibility of judicial resistance
logically means only that the settlement process will be extended until the
parties tender the minimal settlement that the court will accept, not that the
outcome will reflect true adversative bargaining.
56. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
57. For an example, see supra p. 18.
58. For a review of the cases, see Note, Attorneys' Fees in Shareholders Derivative Suits: The
Substantial Benefit Rule Reexamined, 60 CAL. L. REV. 164 (1972). For decisions finding a substantial
benefit in "corporate therapeutics," see United Operating Co. v. Karnes, 482 F. Supp. 1029
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Lewis v. Anderson, 81 F.R.D. 436,439 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding benefit even though
action was dismissed); Tanzer v. Huflines, 345 F. Supp. 279 (D. Del. 1972); Fischman v. Wexler, 309
F. Supp. 976 (D. Del. 1970). Earlier cases expressed a different attitude and were reluctant to find a
"substantial benefit" where the nonpecuniary relief could not easily be quantified. See Schechtman v.
Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957).
59. For a representative case, see Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 1982 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,716 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (fees in excess of $200,000 paid for relief consisting of revised
corporate procedures and disclosures to shareholders, but no cash recovery); see also cases discussed
infra at notes 68-79.
60. It is not only the private bar that is attracted to nonpecuniary attorneys. Public servants also
have conflicts of interest with their clients. In a recent antitrust case involving Levi Strauss, the
California Attorney General's expenses totaled $3 million out of a $12.5 million settlement, and a
significant portion of these expenses, which depleted the recovery to the class, was the cost of
mailing a letter to "all Californians" informing them that then-Attorney General Deukmejian, now
the Governor of California, had won a legal victory benefitting them. See Jenkins, The Law: Heads of
the Class, TWA AMBASSADOR, October 1983, at 22-23.
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In overview, the nonpecuniary settlement fits the paradigm of the non-
zero sum game. Normally, in litigation, the winning side's recovery equals the
losing side's losses, much as in poker. But in this variety of non-zero sum
game, an absent third party, the corporation, bears the expenses of both
sides. Meanwhile, the litigation is dismissed with prejudice, and principles of
collateral estoppel prevent the underlying claim from being relitigated by a
more faithful champion.
One can thus understand why the nuisance suit can (and probably will)
survive the appearance of the special litigation committee. From the
defendant's perspective, a costless settlement is as attractive as a dismissal and
may be obtained more quickly and with less risk. If the defendant insists on
seeking the vindication inherent in a dismissal (as he sometimes does), he
thereby accepts the possibility of a costly and stigmatizing defeat. 6' Even
from the corporation's perspective, it may be considerably cheaper to agree to
settle and pay a fairly modest fee to the plaintiffs attorney than to conduct an
expensive and potentially embarrassing inquiry by its litigation committee.
Put simply, if the plaintiffs attorney can underbid the cost of the special
litigation committee, it becomes financially more attractive for the
corporation to settle the action than to dismiss it, even if dismissal were
certain. As a result, strike suits should survive even in the face of a hostile
legal climate so long as the cost of the special litigation committee procedure
is substantial. 62 Derivative actions become less profitable, but not less
numerous; indeed, their frequency could even increase, although the return
to both the corporation and the attorney should fall. The available empirical
evidence is at least consistent with this prediction, as insurance industry data
show that the frequency and costs of liability claims against directors and
officers have risen, even though the prospect of a litigated adverse verdict has
fallen .63
61. The point here is not simply that the defendant risks his insurance coverage by going to trial
(either because the ceiling on the policy could be exceeded or an exclusion in the policy may apply),
while any settlement would necessarily involve the insurance carrier's agreement to honor the policy;
in addition, the defendant risks his reputation, because he can always deny guilt if there is a
settlement (even one approaching 99 cents on the dollar).
62. In Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 511-12 (Del. Ch. 1984), Chancellor Brown of the
Delaware Chancery Court candidly summarized the practical effect of the special litigation
committee: "It sidetracks derivative litigation as we have heretofore known it for approximately two
years at a minimum while the Committee goes through its functions and while the plaintiff awaits his
chances to resist them." This delay is, of course, costly to both sides and thus makes a quicker
resolution through settlement attractive.
However, this process may be changing. One implication of Aronson v. Lewis, 472 A.2d 805
(Del. 1984), is that the board will not in the future need to appoint a special litigation committee;
instead, it can simply move to dismiss on the ground that demand was required (as in Aronson)
without conducting any more than a cursory inquiry into the allegations. This would reduce the cost
of defending the action and also thereby reduce the plaintiff's attorney's ability to underbid the costs
of dismissal by proposing a cheap settlement.
63. According to the 1984 Directors and Officers Liability Survey published by The Wyatt Co., an
insurance industry consulting firm, both the frequency and costs of liability claims against officers
and directors have recently risen. This survey of 1,652 corporations found a 10% increase since
1982 in the probability of suit against an officer or director. See Myrick, Corporate Officers, Directors Face
Rise in Suits, Legal Fees, Legal Times, Feb. 4, 1985, at 3. According to this survey, the average payout
in such suits was $1,618,000, of which $715,000 was attributable to legal fees. The leading cause of
PLAINTIFF AS MONITOR
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
If we wish an explanation for the prevalence of cheap settlements in
derivative actions, the fact that the corporation can pay the legal expenses of
both sides certainly accounts for much of the collusive behavior that even
casual observation reveals. An obvious question therefore suggests itself:
Why should both sides be permitted to have their legal expenses paid by the
corporation? Surely, there is no corporate benefit from paying both sides,
and the predictable result is an extraordinarily strong urge to settle. Easy as it
is to pose this question, it is more difficult to frame a policy proposal that
responds sensibly to it. In theory, the law could permit only one side to have
its expenses paid; in the case of a settlement, this prohibition would permit
the parties to inform the court as to which side's expenses would be paid, but
partial reimbursement to both would not be permitted. The latter restriction
would prevent the parties from inflating their fees to obtain reimbursement of
their real expenses. Still, simple as this solution sounds, its practical effect is
likely to be minimal, given the prevalence of liability insurance covering the
defendants' litigation expenses. Because the corporation pays the premiums
on these policies (and could do so indirectly in the form of higher
compensation, even if it were forbidden to pay the premiums), it still would
indirectly fund the defendants' litigation expenses. Thus, the parties could
evade the intended impact of this proposal by simply agreeing to have the
corporation pay only the plaintiff's expenses while the defendants looked to
their insurance policies. Only the form, and not the substance, would be
changed. Given that the problem cannot be solved this easily, it is next
necessary to consider the feasibility of two more indirect answers: first, the
requirement of judicial approval of the settlement, and, second, the attorney
fee formula itself.
E. Judicial Approval: A Case Study
Defenders of the status quo have a standard response to arguments such
as those made above that collusive settlements are possible in derivative
actions. Such cynical exchanges of high fees for a low recovery cannot take
place, they reply, because the court must approve the settlement, typically
after notice to the class and an opportunity for objectors to contest the
settlement's adequacy. Although ideally a sensible judge will not approve a
settlement in which the fees appear disproportionate to the benefit obtained,
it sadly does not follow that the judicial approval requirement is a significant
barrier to collusive settlements. First, as Judge Friendly concisely explained
long ago, 64 the trial court's approval is a weak reed on which to rely once the
these increased costs was viewed as the "increased complexity and longevity surrounding such
claims." Id. This analysis dovetails with that of Chancellor Brown in Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501.
Of particular relevance is the conclusion of a Wyatt vice president that, although it is "becoming
harder to win one of these suits, defendants are more likely [to] be slapped with a suit." Myrick,
supra, at 3.
64. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting), affd en
banc by an equally divided court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 28 (1966) (noting that
"all the dynamics conduce to judicial approval of the settlement" once the adversaries lock arms and
approach the court).
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adversaries have linked arms and approached the court in a solid phalanx
seeking its approval. In addition, the court may have incentives of its own not
necessarily consistent with the public interest-namely, to clear a potentially
messy and burdensome case from its docket. Even if the court were not so
motivated, the general infeasibility of trying to force litigants who wish to
settle their case to try it instead will be apparent to the court. Also, even the
diligent and sophisticated judge may feel obliged to approve a settlement in
which the attorney fees appear suspiciously disproportionate to the financial
recovery obtained, because the judge may believe that existing precedents
mandate such a fee award. 65 Alternatively, the court may believe that the
requisite "substantial benefit" necessary to justify the award of plaintiffs'
attorney fees can be found in the fact that costly burdensome litigation is
being resolved that would otherwise drain the corporation's treasury. 66
Finally, the court may simply believe that it should defer to the business
judgment of the corporation's independent directors who wish to see the
action settled. Although none of these justifications seems truly persuasive,
they each permit conscientious judges to take the course of least resistance
and approve settlements that seem inadequate coupled with the fee awards
that seem disproportionate.
Is there any empirical evidence to confirm this hypothesis? The Garth,
Plager, and Nagel article in this volume reinterprets earlier empirical studies
and finds that nonpecuniary recoveries appear to account for a substantial
proportion of all settlements in derivative actions. 67 Indeed, for several
reasons, the rate may be even higher than they suggest. 68 Still, surveys are
not as convincing as a close look at actual cases. Good illustrations are
provided by two recent cases discussed below.
65. Under the prevalent "lodestar" formula for the determination of the appropriate attorney
fees, see infra notes 93-95, it is not an explicit factor that the fee requested would deplete the recovery
fund. In some decisions involving fee awards under federal fee shifting statutes, the fee has
exceeded the recovery. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc)
($160,000 fee approved for $6,169.80 back pay recovery). More importantly, where only
nonpecuniary relief is obtained, the court has little alternative but to award a fee based on the time
the attorney expended, unless the attorney has either failed to maintain adequate records or
demonstrably wasted time.
66. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 81 F.R.D. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United Operating Co. v. Karnes,
482 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This is, of course, a bootstrap argument under which the
"benefit" consists of the plaintiffs attorney going away, and in effect it amounts to virtually a
judicially awarded bribe. Still, it appears to persuade some courts.
67. See Garth, Nagel & Plager, supra note 25, at 146. Reanalyzing the data provided by Jones,
supra note 22, they find 32 settlements of derivative actions, of which 10 involved nonmonetary relief
and 2 had indeterminate monetary relief. In other words, roughly one-third of the actions in which
the settlement's terms could be ascertained involved essentially nonpecuniary settlements. In still
other cases, a nonpecuniary component may have been used to inflate the settlement in order either
to secure judicial approval or a larger fee award.
68. For example, the Jones data are based on the 1971 to 1978 period. Because the lodestar
formula did not come into widespread use until the middle of this period, the incentive to structure
nonpecuniary settlements also did not arise until the latter portion of this period and indeed may not
have been immediately perceived by counsel. More importantly, Jones obtained settlement data on
only a minority of the cases whose outcomes he reported; it should not be assumed that the missing
data would show the same proportion of nonpecuniary settlements. In fact, the classic "sweetheart"
settlement would be the settlement whose terms would least likely be reported widely.
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In re General Tire & Rubber Co. Securities Litigation69 was one of many cases
that grew out of the SEC's "illegal payments" investigations of the late 1970's.
Initially, the SEC brought a civil action against General Tire, alleging
"ubiquitous corporate improprieties and apparent illegalities,- 70 and it
obtained a consent decree permanently enjoining General Tire from similar
practices in the future. Unlike a host of similar cases, the story did not end
there; instead, the FCC picked up where the SEC left off and refused to renew
broadcast licenses held by RKO General, a subsidiary of General Tire, as a
direct result of these improprieties. Ultimately, a highly valuable broadcast
license was forfeited, resulting in a loss to General Tire that the Sixth Circuit
estimated at over $100 million.7' Predictably, plaintiffs brought derivative
actions to recover these damages. 72 Because these actions sought recovery of
a relatively precise and quantifiable loss that had proximately resulted from
knowing illegal behavior, it seems reasonable to believe that the plaintiffs had
a stronger case on the merits than in most other illegal payments cases where
the nature of the damages is more perplexing. 73 In response to these
derivative actions, General Tire's board followed the standard operating
procedure and appointed two new directors whose lack of involvement in the
prior illegal activities was clear, and then named them to a special litigation
committee to investigate the actions' merit. In due course, these new
directors reached the usual determination that the actions should be
dismissed.
At this point, the course of events deviated from the standard script:
before the motion to dismiss based on the committee's report could be
resolved, the actions were settled. Under the settlement, General Tire did not
recover any monetary damages, but the plaintiffs' attorneys received a fee
award of $500,000 which was duly approved by both the district court and
Sixth Circuit (over a strong dissent).74 Apparently, the only arguable benefit
to General Tire from the settlement was a provision requiring the
appointment for three years of two "outside" directors to the board of its
subsidiary RKO. 7 5
69. 726 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1984).
70. Id. at 1078.
71. Id. at 1080.
72. Actions were brought in New York and Delaware state courts, federal courts in the Northern
District of Ohio, the Southern District of Ohio, NewJersey, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Id. at 1078 n.1 & 1079 n.4. This trend illustrates the problem of interdistrict competition discussed
infra at notes 138-66. Although the federal cases could be consolidated (and were), the state actions
could not be.
73. Arguably, an illegal payment in some cases may have averted a greater loss to the
corporation (such as confiscatory nationalization) or may have produced a greater benefit (such as a
profitable concession). These problems raise difficult issues as to the burden of proof on the
question of damages, which issues were not reached in General Tire. For a discussion of these issues,
see A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.06 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982). See also Note, Pleading and Proof of Damages in
Stockholders' Derivative Actions Based on Antitrust Convictions, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 174 (1964).
74. 726 F.2d at 1088 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1079. The settlement also acknowledges "the plaintiffs' cole in implementing
remedial action to prevent future improprieties." Whatever this "remedial action" may have been,
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One need not be a cynic to call such relief cosmetic or to doubt that it
justified a significant fee award. Even if therapeutic relief is sometimes
valuable, the real moving force in uncovering the improprieties in this case
was not the plaintiff, but instead was, depending on one's perspective, the
SEC, the FCC, or perhaps even General Tire's board itself. Yet, it would be
too cynical to assume that either side believed subjectively that it had not
served its clients well. How then should we account for this seemingly empty
settlement coupled with a substantial fee award? First, from the defendants'
perspective, a logical possibility is that the extent of tangible, easily proven
damages in this case plus the fact that the district court had authorized broad
discovery created considerable anxiety for them. 76 They could not be certain
that the court would accept the committee's recommendation, even though
Ohio law seemed favorable to them. Moreover, a substantial award of
attorney fees was costless to them, because it would be paid by the
corporation. Conversely, plaintiffs also faced a difficult and uncertain
prospect if the case proceeded further; they would have to overcome the
special litigation committee's findings and also convince the court that the
defendants should be held liable for the unexpected action of the FCC in
cancelling RKO's broadcast licenses. Yet, even if both sides can justify such a
settlement to themselves, the social benefit of such an action is minimal
because there is neither deterrence generated nor compensation recovered.
General Tire is not an aberrational case; other examples can be cited. 77 To
focus on just one other contemporary instance, the Delaware case of Good v.
Texaco, Inc. 78 initially represented a substantial triumph for plaintiffs. It arose
when Texaco selectively repurchased approximately 25.6 million shares of its
the intervening passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd, 78dd-1, 78dd-2,
78ff (1982), did far more to prevent any repetition of the original incidents, and this reference seems
to be rhetorical surplusage.
76. The district court had ordered discovery as to the litigation committee's report on the issue
of the independence of the committee members and "had requested supplemental briefing on the
effect of the termination of RKO's licenses." 726 F.2d at 1079. The latter substantive focus on the
injury may have foreshadowed an intent to engage in substantive review of the justifications
underlying the committee's rejection of the suits. In any event, approximately three months after
this broad discovery order, the parties presented a stipulation of settlement to the court for its
approval. Id.
77. See supra notes 59-60. For the broader survey evidence, see supra note 67.
Surveys of reported cases may also understate the extent of collusive settlements because some
practices-such as a settlement of a threatened action that is never filed or an exchange of a generous
fee payment in return for a decision not to appeal a dismissal of the action-may escape detection.
Yet such tactics are not uncommon. Recently, Judge Whitman Knapp of the District Court for the
Southern District of New York ordered two New York law firms (one of which was the firm headed by
Roy Cohn) to repay $230,000 to Ford Motor Co., which they had received from Ford without judicial
approval after a derivative action brought by Cohn alleging misappropriation of funds by Ford's
senior management had been dismissed on procedural grounds. The action was never refiled,
possibly as a result of this payment. A subsequent derivative action brought by the Public Citizens
Litigation Group resulted in the court's order directing that Ford be repaid because the requisite
state court approval of the fee payment was not obtained. See Inadmissible: Take My Fees . . .Please,
Legal Times, May 20, 1985, at 3.
78. No. 84-7051 (Del. Ch. May 14, 1984). Good seemed to imply that the Delaware courts would
examine closely "greenmail" transactions (i.e., selective repurchases at a price over the market) and
would not defer automatically to special litigation committees.
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common stock (or roughly 9.9%) held by Bass Brothers Enterprises, Inc. (and
certain of its affiliates) at a price substantially over the then market value of
Texaco's shares-seemingly, a classic instance of "greenmail." The sellers
received approximately $650 million in cash plus 12.6 million shares of newly
issued voting Texaco preferred stock, which they agreed to vote in accordance
with the directions of Texaco's board for ten years. 79
Over twenty derivative actions were commenced in a variety of forums to
attack this transaction, which seemed both to result in a waste of shareholder
funds and to immunize Texaco from further takeover threats by virtue of the
Texaco board's power to control the voting of the preferred stock. In May of
1984, the Delaware Chancery Court denied Texaco's motion to dismiss the
principal derivative action, finding that demand on the Texaco board was
excused because the entire transaction appeared to raise serious questions as
to whether the board was seeking to perpetuate itself in office. 80 In overview,
Good thus appeared to be a case having a substantial settlement value, because
it had already cleared the critical "demand excused" barrier.8' Yet, when the
parties reached a settlement later in 1984, the proposed settlement required
no financial contribution by the defendants, except for the payment of
plaintiffs' attorney fees by the defendants. Instead, the principal relief was
nonpecuniary: the provision requiring the Bass defendants to vote the
preferred stock as instructed by the Texaco board was deleted. In return for
this relief, the plaintiffs' attorneys sought and received legal fees in an amount
of up to $700,000 plus expenses, and the defendants agreed to pay these fees
if approved by the court. 82 Although several objectors vigorously opposed
the settlement's approval, other shareholders sought to intervene and replace
the plaintiffs, and over 1400 shareholders opted out from the class action
portion of the combined class and derivative action,83 the court still approved
the settlement and awarded the full $700,000 that had been negotiated by the
parties.
79. The transaction is described in clearest detail in the notice of settlement sent to
shareholders. See Notice of Pendency of Actions, Class Action Determination, Settlement,
Settlement Hearing and Right to Appear, at 1 (Nov. 14, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Notice of
Settlement]. This notice also indicated that between March 7 and April 30, 1984, "twenty additional
complaints" were filed in Delaware and elsewhere. Id. at 1.
80. Chancellor Brown focused on the board's power to vote the preferred shares (as a result of
the Bass defendants' agreement to vote the stock as directed by the board): "Since this power to vote
the shares of the Bass defendants hereafter is alleged to be a power acquired for the board of
directors itself, it follows that all board members are necessarily interested personally in the
transaction that they are alleged to have wrongfully approved." Good v. Texaco, Inc., No. 84-7501
(Del. Ch. May 14, 1984) (available Nov. 1, 1985, on LEXIS, States library, Del file).
81. Under Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), once demand is excused, the court may
substantively review the committee's justifications for dismissal; otherwise, the court may only
undertake a procedural review.
82. See Notice of Settlement, supra note 79, at 4 ("If the settlement is approved by the Delaware
Court of Chancery, the plaintiffs' attorneys intend to apply for an award of attorneys' fees not to
exceed $700,000 and for their disbursements . . . . The defendants will not oppose such
application and agree that such an award would be fair and reasonable .... ").
83. Good v. Texaco, Inc., No. 7501, slip op. at 1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 1985). At the settlement
hearing, eight law firms appeared to oppose the settlement.
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What motivated the court to accept this result in a case where, as it
candidly noted, "[t]he proposed settlement is . . . unusual in that, if it is
approved by the Court, nothing of consequence will happen other than the
dismissal of the suit and the payment of counsel fees." 84 In a lengthy opinion,
the court first stressed the serious obstacles that plaintiffs would face if they
proceeded with their action. True as this may have been, this factor hardly
justifies a $700,000 net fee; indeed, if the weakness of the plaintiffs' case could
justify such a fee award, the law would in effect subsidize frivolous actions.
Obviously wrestling with this problem, the court at various points
acknowledged that the requested fee was "somewhat staggering," had
aroused "a sense of shareholder outrage," and would be seen by some as an
example of "feemail." 85 Yet, in still finding the fee reasonable, the court
relied on three factors: (1) its confidence in the sincerity and abilty of the
plaintiffs' attorneys; (2) the fact that the requested fee "compares favorably to
the fees normally paid to investment bankers for their participation in such
transaction[s]"; 86 and (3) the value of the disclosures about Texaco's board's
motivation for the repurchase that the shareholders would receive as a result
of the settlement.8 7 None of these factors should be persuasive. Even able
attorneys will find it foolish to litigate a difficult case when they are offered
$700,000 to settle on a nonpecuniary basis, and even the most sincere can
sometimes rationalize a profitable outcome. Nor should weight be given to
the unarticulated factor that the fee was to be paid by the defendants.
88
Indeed, to the extent that these factors are given weight, the end result in
Good permits defendants in future greenmail cases to use Good as a model by
which to structure transactions: that is, the defendants could always include
some nonessential provision in the greenmail transaction that they would
later agree to relinquish in return for a nonpecuniary settlement and a more
than generous fee award.
These cases provide evidence for two contentions earlier made: First,
although desirable, judicial approval of the settlement is an imperfect
safeguard, precisely because courts are often not prepared to force litigation
in complex cases when the parties wish to settle. Second, the logical response
84. Id.
85. Id. at 38, 40, 25. The term "feemail" was used by one of the objectors, Seagoing Uniform
Corp., and this term was characterized by the court as a "strained effort to coin . . . a legal
neologism." Id. at 25. Still, once coined, the term will predictably be heard again.
86. Id. at 41. This curious argument does not address the real issue of whether the services
rendered were comparable.
87. Id. at 16-18. As part of the settlement, defendants agreed to provide members of the class
"with all information relevant to the issues in the various suits proposed to be terminated by
disclosing the details of the plaintiffs' investigation and discovery." Id. at 16. Plaintiffs argued that
this report of the plaintiffs' view of the evidence would "enable the common shareholders to better
evaluate the performance of their board .... ." Id. at 18. To at least this author, this technique
sounds more like a classic bootstrap argument by which to inflate the value of a cosmetic settlement.
88. Under the settlement, the Bass Brothers were to pay 21.43% of the fee award and the
individual director defendants were to pay 78.5%. Id. at 17. Because the fee award was not to be
paid with corporate funds, the court may have believed that there was little reason to examine the
amount closely. In fact, however, there is considerable reason to examine such payments because
they may signal that the corporation itself was unwilling to pay the fee and considered it excessive.
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of plaintiffs' attorneys to the special litigation committee device may simply be
to lower their settlement price. So long as there is either some uncertainty as
to a litigated outcome or the cost of dismissing the action exceeds the cost of
settling it, defendants predictably will be willing to authorize substantial
attorney fees for the plaintiffs. From an ex ante perspective, it matters little
whether the offer to exchange a low settlement for a high fee award comes
from the plantiff's side or the defendant's; all that counts is that the outcome
is predictable.
Cheap settlement should persist then so long as the plaintiff's attorney is
able to underbid the cost of the special litigation committee device.8 9 In many
instances, a full scale inquiry by such a committee will have a cost in the
millions of dollars and public disclosure may set other undesired events in
motion (as General Tire shows), while the plaintiff's attorney will be satisfied
with a much smaller fee award. From a public policy perspective, the curious
irony then is that nuisance actions should survive the judicial acceptance of
the special litigation committee device for the dismissal of derivative actions.
The primary consequence of judicial deference to special litigation
committees may be not to abolish the derivative action, but to minimize the
possibility of a substantial corporate recovery. Ex ante, the plaintiff's attorney
today knows two basic facts: First, no matter how meritorious the action is, he
faces a significant probability of dismissal as a result of the special litigation
committee procedure. Second, even when dismissal is highly likely, he may
often still obtain a substantial fee award by offering or accepting a
nonpecuniary settlement, in effect by underbidding the costs of dismissal.
Knowing these two facts, the rational plaintiff's attorney has some incentive to
file a nuisance action for its quick settlement value, but little to invest
substantial time and effort in litigating an action more intensively. Hence,
frivolous actions may remain, but substantial corporate recoveries become
rare-in effect, the worst of both worlds.
The special litigation committee device is not alone responsible for this
state of events. Judicial acceptance of nonpecuniary settlements and the use
of the lodestar formula for measuring the fee award share substantial
responsibility,90 because they allow the parties to establish with reasonable
assurance what the fee award will be and to structure a settlement in which the
amount is disproportionate to the size of the settlement. In combination,
these three factors minimize the likelihood that any legitimate purpose
89. In Kaplan v. Wyatt, supra note 62, Chancellor Brown noted that current procedures in
Delaware now typically result in three stages of contested hearings (first, a hearing to stay the
plaintiff from conducting discovery pending the completion of the committee's study; second, a
hearing to grant limited discovery of the report; and third, the hearing on the motion to dismiss).
The report, he added, is usually "at least 150 pages in length, exclusive of appendices and
attachments" and the entire process takes "two years at a minimum while the Committee goes
through its functions." 484 A.2d at 510, 512. All this costs money and makes dismissal based on the
special committee procedure expensive. Settlements, such as that in Good, may therefore be
considerably cheaper.
90. See infra notes 93-95 with respect to the lodestar formula. With respect to nonpecuniary
settlements, see supra notes 58-60, 66, & 68-78.
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underlying the derivative action-either deterrence or compensation-will be
well served.
III
Is THERE AN OPTIMAL ATrORNEY FEE FORMULA?:
A LOOK AT THE TRADE-OFFS
The preceding analysis suggests that the prospect of collusive settlements
today often cripples the shareholder suit as an effective monitoring
mechanism. If so, an obvious policy prescription would be to compensate the
plaintiffs attorney in a manner that better aligns his interests with those of his
involuntary clients, the shareholders. For example, if we returned to the once
common "salvage value" system, under which the plaintiffs attorney was
awarded a percentage of the recovery received by the class, 9' nonpecuniary
settlements would no longer be attractive to the plaintiff's attorney, and the
exchange of a high fee for a low settlement would be effectively precluded,
because the fee would be a direct function of the settlement size.
Commentators have correctly pointed out, however, that a simple percentage-
of-the-recovery formula also can lead to a conflict between the attorney's
interests and those of the class he represents. 92 Accordingly, this section will
examine the problematic trade-offs between the two principal formulae now
employed by courts: the "lodestar" formula and the percentage-of-the-
recovery method.
A. The Lodestar Formula: The Attorney as Regulated Utility
The predominant approach in federal courts for determining the fee
award to a prevailing plaintiffs attorney is to use a time-based formula.93 The
court simply computes the hours reasonably expended by the attorney, then
multiplies these hours by the attorney's normal hourly billing rate (unless
unreasonable or above that generally prevailing in the relevant community),
and finally, in the court's discretion, adds a "contingency bonus" to reflect
both the risk assumed by the attorney and the deferral of payment incident to
91. See Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The Salvage Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REV.
658 (1956); see also, Hornstein, supra note 41, and accompanying text (summarizing actual fee
awards). For a representative case, see Pergament v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 224 F.2d 80, 83 (6th Cir.
1955) (holding 20% of the recovery was appropriate). Historically, awards appear to have ranged
between 20%-30% of the recovery when the recovery was below $1 million, and between 20%-30%
of the total recovery when it was more. See Cole, Counsel Fees in Stockholders' Derivative and Class Actions:
Hornstein Revisited, 6 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1972). See also Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Action
and Derivative Suits, 3J. CORP. LAw. 267, 334-36 (1978).
92. See Clermont & Currivan, Improving the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 536 (1978);
Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1125 (1970).
93. This is the "lodestar formula." For a detailed analysis, see Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor
In Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473 (1981). In Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984), the
Supreme Court adopted the lodestar formula as the appropriate method to be used in determining
attorney fee awards under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Award Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). See
also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
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a contingent fee system. 94 Although this lodestar approach dates back only to
the early 1970's, 95 it has already received the endorsement of the Supreme
Court (at least with respect to federal statutes that provide for fee shifting in
favor of the prevailing plaintiff),96 and it has been generally followed by the
federal courts in a variety of other contexts. 97
Criticism of the lodestar method has generally focused on the inevitable
incentive that arises, once time is equated with money, for the plaintiff's
attorney to conduct a dilatory, unnecessarily prolonged litigation.98 Defense
counsel have complained that their ability to negotiate an expeditious
settlement is impeded by the lodestar formula, 99 and anecdotal evidence
suggests that it is not uncommon for settlements to be reached among the
parties at one point in time, but not presented to the court for approval until a
considerably later point after the plaintiff's attorney has engaged in sufficient
billable hours of discovery to justify the maximum fee that he expects the
court will approve.' 00 Substantially accurate as these critiques may be, they
prove little of significance. Plaintiffs' attorney fees do not appear to have
risen in the wake of the introduction of the lodestar formula and may have
94. Some surveys have found the contingency bonus to have averaged nearly 50% of the time
component. See Leubsdorf, supra note 93, at 479 n.36. In Blum v. Stenson, however, the Supreme
Court indicated that a contingency bonus would rarely be appropriate, at least in the context of fee
awards under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Award Act. 104 S. Ct. at 1547. A year earlier in
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, the Court did indicate that a variety of factors could lead to an
upward or downward adjustment of the fee award and emphasized that the "results obtained were
the most important factor" in this determination. Id. at 434.
95. The key decisions were Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Corp.,
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Lindy I"); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc) ("Lindy II"); City of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d
448 (2d Cir. 1974). These decisions essentially adopted the "lodestar" criteria from the MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, (5th ed. 1981), which had been revised in 1973 to suggest a time-based
formula for fee awards. Id. § 1.47.
96. See Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984). However, Blum contains an extraordinary
statement that in "common fund" cases (a category that presumably includes most forms of
shareholder litigation) the "reasonable fee is based on a percentage of the fund bestowed on the
class .... ." Id. at 1550 n.16. This statement would seem to contemplate a percentage-of-the-
recovery approach in most securities and derivative actions.
97. Professor Leubsdorf has reported that the clear majority of the federal courts of appeals are
employing the lodestar methodology. See Leubsdorf, supra note 93, at 437 n. I. See also A. MILLER,
ATrORNEYS' FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS (1980 Federal Judicial Center) (cataloging the various areas in
which the basic lodestar methodology is used).
98. Among the many critics (including the author) who have raised this theme are: Wolfram,
The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limits of Professional Discipline, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1984, at 293, 302 ("Under the widely employed 'lodestar' method . ..lawyers are
under strong economic pressure to work slowly or to perform work that is unnecessary."); Solovy &
Mendillo, Calculating Class Action Awards: Is It Time to Unload the Lodestar?, National Law Journal, May 2,
1982, at 20; A. MILLER, supra note 97, at 270-7 1. See also In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D.
48, 68, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1983), afd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
99. See Herzel & Hagan, Plaintifs 'Attorneys' Fees in Derivative and Class Actions, LITIGATION, Winter
1981, at 25-26 ("Our experience and that of other defendants' lawyers has been that stockholder
suits have become increasingly difficult to settle at an early stage.").
100. Both defense and plaintiffs' counsel have acknowledged to me having seen such instances,
and one federal district court judge has told me that it is often apparent to the court when this occurs
because discovery thereafter proceeds placidly without the usual contested motions.
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actually declined slightly.' 0 In effect, the plaintiff's attorney who stretches
out the course of the litigation to maximize his hours may only be protecting
himself from a decrease in his expected return from the action because of the
transition to the lodestar formula. Although this practice of feigned litigation
by which the plaintiffs attorney runs up his hours is unsettling and potentially
corrupting to the legal system, the claim that the lodestar formula results in
excessive fees is nonetheless a red herring.
The real problems with the lodestar lie elsewhere. Chief among these is
the inherent tendency of a time-based formula to exacerbate the problem of
collusive settlements discussed earlier. By severing the size of the fee from
the size of the settlement fund, the lodestar formula permits the parties to
assure themselves with relative confidence what the fee award will be. t0 2 In
this respect, the contrast between a time formula and a percentage-of-the-
recovery formula is obvious. For example, if the parties were to agree upon a
primarily nonpecuniary settlement in a jurisdiction that followed the
percentage-of-the-recovery system, the court might approve the settlement,
but it would be hard pressed to justify awarding more than a trivial fee.
Under a time formula, however, the presumption is that time expended
should be compensated at the attorney's normal billing rate. If the defendant
agrees not to object to the plaintiffs fee request, there is little prospect that
the court will engage in an elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of the
hours expended by the plaintiffs attorney. Not only does the court have little
incentive to undertake such an inquiry, but when the defendants agree not to
oppose the plaintiff's fee request they deprive the court of the only adversary
who truly knows if the time was reasonably expended. Put simply, it is the
adversary and not the court who best understands the justifications (or lack
thereof) for the work the plaintiffs attorney has done. Denied this
information by the de facto settlement agreement, the court is itself a
relatively poor and undermotivated monitor of the plaintiff attorney's
performance.
To understand how the lodestar formula facilitates settlements that do not
accurately reflect the probable results of a litigated outcome, it is essential to
focus on the plaintiffs attorney's position once he has expended substantial
time on a case. For example, consider the position of the plaintiffs attorney
in the following case on the assumption that he is a rational decisionmaker
101. See Mowrey, supra note 91, at 343-48 (noting that courts have awarded approximately the
same percentage of the recovery under the lodestar formula as before).
102. There are, of course, limits, because the court will resist depleting the recovery fund
excessively to pay attorneys' fees. See supra note 100. Yet, to some extent, the wool can be pulled
over the court's eyes if the parties negotiate an agreement under which the legal fees will be paid
separately by the defendants. For example, the court may approve a settlement under which
defendants will contribute $1,000,000 to a settlement fund and will separately pay plaintiffs' attorney
fees. After the settlement is approved, fees amounting to another $1,000,000 will be paid, meaning
that in effect 50% of the total recovery has gone to attorney fees. Although the Manual for Complex
Litigation disapproves of these agreements for separate payment, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION § 1.46 (5th ed. 1981), such low visibility agreements appear to be common and probably
escape adequate recognition in recent empirical surveys. Cf In re General Motors Corp. Engine
Interchange Litig., 598 F.2d 1106, 1130-31 (7th Cir.). cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
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seeking to maximize his own return. A class or derivative action seeking
damages of $20 million is commenced and litigated through the usual
preliminary procedural steps for a period of two years or more. By the eve of
trial, the plaintiffs attorneys have reasonably expended time that at a normal
billing rate would justify an award of $1 million to them. They believe their
action has an expected value to the class of $10 million; that is, the class, itself,
would not settle for less than this amount. However, there is also a fifty
percent risk of an adverse judgment. If the plaintiffs attorneys proceed to
trial, they will expend additional time that should enhance their fee from $1
million to $1.2 million; but by proceeding to trial they would also accept the
fifty percent risk of an adverse judgment. Thus, the expected value of the
action to them, if a trial were necessary, is not $1.2 million, but only $600,000
(or even lower to the degree that they were risk averse). Against this
backdrop, it is understandable why the plaintiffs attorneys might accept a
settlement offer of $5 million even though their clients would prefer to hold
out for $10 million. Why? Simply put, they have nothing to gain and much to
lose by proceeding to trial, because the bulk of their time was already
expended before trial in discovery and procedural skirmishing. A trial would
only subject them to a substantial risk that their investment would be lost.
This example may seem to depend on fortuitous facts, either because (1)
the time expended prior to trial was much greater than the time likely to be
expended at trial, or (2) the risk of an adverse verdict was relatively high. Yet
the example does not depend on any special set of facts. One need only
change the moment at which the settlement offer is made to the moment
immediately before the jury returns with its verdict to see that now the
attorney has absolutely no economic reason not to accept the inadequate
settlement offer. At that point, rejecting an inadequate settlement gains him
nothing, but jeopardizes the prospect of any fee recovery. To generalize:
once time is equated with money, there will always be a point at which the
attorney can secure no further gain from the action and would rationally wish
to eliminate the risk of an adverse judgment (even if it were only a ten percent
risk) by accepting a settlement that his clients would consider inadequate.
Indeed, the purely self-interested attorney would rationally accept a
settlement offer in an amount no greater than one dollar over his expected
fee-if he believed that he could secure judicial approval of such a settlement.
In truth, this last outcome is substantially equivalent to the now common
nonpecuniary settlement (such as that in General Tire or Good); both amount to
a settlement equal to the attorney's fee plus cosmetic relief.
The more general proposition here advanced is that the lodestar formula
gives the attorney an interest in accepting settlement offers that his clients
would prefer to reject if they were in a position to instruct their attorney. This
incentive is, however, exactly the opposite of that which the popular literature
has emphasized in its recurrent focus on the allegedly excessive fees and
dilatory pace of litigation under the lodestar formula. 0 3 These popular
103. See supra notes 98, 99.
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critiques have tended to assume that by stretching out the litigation in order
to maximize his fee, the attorney might reject or jeopardize settlements that
his clients would desire to accept. Although the self-regarding plaintiff's
attorney does have an incentive to delay the time of settlement under the
lodestar formula, he has a much stronger incentive than do his clients to
accept a settlement once substantial time has been expended. From his
perspective, an adequate settlement can be defined as simply one that covers
the amount of his fee. Once this level is exceeded, he might delay the
settlement's formal submission to the court to justify the amount of his fee,
but he would never rationally cause the offer to be withdrawn.
Once we focus on this conflict between the plaintiff's attorney and his
clients under the lodestar formula, it becomes clearer why settlements that
appear collusive can occur without any of the participants believing that the
process was other than fully adversative and conducted in complete good
faith. For example, the defendants in the foregoing example of a $20 million
lawsuit may deny liability with the utmost sincerity, but still be willing to offer
a small settlement in view of the "nuisance value" of the action or the
inherent risk of an unsympathetic jury or judge. If the plaintiffs believe that
they have a substantial prospect of success at trial and the defendants believe
the reverse, this case would normally be a paradigm of the action likely to go
to trial, because the parties cannot agree on the litigation odds. Yet, as the
plaintiff's attorney expends more time, increasingly he has nothing to gain
and much to lose if the case goes to trial. As a result, a nominal settlement
offer made in good faith by the defendants (who believe the case against them
is without merit) may be accepted by the plaintiffs attorney, even though his
clients would reject this offer. Still, the defendants would be outraged by any
suggestion that this settlement was collusive. Nor would even the plaintiff's
attorneys recognize such a description as accurate because there never was any
offer on either side that linked the settlement size to the fee award. The simple truth is
that there need not be any such linked offer or any form of exchange of high
fees for a low settlement; instead, there can be de facto collusion, which the
parties may not even consciously recognize. Indeed, the defendants need not
even be aware of what the likely fee award would be. Rather, it is a sufficient
condition that the plaintiffs attorney know the approximate fee that the court
would award him. All that the defendant must signal is that he will not object
to the plaintiffs attorney's fee request in order for the plaintiffs attorney to
be in the same position as if he had received a collusive offer from the
defendants. Given the information that the lodestar formula conveys about
the likely size of the fee, the outcome resembles collusion, even though the
process may not. In short, under the lodestar formula, structural collusion
replaces actual collusion.
The onus here should not be placed disproportionately on the attorney for
the plaintiff. The sophisticated defense counsel understands that the longer
the action continues, the more the plaintiff's attorney will have built up a
valuable property right in the action whose realization is contingent upon
avoiding an adverse judgment. Thus, under the lodestar formula, a rational
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strategy for the defendant's attorney is to cooperate in delaying the pace of
the litigation and then to make only a last minute cheap settlement offer.
Because the plaintiff's attorney is most vulnerable to a cheap settlement offer
at the end of the litigation, the defense counsel should realize that the more
protracted the litigation becomes, the more the pressures mount on his
adversary to accept a cheap settlement. In contrast, the incentives are quite
different under a percentage-of-the-recovery formula, where they favor an
early settlement, as will be seen later.
The danger of collusive settlements is not the only problem associated
with the use of the lodestar formula. Another problem is the sometimes
extraordinary demand the lodestar methodology makes upon judicial time to
oversee and regulate the plaintiffs fee request. If the court wishes to guard
against excessive fee requests (particularly in the settlement context where the
defendants will not typically oppose the plaintiff's fee request), the court must
spend its own scarce time reviewing and corroborating the plaintiffs fee
petition. As recent examples have shown, the tail can wag the dog, and the
fee hearing can consume more judicial time than the substantive merits of the
underlying action. 10 4 In addition, when the plaintiff's attorney has won a
litigated judgment, the lodestar methodology exposes him to a potential
reprisal that can take the form of an attack on his fee petition; in recent
instances, he has had to wage a second litigation to obtain his fee award when
challenges have been made by those who would chill his willingness to
undertake contingent fee litigation against them in the future. 10 5
On a more abstract level, the basic approach taken by the lodestar formula
treats the plaintiffs' bar as a regulated public utility. The decisions that the
court must make in following the lodestar's methodology roughly conform to
the decisions that a public service commission must make in determining the
rate a utility may charge its customers. A utility regulator must first decide
which expenditures to include within the utility's rate base and which to
disallow; correspondingly, a court must decide whether the attorney's time
was reasonably expended.' 0 6 The issues at this stage have proliferated; for
104. For example, in the Fine Paper antitrust litigation, some 41 hearing days were devoted to
the fee petitions. Thereafter, the court wrote a lengthy opinion of over one hundred pages. See
Coffee, supra note 19, at 255 n.94.
105. In the Fine Paper antitrust litigation, a group of 15 "Business Roundtable" corporations
(including Exxon, IBM, and Xerox) intervened to challenge the fees sought by plaintiffs' counsel on
the theory that it would reduce their share of the recovery as users of fine paper. See Coffee, supra
note 19, at 254-55. This same group has intervened in other cases. Id. at 286 n.153. It would appear
patently obvious that these corporations are primarily interested in discouraging plaintiffs' counsel
by challenging their fee petitions.
106. As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals emphasized in Copeland v. Marshall, 641
F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980), "It does not follow that the time actually expended is the amount
reasonably expended." See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 410 (D. Colo. 1977)
(lawyer devoted 505 hours; court found that 125 hours would have been reasonable). Attorneys
seeking a fee award must submit detailed and often voluminous records. In the Second Circuit,
contemporaneous records must now be submitted. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children,
Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147-48 (2d Cir. 1983). The court must then review counsel's records.
See Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160, 164 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980); Steinberg v. Carey, 470 F. Supp. 471, 479
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). In particular, the court is expected to compare these fee petitions in order to
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example, should research on unsuccessfully asserted theories of liability be
disallowed? 107 Should the attorney be compensated for time spent dealing
with the media or potential members of the class who want advice (even
though neither activity will advance the progress of the class action)?10 8 After
the rate base is determined, a utility regulator must next determine the
appropriate rate of return; correspondingly, the court must determine
whether to use the attorney's normal billing rate or a lower rate prevailing
within the local community in which the action was litigated. Also, should it
use the attorney's current hourly rate or the lower rate that he charged over
the actual period in question? 10 9 Lastly, the utility regulator must decide
whether the special risks to which investors in the utility are subject justify an
above average rate of return in order to ensure that the utility will be able to
uncover duplicative work or evidence of overstaffing. Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d at 164-65. See also
Sun Publishing Co. v. Mecklenburg News, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1512, 1517-18 (E.D. Va. 1984).
107. Cf Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d at 164-65 (no deduction should be made for work that
proved "unfruitful" but was not frivolous, because lawyers must prosecute suits "on the basis of the
entire spectrum of theories that show promise").
108. This issue arose in a poignant form in the recent Agent Orange litigation. Some of the
principal plaintiffs' attorneys in that case spent significant periods of time counseling Vietnam
veterans in a fashion that is more easily described as therapeutic than legal. Considerable time was
also spent in political lobbying and developing a nationwide organization of veterans. None of this
time clearly advanced the class action, and it was disallowed by Judge Weinstein. See In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1335 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Society for Good Will
to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (no fee allowance for relations
with media), remanded on other grounds, 737 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1984).
109. Much litigation has centered on two issues: (1) whether to use the locally prevailing hourly
rate in the forum jurisdiction, the rate in the attorney's own district, or a nationwide rate applicable
to attorneys having special expertise; and (2) whether to use the attorney's current hourly rate or that
lower rate which he charged during the course of the litigation. With respect to the first of these
issues, see Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1547 (1984) (in determining statutory fee awards under
42 U.S.C. § 1988, courts should look to "the prevailing market rates in the relevant community");
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1140 (2d Cir. 1983). In
multidistrict litigation involving the participation of attorneys from many districts, however, some
courts recognize an exception, at least when special expertise is needed (as it often may be in the
special context of shareholder litigation). See Polk v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs.,
722 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983); Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 689 F.2d 137, 140-41 (8th Cir.
1982) (en banc); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at 1335 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). Still,
a different rule is sometimes followed when a case is consolidated to a jurisdiction different than the
attorney's home jurisdiction. Then, some courts view the attorney as entitled to receive
compensation at the rate prevailing within the "home" district when he filed the action in that district
and then saw it involuntarily transferred to a foreign forum. See Polk v. New York State Dep't of
Correctional Servs., 722 F.2d at 25. This rule may force the court to utilize several different
prevailing rates at once; to avoid this logistical nightmare, some courts have used a uniform
nationwide prevailing rate when faced with multidistrict litigation involving a large number of
attorneys. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 83 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984) (accepting nationwide rate but objecting to
evidence used to determine it). See also H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLAss ACTIONS § 6924(e) (1977).
The second issue-whether to use current or historic rates-has also proven difficult to resolve,
particularly in cases that extend over several years (as again, shareholder litigation often does). For
decisions favoring the historic rate in a variety of contexts, see New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d at 1153 (requiring use of historic rate); Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test
Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same); Weiss v. Drew Nat'l Corp., 465 F.
Supp. 548, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Conversely, other decisions have used the current rate, partly on
the grounds that it compensates the plaintiffs attorney for foregone interest and for inflation. See
Cooper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 1087, 1096 n.26 (5th Cir. 1982), modified on other
grounds, 701 F.2d 542 (1983) (en banc); City of New York v. Darling-Delaware, 440 F. Supp. 1132,
1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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raise capital in the future. Correspondingly, the court must determine
whether to award a contingency bonus so that similar meritorious cases will
be litigated in the future." l0 The point of this comparison is that the lodestar
is an extremely regulatory approach. Not only does it consume judicial
resources prodigiously, but there is also little reason to believe that courts are
as skilled as an administrative agency might be at making the multiple
judgments required by the lodestar methodology. Thus, it is useful to
consider next a deregulatory alternative.
B. The Salvage Value Method
If a time-based formula seems to encourage inadequate settlements, the
obvious alternative is the percentage-of-the-recovery or "salvage value"
method, which historically preceded the lodestar formula but has been
substantially (although not wholly) replaced by it."' At a stroke, the
percentage-of-the-recovery approach appears to give the attorney an interest
in maximizing the settlement fund, while also eliminating the seductive
attraction of a nonpecuniary settlement. Yet, although this formula may be
superior to the lodestar, a closer analysis shows that it too has more problems
than appear at first glance.
Three problems complicate the attractions of the salvage value approach.
First and most important, awarding a percentage of the recovery does not
necessarily align the attorney's interests with those of the shareholders he
represents. A well-known economics literature has convincingly made the
point that under the percentage-of-the-recovery method the attorney will still
have an incentive to accept an inadequate settlement that the class would
prefer to reject. 1i 2 A second problem with the percentage-of-the-recovery
approach is its political acceptability. According to some accounts, the
original impetus for adoption of the lodestar formula came from the seeming
windfall that plaintiffs' attorneys received under the salvage value system
when cases were quickly settled.' 13 Federal courts in particular faced acute
110. Several different factors are expected to be evaluated in the decision whether to increase or
decrease the fee award above or below the time component. Decisions have distinguished a "risk"
multiplier from a "quality" multiplier; the delay in payment and the complexity of the legal issues are
also said to be relevant factors. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1140
(2d Cir. 1983); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at 1310-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
The court must set forth specific findings of fact supporting any such increase or decrease. Gagne
v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 345 (2d Cir. 1979), afd, 448 U.S. 122 (1980). Once again, the district court
faces a complicated decision requiring its consideration of a significant range of issues. To the extent
that the court prefers to duck these issues, the result will be undercompensation of the plaintiffs
attorney. The same point about the amount of judicial time and energy required to implement the
lodestar formula could be made with respect to still other issues: the recognition of travel and other
expenses, the awarding of interest, the required use or nonuse of paralegals to reduce costs, whether
time expended in preparing the fee petition should be considered, etc. In each of these areas, there
is little uniformity today and considerable disparity.
11l. For the history of this formula, see sources cited supra note 91. With respect to its
continuing relevance to common fund cases according to Blum v. Stenson, see supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
112. See supra note 92.
113. For a brief overview, see Coffee, supra note 19, at 241-42. See also Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (debating the rationale underlying the lodestar formula).
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embarrassment and public criticism when they were constrained to award
multimillion dollar fees to plaintiffs' attorneys in large antitrust class actions
when the attorneys had negotiated speedy settlements in the wake of prior
indictments filed by the Department of Justice. In such instances, the
plaintiff's attorney looks like a free rider who has piggybacked on
governmental efforts and now stands to receive a grossly excessive reward in
proportion to his efforts. For example, to award such an attorney twenty to
twenty-five percent of a settlement that he negotiated within a brief period
after the commencement of the prior governmental proceeding will
predictably produce a public outcry (some of it possibly aroused by irate
defendants).
A final problem with the percentage-of-the recovery approach is that it
becomes unworkable when there is no settlement fund. 1 4 One can easily
imagine cases in which the plaintiffs attorney has performed a substantial
service in enjoining or otherwise preventing an impending fraud, but then
finds that his early intervention caused him to be compensated less
generously because no settlement fund was created. If the law were thus to
reward the attorney who prevents a loss less well than the attorney who
restores the same loss, a perverse incentive would arise under which the
attorney would be better advised to wait until the loss had occurred before
intervening. In fact, because the loss might often be only partially restorable,
the consequence would be to justify a larger fee for the less complete victory.
Of these three problems, the most important is the claim that a
percentage-of-the-recovery formula will still leave the attorney with an
incentive to accept an inadequate settlement. Although it may seem
counterintuitive, this assertion rests on a strong economic foundation. All
that we need assume is that (1) the size of the settlement will be a function of
the time the attorney expends on the action, and (2) after some point of
diminishing returns, the rate of increase in the size of the settlement will grow
more slowly and ultimately level off as the attorney expends more time on the
Clearly, the decisions that orginally adopted the lodestar formula were greatly concerned about the
possibility of "windfall" profits and the damaging public appearance of such overly generous awards.
See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir. 1974) ("For the sake of their own
integrity, the integrity of the legal profession and the integrity of Rule 23, it is important that courts
should avoid awarding 'windfall fees' and that they should avoid every appearance of having done
so.").
114. One could attempt to resolve this dilemma by valuing the loss that had been averted and
then awarding the same percentage of it. This procedure might work in the derivative action, where
the corporation in whose name the action is brought pays the attorney fees. The solution is less
simple, however, in the direct class action, because there is no way to tax the class that benefits and a
common fund does not exist from which the fee can be subtracted. Arguably, one could shift the fee
onto the losing defendant (thereby possibly reducing his willingness to settle), but little doctrinal
basis exists for combining fee shifting and a percentage-of-the-recovery fee formula. The conceptual
basis for the percentage-of-the-recovery formula rests on principles of unjust enrichment; the
traditional theory was that if the class that benefited did not share the plaintiff's legal expense, they
would be unjustly enriched. But see Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation,
88 HARV. L. REV. 849, 858-59 (1975). This justification cannot apply, however, once the fee is shifted
to the defendant, who is hardly unjustly enriched by the plaintiff's efforts and who is in any event
probably compensating his own attorney on a time basis.
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case. If these highly realistic assumptions are accepted, then the following
relationship, expressed below in Exhibit A, will hold true among the size of




Exhibit A depicts the conventional world in which the amount of the fee
(represented by thef' curve) is a direct function of the size of the settlement
(represented by the s' curve) and the attorney's total opportunity cost
(represented by the o' line) rises over the period at a constant rate.' 1 5 Under
115. This diagram and the explanation of it are derived from Clermont & Currivan, supra note
92, at 544. The argument that a contingent percentage-of-the-recovery fee produces premature
settlements was first advanced by Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 92.
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these standard assumptions, the client is best off at that point where the
vertical distance is the greatest between the f curve and the s' curve. For
example, assume that the fee is set at one-third of the total at which the
settlement curve levels off. Then, because sixty-six and two-thirds percent of
any marginal increase in the size of the settlement will go to the client, he
would want his attorney to continue to work on the case as long as the
settlement fund is thereby enhanced (subject only to the inevitable limitations
imposed by the time value of money). On Exhibit A, the point where the s'
curve levels off is indicated by Point X.
For the plaintiff's attorney, however, Point X is not optimal. He is better
off at Point Y, which represents the greatest vertical distance between thef'
curve and the o' line, which is his aggregate opportunity cost. Unlike the
client, his costs (including both out-of-pocket expenses and foregone
opportunities) constantly mount and, as the fee curve levels off, the rate of
increase in his costs eventually exceeds the rate of increase in his fee. Point Y
is thus the point at which the attorney's marginal costs exceed the marginal
benefits to him of continuing to litigate the action.
Neither Point X nor Point Y, however, represents the efficient outcome.
That point is instead represented by Point Z, which is where the vertical
distance between the o' line and the s' curve is greatest. 1i 6 This point
illustrates where the overall marginal costs from continuing the action (that is,
the costs to the client and attorney taken as a unit) first equal the overall
marginal benefits. Intuitively, this concept is best understood by asking when
the client would wish to settle if he were acting as his own attorney. The clear
answer to this question is that, if the client were representing himself in the
action, he could ignore the amount of his own fee and would rationally focus
simply on the expected return from continuing the action (the s' curve) as
against his expected costs (the o' line). Because he would not have to allocate
between his expected return as a client and that as an attorney, he would
simply wish to maximize the total excess of benefits over costs, which occurs
at Point Z. If he were to expend additional time after reaching Point Z, he
would incur marginal costs in excess of his marginal benefits. Therefore, he
would prefer to settle at Point Z.
Does this theoretical analysis have any empirical confirmation? The
assertion is frequently heard that plaintiffs' attorneys practicing in the
116. Point Z is efficient only from the standpoint of the collective private interests of the plaintiff
and his attorney. Although it maximizes their joint return (that is, any greater investment of time will
produce a lesser joint recovery after subtraction of opportunity costs), it does not necessarily
maximize the social benefit from the action. For example, Point Y imposes fewer costs on the
judicial system which must monitor the action, while Point X could yield greater deterrence and
thereby produce a greater social benefit, if a lesser private benefit. This consideration is especially
relevant when the underlying cause of action was meant to deter (as in the case of private treble
damage actions under the antitrust laws). The derivative action also can be analyzed in this light
because, to the extent that shareholders are at least partially diversified, they may benefit more from
the deterrence generated than from the compensatory recovery. See supra note 28.
This analysis also disregards the time value of money, which could in some circumstances make
the shareholder prefer a "premature" settlement. However, this problem could be mitigated by
awarding prejudgment interest from the date of the action's commencement.
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personal injury field tend to accept premature and inadequate settlements,
often without conducting any discovery or adequately investigating their
clients' cases. 1 7 Typically, these attorneys are compensated on a percentage-
of-the-recovery basis, and the foregoing economic analysis supplies a possible
explanation for this pattern. But recent empirical work has not found
statistically significant differences between the performance of plaintiffs'
attorneys compensated on a contingent fee basis from those paid on an hourly
basis." t8 In fact, some evidence even suggests that as the case gets larger in
size, the contingent fee attorney will spend more time than the hourly fee
attorney. "19 Still, these findings do not directly relate to the special context of
shareholders' litigation where client control is weak and the hourly fee is
awarded by the court, not the client. 120
Within the special context of shareholder litigation, there may be more
reason to suspect that the salvage value method will produce premature
settlements. In Delaware, which does not follow the lodestar approach but
instead continues to award fees according to a procedure that resembles a
hybrid of the lodestar and salvage value approaches, 12 1 a colorful phrase has
been coined to refer to plaintiff attorneys who specialize in speedy settlements
of derivative actions. They are called "pilgrims" because they believe in
"early settlements."' 122 These "early settlers" appear to be quite candid
about their preference for a quick resolution and apparently advertise this
willingness. Although no empirical comparison is available, my sense is that
"pilgrims" appear to be more prevalent in Delaware than in other
jurisdictions where the lodestar methodology reigns, possibly because early
settlements would imply a low fee under a time-based formula.
Assuming that the salvage value approach may produce premature
settlements, what policy prescription should follow? Other commentators
have suggested a compromise of the lodestar and percentage-of-the-recovery
systems. 2" For example, following essentially the analysis outlined above,
Clermont and Currivan argue for a fee formula that "would be computed by
117. The empirical data are less than satisfactory and almost entirely anecdotal. Based largely
on interviews, Douglas Rosenthal has reported that attorneys compensated on a contingent fee basis
do minimize their time investment through a variety of questionable tactics. See D. ROSENTHAL,
LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 106-15 (1977). For other studies, see F. MACKINNON,
CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 196-200 (1964); Franklin, Chanin, & Marks, supra note 35.
118. See Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer, & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litlgation, 31
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 72, 108-09 (1982).
119. Id. at 108-09 (finding that at the $15,000 level in terms of case size, contingent fee lawyers
spend more time than hourly fee lawyers). At a lower level, the median hourly fee lawyer did spend
more time, but the margin was not statistically significant.
120. One possible explanation for the findings in the above study is that the individual client can
exercise considerable control over his attorney in the typical personal injury case, and so the natural
incentive under a time formula to multiply the hours expended is thereby restrained by the fact that
the client will not pay an exorbitant fee, particularly before the outcome of the litigation is known.
121. See Sugarland Indus. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980) (explicitly rejecting the lodestar
formula in favor of a more discretionary hybrid that considered the recovery obtained).
122. I have heard this term frequently used by Delaware counsel to refer to a specific
identifiable subset of the plaintiffs' bar. One plaintiffs' attorney who reviewed a draft of this article
informs me that there are well-known "pilgrims" within the New York bar as well.
123. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 92, at 546-50, 578-600.
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adding (1) the lawyer's time charge for the hours worked to (2) a small
percentage (say five percent or ten percent) of the amount by which the
recovery exceeds the time charge."' 124 They argue that this formula "solves
the problem of economic conflict of interest between lawyer and client that
exists under both the certain hourly fee and the contingent percentage
fee." 12 5
But does it? Seemingly, any formula that averages in some fashion a time
component with a percentage-of-the-recovery component should move us
closer to Point Z on Exhibit A and hence in the direction of the efficient
outcome. Still, at least as applied to shareholder litigation, there is a fallacy in
this answer because the time component is also contingent on success and a
sophisticated defense counsel can easily exploit this fact. Under any hybrid
formula that averages time charges with a percentage of the recovery, defense
counsel would still be well-advised to wait until the eve of trial (or later) and
make a settlement offer that covered the amount of the fee (as determined
under this hybrid formula), but gave little more to the class. For example,
suppose a class action is brought for $20 million and both sides recognize that
its settlement value based on the litigation odds is $6 million. Assume further
that the plaintiffs' attorneys have expended $1 million of billable time and
that there is a roughly fifty percent chance of an adverse verdict against them.
If defendants now make a settlement offer of $3 million at the last possible
moment, the plaintiffs' attorneys could expect a fee of $1.2 million under the
Clermont and Currivan proposal (i.e., $1 million of time plus ten percent of
$2 million, the net recovery after subtraction of the time charge). Against this
certain $1.2 million, they would have to balance their possible fee if they went
to trial and won the expected recovery ($6 million), which recovery would
produce a fee of $1.5 million (i.e., a $1 million time charge plus $500,000,
which is ten percent of the excess of the expected recovery over the time
charge). In fact, however, we must still discount the $1 million time charge
for the fifty percent risk of an adverse verdict, because it (unlike the $500,000
percentage-of-the-recovery component) does not yet represent an expected
value. So discounted, the expected value associated with proceeding to trial
falls to only $1 million.' 26
Of course, the logic of the Clermont and Currivan proposal could equally
well justify a formula containing a much larger percentage of the recovery
component.1 27 For example, the formula could combine the time charge with
124. Id. at 598.
125. Id.
126. That is, the time component would have an expected value of $500,000 and the
percentage-of-the-recovery component would be $500,000, which is 10% of the expected value of
$5,000,000 ($6,000,000 minus the $1,000,000 time charge). Because the actual recovery could be as
high as $20 million, the $6 million figure has already been discounted by the risk of an adverse
verdict.
127. Given Clermont and Currivan's premises, their formal logic would apply whether the
percentage was 1% or 90%. They do assume, however, that the standard percentage-of-the-recovery
is roughly 33 1/3%. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 92, at 532 n.3. A model that does not
distinguish between 1% and 90% has limited relevance. If one were to follow their prescription, I
would recommend that the appropriate percentage-of-the-recovery to be factored into their formula
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one-third of the net recovery after subtraction of the time charge. On the
foregoing facts, this would mean that the expected fee if the case went to trial
and produced a $6 million recovery would be $2,666,666.128 Again, the $1
million time charge must be discounted by the fifty percent risk of loss
associated with a trial, but the resulting figure of $2,166,666 could
conceivably compensate the plaintiffs for the higher level of risk associated
with a trial. Whether a risky, but expected, fee of $2,166,666 is more
attractive than a certain fee of $1.2 million depends on how risk averse the
plaintiffs' attorneys are, and different attorneys might make different choices.
In addition, the plaintiffs' attorneys would still face a more practical problem
associated with the use of a time charge element in the fee formula. In a
derivative action, the attorney's fee is typically paid by the corporation, which
might seek to contest the reasonableness of the $1 million time charge
component in this fee. Ex ante, this possibility of fee dispute after the trial
(but not after a settlement) adds an additional element of risk to the attorney's
calculus that might deter him from going to trial.
The trade-offs at this point are indeterminate. A variant of the Clermont
and Currivan proposal that used a more generous percentage-of-the-recovery
component than their suggested ten percent could potentially curb the
deficiencies of either the time-based formula or the salvage value formula, but
no certainty is possible. Unavoidably, one must make empirical judgments
about the level of risk aversion within the plaintiffs' bar, and no global
judgment applying to all forms of contingent fee litigation (personal injury,
antitrust class actions, securities actions, derivative suits, etc.) is likely to be
accurate.
Other alternatives seem at least as attractive. Because the specific
percentage of the recovery that is to be awarded need not be fixed in advance,
it could be determined ex post by the court based on its assessment of a
variety of factors, including the skill and effort shown by the plaintiffs'
attorney. For example, the percentage-of-the-recovery formula could
authorize the court to award between fifteen percent and thirty-three and one-
third percent of the recovery, depending upon the court's assessment of the
same factors today specified in the lodestar formula for the award of a
contingency bonus. 1 29 This approach would mitigate some of the difficulty in
be determined based upon some of the factors that today determine the lodestar "contingency"
bonus-that is, the level of risk (at least in the generic type of action, but not the individual case), the
period of deferral, and the quality of the services. The result is obviously a formula that resembles
the contemporary lodestar formula, which is why I suspect that their proposal (for all its considerable
orginality and intelligence) would produce little net change, if adopted.
128. Because one-third of $5,000,000 (i.e., $6,000,000 minus the $1,000,000 time charge) is
$1,666,666, the fee award would be $1,000,000 plus $1,666,666, or $2,666,666.
129. The factors most typically considered are (1) the risk of litigation, (2) the complexity of the
issues, (3) the demonstrated skill of the attorneys, and (4) the delay in payment. There are objections
to the use of each of these factors (except possibly the last), which this article does not address. Cf
Leubsdorf, supra note 93.
The approach suggested here would not produce the same approximate result as the lodestar,
because the time component would either be small or nonexistent. In contrast, the Clermont and
Currivan proposed hybrid formula would approximate the lodestar formula in its actual operation,
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the court's position in the case of a premature settlement, when the court
would be embarrassed by having to award thirty-three and one-third percent
of a settlement negotiated in a very brief period. In effect, the plaintiff's
attorney would have to fear that if the settlement struck the court as
unimpressive, it would award only a fifteen percent fee recovery.'
3 0
Of course, one can question both the legitimacy and practicality of broad
judicial discretion to determine the particular percentage to be awarded. It
may appear disquieting that the court would award a low percentage when
this award in effect signaled that it had doubts about the adequacy of the
settlement. But this criticism demands perfect justice. If one recognizes that
inadequate settlements are often approved, 31 it seemingly would be better
for the shareholders if the court had increased discretion to determine the fee
award so as not to reward such settlements.
Other objections to a variable formula are more substantial: broad
discretion may only produce broad disparity; in some instances, the parties
may be able to submit the settlement in a manner that is conditional upon the
court's acceptance of the specific fee award that they have negotiated.
3 2
Finally, the court may have little incentive, absent an objector's protest, to
scrutinize the settlement carefully. Nonetheless, even after conceding the
force of these criticisms, the point remains that a shift from a predominantly
time-based formula to a variable percentage-of-the-recovery system shifts
discretion to the court and away from the parties, who have considerable
incentive to collude. Once the court's discretion is protected, it can also be at
least partially structured through the promulgation of guidelines that specify
the factors on which the court should place special weight. For example, if the
deficiency of the salvage value formula is that it may produce premature
settlements, this danger is hardly as present in a case litigated to a judgment
as it is in a settlement. It would therefore seem appropriate to instruct the
court to award a more generous percentage in cases when the plaintiff has
gone to trial and thus accepted the risk of an adverse decision. To be sure, a
mandatory rule that a higher percentage be awarded after a judgment would
be overbroad because, for example, the judgment might have yielded less
than a previously offered and declined settlement. Yet, a discretionary rule
would reduce some of the incentive that today exists to agree to an early and
inadequate settlement. Another guideline that would make considerable
sense would be to award a lower percentage when the plaintiffs action
essentially piggybacked on a prior enforcement proceeding brought by a
governmental agency (such as the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department or the SEC), because in these cases the plaintiffs attorney
typically bears less risk and expends less effort. This approach would also
because their modest percentage-of-the-recovery component would largely duplicate the current
contingency bonus component in the lodestar formula.
130. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
132. But see infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
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reduce the windfall (and resulting public relations problem) that seemingly
arises when a settlement is reached shortly after the litigation commences.' 33
To sum up, both the lodestar and the salvage approach can misalign the
plaintiff's attorney's incentives so that he is motivated to accept an inadequate
settlement, at least when there is a substantial risk of an adverse decision.
The flaw in the standard analysis that the lodestar formula produces delayed
settlements is the confusion of process with outcome. Logically, it is possible
for the lodestar formula to produce both delayed and inadequtae settlements.
Proposals such as those advanced by Clermont and Currivan overlook the fact
that, at least in shareholder litigation, the fee award is just as contingent
under the lodestar formula as under the percentage-of-the-recovery
formula. 134 Thus, the plaintiff's attorney remains at risk under either formula
and is more vulnerable to an inadequate settlement offer under the lodestar's
approach which implicitly assures him that his time will be compensated. In
this respect, the percentage-of-the-recovery formula is less imperfect and
could be improved through more standardized guidelines. Yet, although
there are some scattered hints ofjudicial disenchantment with the lodestar, 3 5
no trend away from it is yet evident, as courts persist in pious declarations that
ignore the economics of the plaintiff's attorney's position. 36
IV
RISK AND RETURN: WHY THE RATIONAL PLAINTIFF'S ATrORNEY
MUST SETTLE EARLY
The model advanced to this point has been comparatively simple:
Essentially, the plaintiff's attorney in shareholder litigation faces unfavorable
odds, which have been made even more adverse by the advent of the special
litigation committee. Because the attorney who operates on a contingent fee
basis cannot afford to invest heavily in a single case in the face of these odds,
133. See supra note 113.
134. Essentially, the Clermont and Currivan analysis compares a noncontingent time formula
with a contingent percentage-of-the-recovery formula. This is a strange comparison to make, at least
if the starting point is the assumption that the client cannot effectively control his attorney. Possibly
within the context of personal injury litigation (on which they chiefly focus) this contrast may be
appropriate to draw, but within the fields of securities and derivative litigation (and probably
throughout the context of class actions as a whole), the receipt of the fee is wholly contingent on a
favorable judgment (either by trial or settlement). Clermont and Currivan only consider the concept
of a contingent time formula very briefly. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 92, at 595-96. Even
there, they discuss only the idea of a higher than normal hourly fee that would be contingent on
success. What they overlook is that for the class action plaintiffs attorney even his normal hourly fee
is contingent.
135. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, at 85 (E.D. Pa. 1983), afd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984); Sugarland Indus. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142
(Del. 1980). The more evident trend has been toward closer judicial monitoring of the time records
and fee petitions, culminating in the requirement now established in the Second Circuit that
contemporaneous records be submitted to the court. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147-48 (2d Cir. 1983).
136. In particular, the Third Circuit's recent reversal of the district court in the Fine Paper
antitrust litigation suggests that federal courts do not see an alternative to the lodestar formula. Yet,
in Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541, the Supreme Court indicated that in common fund cases, such
as antitrust litigation, the percentage-of-the-recovery approach was the norm. Id. at 1550 n. 16.
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he spreads his risks by litigating a substantial number of cases, seeking early
settlements in a few and accepting the probability that the majority will be
dismissed. This approach is both economically rational and socially
undesirable. The relatively recent ability of the adversaries to reach a costless
settlement based on nonpecuniary relief simply exacerbates this tendency.
Reaction to this state of affairs has been more visceral than analytic. As a
whole, the Bar has come to view derivative actions with an attitude ranging
from distaste to disgust, but the only remedy it can agree upon is the use of
judicial sanctions in egregious cases. 13 7 This is an ex post response that,
although sometimes appropriate, provides an ineffective remedy, given (1) the
infeasibility of sanctions, (2) the ease with which the adversaries can disguise
their motives, and (3) the inevitability of conflicts of interest in class and
derivative actions. Defendants have a simpler proposal: abolish the derivative
action! Although this goal is today within sight (at least in those jurisdictions
that defer to the special litigation committee's findings), defendants do not
understand that plaintiffs' attorneys still have an adaptive response available
to them: they can underbid the cost of the special litigation committee
procedure by either offering or accepting a cheap settlement. The result is to
reinforce the disincentives that already discourage the plaintiff's attorney
from intensively pursuing an individual case. Gresham's Law predicts that
bad money drives out the good, and the corollary here may be that the
"pilgrims" will drive out those plaintiffs' attorneys able and willing to litigate
a case on the merits.
What should be done? In general, if the law wishes to encourage
investment in any profit-seeking activity, it must either increase the expected
return or reduce the level of risk associated with that return. Some means to
this end are obvious: the substantive law could be revised (particularly with
respect to the special litigation committee), or the fee formula could be
modified, as earlier discussed, to include a more substantial salvage value
component. Beyond these reforms, other less visible obstacles to the
plaintiff's attorney could be removed or lessened without unfairly prejudicing
the interests of defendants. This section next considers several means to this
end.
137. With respect to this new deterrent orientation, see Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation
in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Deterrence Orientation]; a clear trend is evident toward more liberal use of sanctions. See, e.g., Roadway
Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); McCandless v. Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198 (7th
Cir. 1983); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1980). The recent amendment of FED. R.
Civ. P. 11 to require the attorney to certify his belief that the pleading or motion is "well grounded in
fact" is also a similar straw in this wind. See, e.g., Gordon v. Heiman, 715 F.2d 531 (11 th Cir. 1983);
Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 683 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Also consistent with this
pattern is the judicial trend toward strict enforcement of the particularized pleading required of FED.
R. Civ. P. 9(b). See Note, supra note 99, at 1441 (noting both difficulty of complying with this rule in
shareholder litigation and trend toward more frequent awards for violations of Rule 11). Still,
commentators have suggested that a general judicial reluctance to impose sanctions confounds this
approach to the problem of curtailing frivolous litigation. See Note, Deterrence Orientation, supra, at
1033, 1034-38; Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: AJudicial Perspective, 67 CAL. L. REv. 264, 271 (1979). As
a result, this article's view is that a shift away from the lodestar fee formula toward the percentage-of-
the-recovery formula could have greater (or at least supplementary) effect.
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A. The Problem of Inter-Plaintiff Competition
The plaintiffs attorney in a class or derivative action lacks any property
right by which he can exclude other attorneys from essentially free riding on
his efforts and claiming a share of the court-awarded fee. In effect, the usual
analogy of the plaintiffs attorney to the bounty hunter is inaccurate, because
only one bounty hunter is entitled to collect the bounty. In contrast, in recent
antitrust and securities class actions, as many as 150 plaintiffs attorneys have
appeared to represent the plaintiff class. 138 Indeed, representing the plaintiff
class is a game virtually anyone can play. One has only to find a nominal
plaintiff, file a class action in his name in any federal district court, and then
await the consolidation of all the separate class actions into a single forum by
the Federal Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation. 139 Alternatively, one
can seek to intervene in an action already filed by another attorney. Once all
the actions are so joined in a single courtroom, the usual procedure is for the
court to permit the horde of plaintiffs' attorneys so assembled to elect their
own leadership.' 40 The steering committee thus elected assumes control of
the case, and the plaintiff's attorney who initially investigated and first
brought the case may be either displaced or at least forced to share the
economic return that flowed disproportionately from his efforts.14'
138. To give some recent examples:
(1) In In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), afd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984), fee petitions were submitted on behalf of 160 individual
attorneys. See Bruck, Harold Kohn Against the World, The American Lawyer, Jan. 1982, at 28-32.
(2) In In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), fee petitions
were submitted on behalf of "more than 100 attorneys."
(3) In In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 415 F. Supp. 384 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976), 57 law firms
sought fee awards on behalf of an unstated (but obviously larger) number of individual attorneys.
(4) In In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 80 F.R.D. 244 (S.D. Tex. 1978), 48 law firms
submitted fee petitions. See Lempert, supra note 50, at 1, col. 1.
(5) In In re Armored Car Antitrust Litig., 472 F. Supp. 1357 (N.D. Ga. 1979), 85 attorneys for 20
firms sought fee awards. Id. at 1380, 1384.
These are all examples of "ad hoc" plaintiffs' law firms-a large loosely organized and often
overstaffed group of plaintiffs' attorneys who have had their separate actions consolidated.
139. For an overview of the Panel and its procedures, see J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (2d ed. 1981). Under the Panel's rules, if separately
filed class actions involve common questions of fact, they will be referred to a single judge. See
J.P.M.D.L. Rules 9 and 10, 65 F.R.D. 253, 259-60 (1975). The Panel will also transfer individual
actions that are subsequently filed in the wake of a class action. For example, in the Agent Orange
litigation, some 600 such "tag-a-long" cases were transferred to Judge Weinstein. See In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at 1301. In the Fine Paper litigation, 98 F.R.D. 48, fifteen
separate class actions, filed in eight different federal courts, were transferred to the Eastern District
of Pennsylvnia.
140. The MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 139, instructs the trial court, where
possible, to permit the plaintiff's attorney to select his own lead counsel: "While the court should
not, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, select and appoint lead counsel, the court can
request the parties to select such counsel and encourage the use ofjudicial power." Id. at 192. For a
sample order designating such a lead counsel chosen by the plaintiff's attorney who has filed a notice
of appearance, see Moore, supra note 139, at 91.192-I.
141. The powers of the lead counsel are far from clearly established, but typically he, or a
steering committee of plaintiffs' counsel, controls work assignments. Thus, he will determine which
attorneys are assigned to take the principal depositions during the discovery phase of the case.
Although the attorney who initiated the case could still attend this deposition and presumably ask
questions, his time will not necessarily be billable, because the trial court is expected to deny fees for
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Democratic as the process sounds in theory, recent experience shows that it
can be corrupted in practice into a brokered political convention, at which
rival factions contend for dominance, coalitions are formed, and political
deals are struck. 142 More important, even if the process could be made open
and fair, it would still be unsound from an economic perspective, because it
erodes the attorney's incentive to search for appropriate cases to be brought.
By definition, the rational attorney/enterpreneur will invest in search costs
only to the extent that he anticipates he can recoup these costs from the
expected fee award. Thus, to the extent the attorney must share the fee, he
will engage in less search activity. By analogy, the attorney who cannot
exclude other late-appearing attorneys from his action is in the same position
as a prospector who cannot stake out a claim that the law will protect against
claim jumpers or an inventor who is denied the right to patent his invention.
From an ex ante perspective, legal rules that contribute to such a result
appear irrational; yet, from a naive ex post perspective, the horde of late-
appearing attorneys who seek to consolidate their actions with the initiating
attorney may appear to be simply zealous counsel anxious to represent their
clients. Thus, this pattern could be mistakenly viewed as apparent proof that
the plaintiffs' bar is healthy and vigorous, when in fact the evidence, when
properly interpreted, suggests economic anarchy.
The sensible prescription is to exclude the free riders by conferring some
form of property right on the attorney who truly initiates the case. Once his
control over the case is assured, he need share it only with those other
attorneys whose assistance he requires to prepare it for trial. The problem is
that no simple rule clearly does this. If the property right were automatically
conferred on the first attorney to file the action, races to the courthouse, hasty
pleading, and poorly researched complaints would be encouraged.
Alternatively, giving the court wide discretion to choose lead counsel could
lead to cronyism or might result in the true initiating attorney being displaced
by better known attorneys who did not incur the search costs that led to the
filing of the action.' 43 All that can clearly be said is that the worst alternative
is the political election process that is now our de facto system for the
duplicative work. See Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160, 164-65; Sun Publishing Co. v. Mecklenburg
News, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1512, 1517-18. Moreover, a growing trend is evident under which the
steering committee files a master fee petition covering all or most the attorneys in the action. See
infra note 199. Attorneys not included in this fee petition are apt to have their claim for fees viewed
more skeptically by the court.
142. For a closer look at this process, see Coffee, supra note 19, at 248-52, 256-60 (noting
evidence of vote buying by which attorneys are invited to file an action and promised work
assignments in return for their vote for lead counsel). Among experienced "repeat players," this
reciprocal vote trading can occur across cases, as counsel intervenes in one case to vote for an ally
who he expects will do the same for him in another case.
143. This is where the "professional" and "economic" perspectives conflict. From the former
perspective, one wants the "best," most qualified attorney to represent the class as lead counsel. But
this rule may lead to a "star" system under which attorneys with established reputations could appear
at a later stage after the initial "search" work was completed and supersede the younger, less
experienced attorney who had initially prepared the case. The result would chill search activity and
could produce a suboptimal frequency of suits from a societal perspective. From an economic
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selection of lead counsel, 144 because it ensures the selection neither of the
most able attorney nor of the attorney who did the basic investigatory work
leading up to the action.
Inter-plaintiff competition tends to take a different form in derivative
actions than it does in class actions. Although instances can be cited in which
steering committees have been appointed in derivative actions,' 45 there is
seldom the same number of plaintiffs' attorneys involved as in securities class
actions. 146 Why this disparity should exist is puzzling since the underlying
transaction is often susceptible to challenge by either a securities action, a
derivative suit, or both. One possibility is that the derivative action more
often involves a race to different courthouses, rather than to a common
courthouse, and this race also pits plaintiff against plaintiff. Although the
same pattern can sometimes also be observed in actions that are
fundamentally based on federal securities law claims,' 47 attempts to exploit
the state/federal court division in this context are less frequent, because
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the federal securities laws.
Thus, to escape consolidation by the Multi-District Panel, a plaintiff's attorney
perspective, it is necessary to recognize and protect a property right in order to encourage
investment in search activity.
To the extent that plaintiffs today tend to piggyback on a prior governmental proceeding (for
example, antitrust indictments or SEC enforcement actions), however, it may be the case that little
search activity is necessary; hence fears of inadequate investment in search would be less justified.
This conclusion is debatable because the piggyback pattern under which private actions typically
follow in the wake of governmental proceedings may be the effect of inadequate protection of the
plaintiff attorney's property right in the first instance. In any event, when the issue is the selection of
lead counsel in a private action that followed in the wake of a prior governmental action, there
appears little reason not to choose the most competent counsel because the incentive to search need
not be protected in these cases where the real search was conducted by the government.
For an instance in which the initial counsel in a consolidated derivative action was displaced by a
counsel who filed subsequently, see Rich v. Reisini, 25 A.D.2d 32, 266 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1966).
144. As discussed supra note 143, the two models for which an intelligent case can be made are
the "professional model" (under which the court would choose the lead counsel on the basis of his
reputation and demonstrated ability) and the "property right model" (under which the attorney who
principally investigated and "discovered" the case deserves priority-typically, under some form of a
"first to file" rule). In contrast, the political model creates an incentive for socially wasteful
expenditures on "politicking" and invites the appearance of a new specialist who lacks any social
utility: the case "broker" who organizes a majority coalition by striking political deals and is
compensated with a share of the fees in return for his efforts.
145. See, e.g., In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,681 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (combined class and derivative actions); Rich v. Reisini, 25 A.D.2d
32, 266 N.Y.S.2d 492.
146. This author is unaware of any "true" derivative action in which the number of plaintiffs'
attorneys has approached the number of attorneys in the antitrust class actions listed supra note 138.
For securities class actions involving substantial numbers of attorneys and the same problems of
overstaffing and duplicative work as has characterized recent antitrust litigation, see In re Penn
Central Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Pa. 1976), rev'd, 560 F.2d 1138 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnett v.
Pritaker, 73 F.R.D. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 438 F. Supp.
1303 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Blank v. Talley Indus., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
147. For example, in the complex litigation involving the Washington Public Power System
bond fiasco (In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., M.D.L. No. 551), a major issue has
been the attempt of some plaintiffs to file state court actions alleging malpractice and common law
fraud in order to outflank the consolidated federal actions. See WPPSS Booty Attracts Many Plaintifl,
Lawyers, Legal Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at 2 (noting that a state action brought by an attorney who did
not want to participate in the federal class action "threatens to splinter the WPPSS bondholder
proceedings" in federal court).
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must allege a purely state cause of action and file it in a state court. This
approach has an inevitable cost in that the special protections and procedural
rights afforded by federal law are thereby lost. In contrast, a derivative action
grounded on a traditional theory of liability can usually be filed in either
federal or state court and, in the latter case, consolidation can thereby be
evaded. When actions are filed in different state courts, the defendants may
be able, of course, to stay the subsequent actions. A clever defendant,
however, may instead prefer to promote a competition among the plaintiffs-
in effect, inducing them to bid for the right to settle with him. As a result, the
first court to decide the case (or to approve a binding settlement) will confer a
preclusive effect that the defendants can use to estop collaterally the plaintiffs
in the other cases. 148 In short, a potential exists for a race to settlement, with
the first plaintiff attorney to settle being in a position to claim at least the
lion's share of the attorney fees. This race-to-the-bottom scenario does not
require that plaintiffs actually engage in a competition to conclude a
settlement; it is sufficient that the attorneys in parallel actions in different
jurisdicitons be aware of each other's existence for them to worry about the
preclusive effect of other settlements. Even if each in fact behaves fully in
accordance with professional ethics, the anxiety will still exist as to what the
other might do, thus intensifying the pressures for early settlement.
Instances that fit the foregoing pattern can easily be identified. Some
twenty derivative actions were filed in a variety of state and federal courts as a
results of Texaco's "greenmail" repurchase of stock held by Bass Brother
Enterprises. 149 In the well-known litigation involving Zapata Corporation,
which gave rise to the important Delaware Supreme Court decision in Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 150 companion cases were litigated in federal and state
courts in Delaware, New York, and Texas.1 5 1 Although the Delaware
Supreme Court ruled that the trial court should employ its own independent
judgment to review the reasons for dismissal given by the Zapata board's
special litigation committee, 152 the effect of this ruling may have been
substantially nullified when a settlement was negotiated in the Texas action
and approved over the objections of the other plaintiffs. 153
148. Assuming adequate notice to shareholders and no evidence of collusion or inadequate
representation, the judicial approval of the settlement operates as a preclusive final judgment on the
merits. See Smith v. Alleghany Corp., 394 F.2d 381, 391 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 939 (1968);
Nathan v. Rowan, 651 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ § 48.1, 86 (1982); Note, ResJudicata in the Derivative Action: Adequacy of Representation and the Inadequate
Plaintiff, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1042 (1973).
149. See supra note 78.
150. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
151. For a description of the complex history of these interlocking cases, see Maldonado v.
Flynn, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Maher v. Zapata, 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
152. Zapata announced a somewhat ambiguous two-stage inquiry, under which the court was
only clearly expected to review the litigation committee's substantive justifications for dismissal when
demand on the board was excused. In Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), the ambiguities
in Zapata were resolved in favor of limiting substantive judicial review to the "demand excused"
context.
153. In the aftermath of the Delaware Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, the parallel action in Texas was settled and dismissed with prejudice in
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Inter-plaintiff competition also occurs in at least two other forms. First,
when a settlement is negotiated between the parties, it is a common event for
another attorney, who may have previously been inactive in the action, to
protest it and seek to block its judicial approval. Of course, the objector's
motives could be wholly legitimate, because the settlement may be
inadequate. 54 In a number of recent cases, however, it appears that the
objector may have been engaged simply in an attempt to extort a portion of
the expected legal fees by threatening to delay the settlement's approval. The
irony is that such abuses are the equivalent to nuisance actions brought
against defendants; here, the target is the original plaintiff's attorney and the
consequence again is to erode his expected return from the action. A recent
federal court decision, In re Itel Securities Litigation, 15 illustrates this pattern.
There, a New York state attorney who had been "involved on the periphery of
[the litigation]" realized that the settlement "agreement appeared to result in
... [his] receiving no compensation for this work."' 156 Aware that the
corporation could not emerge from its bankruptcy reorganization until the
settlement was approved, he filed a motion just prior to the settlement
hearing to redefine the plaintiff class, even though he "was well aware. . . the
class definition issue had been resolved three years earlier."' 157 The motion
never came to a hearing because the corporation agreed that the attorney
could seek fees with its implicit consent in a companion derivative action filed
in Delaware in return for his dropping the motion. Not content with this
success, the same attorney next sought to further exploit his leverage by again
objecting to the settlement on a different ground, after finding a different
client.' 58 Again, the corporation made "further fee-related concessions in
order to keep the final settlement of the securities litigation on track,"'' 59 and
this time it received a broad undertaking from the attorney that he would
wholly withdraw from the case. Nonetheless, displaying a level of chutzpah
possibly unique to New York, this same attorney objected still a third time to
the settlement on behalf of a third client, "again trying to essentially extort
further fee related concessions."'' 60 Although the court did impose sanctions
on the attorney, the case is noteworthy primarily for the relatively blatant and
undisguised nature of the extortion attempted. Its message is not that
the same year. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 671 F.2d 729, 731. The corporation then moved to dismiss
the federal court action on grounds of res judicata. Id. The Second Circuit remanded the case on
the narrow question of the preclusive effect of the Texas settlement. Id.
154. See Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1980) (settlement fund increased as result of
actions of objector and attorney fees awarded to objector). In general the objector is not entitled to
a fee award unless its services improve the settlement fund. See White v. Auerbach, 500 F.2d 822,
828 (2d Cir. 1974); Green v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 326 F.2d 492, 498-99 (1st Cir. 1964); Milstein v.
Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
155. 596 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
156. Id. at 228-30. As a result, the attorney advised his clients that they "should not enter into
the agreement" settling the action. Id. at 229.
157. Id. at 230.
158. Id. This new objection was filled on behalf of the daughter of the prior client.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 232.
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extortion is impossible, but that three bites at the apple are too many. When
more discretion is shown, the threat of ajudicial sanction may be minimal. As
a result, the original plaintiffs attorney may feel compelled to accept some
cosmetic changes in the settlement's form that allow the objector to claim a
share of the fee award in order to forestall his opposition.' 6 '
The Itel fact pattern also illustrates a second mechanism by which the
original attorney may be divested of some of his expected return: the practice
of filing a companion derivative action that parallels the allegations of the
securities class action. In Itel, a federal court action, the disciplined attorney
was to receive his fee concessions in connection with a related Delaware
derivative action, which essentially involved the same disputed events and
transaction. 62 From the perspective of the defendants, a package settlement
is desired. They cannot afford to pay a substantial settlement and then find
that essentially the same issues are to be relitigated in a different forum, only
this time as a derivative action instead of a class action (with the result that the
first settlement will not collaterally estop the new plaintiffs). Sophisticated
defendants will therefore attempt to settle both the securities and derivative
claims together. To the extent they cannot, they may feel compelled to hold
back some of the recovery and fee award they would otherwise have agreed to
pay in order to cover any later action filed by another attorney. The effect of
this piggybacking on the efforts of the original attorney in the class action by
filing a parallel derivative action is to erode the return to the original attorney.
To an uncertain extent, the original plaintiffs attorney can foreclose the
possibility of a parallel action by bringing a combined class and derivative
action in the first instance, thus blocking a parallel action by another
attorney. 63 This tactic permits a global settlement of all claims and, by
protecting the defendants from a second attack, permits them to pay a higher
settlement. But a legal obstacle may block this sensible protective step. From
a doctrinal perspective, it is awkward to permit one plaintiff (or one attorney)
both to represent the class suing the corporation (typically stockholders or
bondholders) and also to seek to represent the corporation derivatively; in
161. Despite the general rule that an objector must increase the settlement fund before he is
entitled to a fee award, see supra cases cited at note 154, some decisions have awarded fees for "aid
rendered to the court . . . in bringing every possible objection to settlement" to the court's
attention. Pergament v. Frazer, 132 F. Supp. 323, 326 (E.D. Mich. 1954), modified & aff'd sub nom.
Pergament v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 224 F.2d 80, 85 (6th Cir. 1955). More importantly, the use of
nonpecuniary relief can be used to "enhance" the settlement and thereby justify a fee award for the
late arriving attorney, thus transferring fees away from the principal plaintiffs' attorney (assuming
that the aggregate fee that the court will award is limited).
162. In re Itel Sec. Litig., 596 F. Supp. at 230. To settle the second objection by the same
attorney in this case, Itel agreed to provide the attorney with a declaration that he had in effect
conferred a substantial benefit on the bondholders in one of several interrelated actions involving
Itel. This agreement illustrates the ease with which the "substantial benefit" concept can be
manipulated.
163. Because a settlement of the derivative claims will carry res judicata effect, the tactic of
appending derivative claims to the direct securities claims protects the defendant from a second
action attacking basically the same transactions. See supra note 146. Defense counsel have advised
this author that it is important from their perspective to ensure that all foreseeable claims are
resolved in this fashion in one global settlement.
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theory, the attorney is representing both a plaintiff and a defendant with
respect to the same transaction. Although this asserted conflict of interest has
been described as more apparent than real, 164 it is precisely the kind of
doctrinal obstacle that may interfere with the expeditious resolution of the
case and permit free riders to come out of the proverbial woodwork in order
to divert fees from the original plaintiffs attorney.
What answers are possible to the broad problem of destructive inter-
plaintiff competition? Clearly, the litigation of multiple derivative actions in
different jurisdictions wastes both judicial time and the corporation's time,
even apart from its effect on settlement value. To deal adequately with this
problem, a state body analogous to the federal Multi-District Panel would be
necessary to consolidate the cases, but this proposal would probably require
an interstate compact. Short of such a visionary step, a presumption might be
recognized that courts should normally stay the subsequently filed cases.
Additional forms of interstate judicial coordination also need to be
explored. 
65
Extortion of the plaintiffs attorney by a threat to delay the settlement is a
problem that can be dealt with more successfully. Once again, the best
answer starts with the need for greater skepticism of nonpecuniary
settlements. Black letter law states that, unless the objector can improve the
settlement, he is not entitled to a fee award. Yet, given the cosmetic skills that
today are evident in the design of nonpecuniary settlements, this rule is easily
manipulated. 113" If courts were more skeptical of nonpecuniary settlements,
however, the objector could justify a fee award only if he did in fact cause a
real tangible enhancement of the settlement fund-in which event he deserves
a fee award on the same basis as the original attorney.' 67 Ironically, the ease
with which a cosmetic settlement may be struck invites not only frivolous
litigation, but also spurious objectors who can similarly extort the original
plaintiffs attorney.
164. Although some state court decisions have declined to allow the same plaintiff to maintain
both direct and derivative actions simultaneously because of this asserted conflict of interest, modern
federal court decisions have taken a more tolerant attitude and have typically found the potential
( ,)nflict to be insignificant. See In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 455 F. Supp. 999, 1014
(N.D. Ill. 197 8): Bertozzi v. King Louie Int'l. Inc., 240 F. Supp. 1166, 1179-80 (D.R.I. 1976).
165. Communications between courts in different jurisdictions might result in one court staying
the action before it in preference to the action in the other jurisdiction. More formalized procedures
might also be adopted so that attorneys in the pending actions could be assured an adequate
r,pwttinity to object to any settlement proposed in a different parallel action. Most importantly,
Courts in different state jurisiictions could agree on a common steering committee of plaintiffs'
aitornevs that would manage the actions in both jurisdictions, thereby reducing the potential for
interplaintif competition. This approach would in effect institutionalize a price-fixing agreement to
preveni destructive competition.
166. Ser supra noteS 154-61. 162 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 154. 161.
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B. Financing the Plaintiffs' Action
For diverse reasons, plaintiffs' attorneys are chronically underfinanced.
Given the small size of the typical plaintiffs' firm, 168 its cash flow predictably
will be more volatile than that of a larger, more diversified firm, and it will
probably have smaller capital reserves. In turn, commercial banks, which are
virtually the exclusive source of credit for law firms, will be more cautious in
the amount of the loans they are willing to make to such a firm. Because most
creditors are not skilled at appraising the value of the contingent future
returns from risky litigation, they are willing to lend only against the assets,
and not the expected future earnings, of the plaintiffs' firm. As a result, it is
the personal credit of the individual attorneys that secures, and thereby sets
the ceiling on, bank credit to the small firm attorney.
At the same time, the cost of undertaking a complex action has grown
significantly in recent years to the point where it can strain or exceed the
borrowing capacity of most plaintiffs' firms. For example, in the recent Agent
Orange action, the plaintiffs' management committee spent over $1 million
between October, 1983 andJune 15, 1984, and it estimated that it would have
to spend an additional $2 to $3 million to carry the case another nine months
to trial.' 69 Obviously, if these costs exceed the financial resources of the
plaintiffs' team, the result is enhanced pressure to settle early and for a far
lesser amount than they could obtain if they could secure additional financing.
The Agent Orange case supplies an instructive illustration both of (1) what
actually happens when plaintiffs find themselves lacking the finances
necessary to continue an action, and (2) the substantial barrier that existing
legal rules may pose to one of the most logical ways in which plaintiffs'
attorneys can obtain additional financing. At the end of 1983, the plaintiffs'
management committee in that case recognized that it "lacked the financial
capacity to continue the litigation."'' 7 0 At this point, the management
committee was expanded and new attorneys able to finance the action were
admitted. The reconstituted committee then entered into an internal
agreement among themselves under which six creditor attorneys (who
together constituted a majority of the nine-member committee) would fund
the remaining litigation costs by contributing $200,000 apiece in monthly
installments of $12,500.1 71 Eventually, over $1 million was contributed by
these six members, and the trial court acknowledged the legitimacy of the
expenses thus funded. 172 In return, the internal agreement specified that any
attorney fees awarded by the court would be redistributed among the
168. Currently, the largest plaintiffs' firm handling securities litigation appears to be Milberg,
Weiss, Bershad, Spectrie & Lerach, which had only 37 lawyers as of late 1984. See supra note 49.
169. See Moore, Fee Splitting Agreement Draws Attention of Agent Orange Judge, Legal Times, Nov. 5,
1984, at 2, col. 7; see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, slip op. at 60
(E.D.N.Y., Jan. 7, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Agent Orange I], modified, 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) [hereinafter, cited as Agent Orange II].
170. Moore, supra note 164, at 7, col. 3 (quoting Phillip Allen, one of the plaintiffs' attorneys).
171. Id.
172. Agent Orange H, 611 F. Supp. at 1330-31 (awarding expenses for the plaintiffs management
committee of $1,390,686.18, subject to additional certification).
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committee members so that the attorneys who had advanced these funds
would receive triple the amount of the funds so advanced. Thereafter, half
the remaining fees would be distributed in equal shares among each of the
committee members, and the remaining portion of the award would be
divided on a basis that primarily reflected the hours worked by each
attorney.'73 In net effect, this agreement transferred a substantial portion of
the expected fees that the minority of the committee that had already
expended substantial time on the case stood to receive to the newly arrived
attorneys who would advance the necessary funds for the completion of the
action.
On public disclosure of this agreement, controversy erupted. One
attorney prominently involved in the case has claimed that the agreement
amounts to "300% interest . . . [charged by] your friendly neighborhood
loan shark"' 174 and has further argued that "[i]t is inappropriate to treat
public-interest class action litigation as an investment vehicle."' 175 At the
hearing on fees, federal district court Judge Jack Weinstein recoiled at the
prospect of substantial reallocation of the fees in favor of persons he
characterized as "money suppliers."1 76 In a lengthy and carefully considered
opinion, which recognized both the arguments for deferring to the attorneys'
own bargain and those for judicial scrutiny, 177 Judge Weinstein took the
position that any redistribution of the fees among the attorneys in a manner
173. Agent Orange I, slip. op. at 60.
174. Moore, supra note 169, at 7, col. 2 (quoting Victor Yannacone, the attorney who initiated
the litigation and was subsequently displaced as lead counsel).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1, col. 3.
177. Judge Weinstein's analysis begins with a cogent summary of the arguments for judicial
deference to fee sharing arrangements made within the plaintiffs' team that assembles to litigate a
large class action:
The [pilaintiffs management committee may be considered an ad hoc law firm. Like any law
firm, it is free to allocate its revenues as it sees fit. Realities of the business aspects of law
practice often require that those who bring clients and capital to the firm be better rewarded
than those whose talents lie in the area of preparing legal papers and arguments. Rainmakers
are usually better rewarded than those who labor in the back room . . . . These factors as well
as the principle of freedom of contract argue in favor of 'deference to the parties' contractual
agreements' if possible.
Agent Orange I, slip op. at 60-61.
Little quarrel can be had with this reasoning, but in the opinion's very next sentence a conclusion
is reached that is in sharp tension with the foregoing logic:
Nevertheless, the court's obligations to the . . . class members under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e) require it to review the reasonableness of the internal management agreement
• . . [citing cases] . . . . A division of fees without regard to work performed or responsibility
assumed is not 'in compliance with the standard' for fixing fees. Prandini v. National Tea Co.,
557 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1979). The 'touchstone for the fee [is] to be the actual effort made
by the attorney to benefit the class' [quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093,
1099 (2d Cir. 1977)].
Agent Orange I, slip. op. at 61-62.
In short, although the decision recognizes that justifications exist for deferring to the parties' own
agreement, it seems to conclude that the law requires the court to monitor the reasonableness of any
fee sharing agreement. Prior decisions appear not to have gone this far, but only to have invalidated
agreements between an attorney and a client, see Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1105 (3d Cir.
1979), or agreements involving forwarding fees where the agreement was not disclosed to the court
as required by local court rules. See Lewis v. Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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that was substantially disproportionate to the relative value of the work
actually done by the individual attorneys could both undermine the intent of
the lodestar formula and violate professional ethics.' 78 In the face of Judge
Weinstein's evident hostility to the agreement, the committee members
renegotiated it, retaining the provision for a reimbursement of the sums
already advanced according to the same multiple of three, but deleting the
further provisions that gave the incoming committee members an additional
share of the fees received by the others. As so revised, Judge Weinstein
upheld the agreement, although not without some trepidation, relying initially
on the fact that the agreement had not been challenged and that the state of
the law was "so unformed" with respect to such an agreement as to refute any
intent on the part of the involved attorneys to violate ethical or disciplinary
rules. 179  In substance, the court both compelled the reformation of a
contract that had already been performed by the creditor attorneys and
suggested that the prospective validity of such agreements remained
questionable. Standing alone, this initial decision left plaintiffs' attorneys in
an exposed position, because it implied that any bargain struck among them
to redistribute fees was of questionable validity. Either on the ground that the
bargain was unfair (as subsequently perceived by the court) or on the ground
that the fee shifting was not in proportion to the work actually done, the
agreement could be rendered unenforceable long after the creditor side had
relied on it.
Matters did not, however, rest at this unsettled stage. One of the original
plaintiffs' attorneys whose fees were largely shifted to the incoming team of
creditor attorneys formally moved to invalidate the agreement, chiefly on the
ground that the fees received under it were not in proportion to the work
actually done as required by Disciplinary Rule 2-107(a). In rejecting this
motion, Judge Weinstein reached two important conclusions on matters of
apparent first impression. He ruled first that the agreement could stand,
essentially because the plaintiffs' team constituted an ad hoc law firm, which
thus could redistribute fees internally on any basis without violating the terms
of Disciplinary Rule 2-107, and, second, that all future agreements of this sort
178. The decision states a rule that would appear to permit only de minimis deviations:
When an attorney has performed services for the class but is allocated a portion of the fee award
that is far different from the book value of the work done, the allocation may be set aside by the
court. Whether the total fee award amount is affected by the allocation is immaterial.
Agent Orange , slip op. at 62.
In support of this rule, the court relied principally on Disciplinary Rules 2-107(a) and 5-103(A) of
the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, which restrict fee splitting among lawyers not
members of the same firm and prohibit lawyers from acquiring an interest in a litigation, respectively.
See infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
179. Agent Orange I, slip op. at 63, 112-14 (discussing revision in fee sharing agreement).
Initially, Judge Weinstein found the substantive legal issues on fee sharing agreements to be
unresolved by prior precedent: "The law on this matter is so unformed that it is doubtful that the
attorneys were aware when they entered into the original agreement that its validity might be
scrutinized." Id. at 114.
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should be prospectively disclosed to the court at the time they were entered
into to permit their review for reasonableness. 180
The compromise thus struck avoids the danger of retroactive surprise that
might chill the willingness of creditor attorneys to finance contingent fee
litigation. It also recognizes the basic reality that the litigation of a large scale
class action today requires the creation of an ad hoc plaintiffs' law firm, which
needs to be able to share fees internally. But it still places the court in the
position of a utility regulator, determining if the internal sharing was fair.
Should a court undertake this role?
The answer to this question depends in part on whether one looks at the
agreement from an ex post or an ex ante perspective. Viewed from the
former perspective at the time the court awards fees, it may seem that the
incoming attorneys are receiving an excessive return based on the obvious
leverage they held over the other attorneys who, although they had worked
long and hard on the action, could no longer afford its costs. But is this the
appropriate vantage point? If contracts were generally subject to invalidation
because one party receives a windfall, the law of contracts would look very
different than it does today. In general, contract law normally looks to the
bargaining process, not the ultimate outcome. From a perspective that
focuses on the bargain at the time it was struck, it seems that there is little
basis for suspicion. In Agent Orange, the plaintiffs' team was insolvent, and it
had to attract new capital to bring the action to trial. Although those
members on the management committee who could not advance further
funds stood to lose compensation for their considerable time already
expended in the action, this time was a sunk cost that would be disregarded by
a rational decisionmaker. To put it simply, had additional funds not been
secured, this time would probably have had little value because the action
would have had to be abandoned or settled very cheaply. While a 300%
return may seem excessive in absolute terms, there is no apparent reason to
distrust the bargaining among the attorneys that produced this result; those
180. The motion to invalidate the fee sharing agreement reached by the Plaintiffs' Management
Committee ("PMC") members was made by David Dean, a committee member who received a court
awarded fee of $1,340,437.50, of which the agreement apparently would have shifted $1,009,090.75
to the new "creditor" attorneys who had joined the action when the plaintiffs' team was effectively
bankrupt. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1453-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Agent Orange III]. In this later opinion, Judge Weinstein emphasized that all the
members of the Committee had "assumed joint responsibility for prosecution of the class action, and
that assumption of responsibility was approved by the court on behalf of the class." Agent Orange III,
611 F. Supp. at 1459. This approach satisfied the formal requirement of ABA Model Rule 1.5, but
not the New York equivalent to Disciplinary Rule 2-107, which requires that the fees be proportioned
to the work done, unless the attorneys are in the same "firm." On this point, Judge Weinstein ruled
that the plaintiffs' team was a single firm: "The PMC may be considered an ad hoc law firm, a joint
venture formed for the purpose of prosecuting the Agent Orange multidistrict litigation." Agent
Orange II1, 611 F. Supp. at 1458. This characterization is the critical element which makes DR 2-107
inapplicable. Note, however, that the court's ruling would not apparently apply to passive "creditor"
attorneys, who did not assume active responsibility for the case.
The disclosure requirement was imposed by amending Local Rule 5 of the Eastern District Civil
Rules to require immediate disclosure of the fee sharing agreement. Agent Orange I11, 611 F. Supp. at
1462-64.
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who agreed to subordinate or shift their claims to the newly arrived attorneys
had every reason to bargain at arm's length and no reason to pay an excessive
return.
From the standpoint of the clients represented by these attorneys, the
agreement seems even less objectionable. The worst possible result would be
to bar any shifting of fees by agreement among the plaintiffs' attorneys
because such a prohibition would deprive the plaintiffs' attorneys of the one
form of currency (a contingent right to fees) with which additional capital
could be attracted; hence, it would maximize the danger of cheap settlements
not in the interest of the class. Precisely because banks and other institutional
creditors are unwilling today to appraise the value of a contingent interest in
pending litigation, it seems undesirable to discourage other attorneys, who
are the one group who can evaluate such a contingent asset, from undertaking
the role of financing the litigation. Nor is it sensible to characterize the
attorneys who agreed to advance funds as money lenders charging a
"usurious" rate of interest.' 8 ' They are better viewed as a class of equity
investors whose ability to recoup their investment depends very much on their
own efforts. In this light, the entire transaction closely resembles what
happens in any number of small partnerships that find themselves lacking
adequate capital to continue business. Under such circumstances, the
partnership agreement is revised to transfer some (or all) of the equity
interest to those existing or incoming partners able to advance additional
capital, and nothing in the process attracts judicial attention.
Should courts therefore adopt an attitude of benign neglect toward fee
redistribution agreements? Here, a more qualified answer is necessary. Judge
Weinstein could well be right that such agreements should be judicially
scrutinized for their "reasonableness," but for a different reason. The
interest to be protected is not the lawyer's, but the client's. Under a number
of circumstances, fee agreements could enhance the danger of a premature.
cheap settlement not in the interest of the class. For example, had those
advancing funds in the Agent Orange case agreed to carry the action to trial in
return for a specified percentage of any attorney fees ultimately awarded,
these creditor attorneys might have had a strong interest in negotiating an
181. The possible relevance of the usury laws to a fee sharing agreement was suggested b%
Judge Weinstein: "[L]aw is a business and within limits of public policy such as those set by the usury
laws, lawyers make their own business arrangements as do other business people." Agent Oriange 1.
slip. op. at 113.
As the court next noted, however, there was "doubt that the money to fund the litigation could
have been obtained on more favorable terms." Agent Orange 1, slip. op. at 113-14. Thus, if other
more attractive sources of credit were unavailable, this analogy to usury has the potential effect of
denying credit altogether. In any event, it seems strange to analyze fee sharing agreements in terms
of the concept of usury. Usury laws exist to protect the commercially incompetent or disadvantaged.
not experienced attorneys who will incur no personal liability in any event. Most states do not apply
usury laws to corporate indebtedness, because of the limited liability enjoyed by shareholders.
Correspondingly, fee shifting agreements impose no liability on the assignor; rather, he merely gives
up an expectancy. Also, attorneys are increasingly incorporated in professional corporations.
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early settlement in order to minimize their costs. 18 2 Alternatively, if the
attorneys who assigned some or all of their expected right to compensation
from the action were to remain active in the litigation, a problem of incentive
might arise: why should these original attorneys work hard for little or
nothing?
A countervailing, and possibly more serious, danger involves a moral
hazard problem: if the assigning attorney retains only that small portion of
the expected fee that will remain once all the creditor attorneys are paid their
prior claims, he may prefer to gamble on a bonanza in the form of a very
large, but unlikely, recovery at trial. Thus, he would rationally refuse an
adequate settlement that his clients would willingly accept. In such a case, his
position resembles that of a speculative warrant-holder who can profit only if
the recovery exceeds all realistic expectations. Finally, from an even more ex
ante perspective, if we do not guarantee the original attorney some portion of
the expected fee, he may prefer to negotiate a cheap settlement with the
defendants instead of assigning his rights in the action to a new team of
plaintiffs' attorneys (as essentially occurred in Agent Orange). Although the
problem of collusive settlements caused by the impending insolvency of the
incumbent plaintiffs' team could be addressed by requiring close judicial
scrutiny of settlements and permitting other plaintiffs to intervene when the
incumbent team appeared incapable of pursuing the action effectively, our
earlier discussion of existing practices at the judicial approval stage provides
little basis for optimism. Still, none of these problems was necessarily present
on the facts of Agent Orange, where control of the case had clearly been
transferred to the six-member majority of the management committee who
were to invest the needed funds. Yet, to the extent that the incoming
attorneys received a present right to an equal share of the fees received by all
the committee members (after the trebled repayment of expenses), it is
theoretically possible that an immediate settlement could have maximized
their own economic position.' 83
The potential danger here is a familiar one to students of corporate law;
once ownership and control are separated, there is a danger that the agent
may behave opportunistically. ' 8 4 Opportunistic behavior could take the form
182. From the standpoint of marginal analysis, this incoming group would look at the marginal
revenue from continuing the action as compared with the marginal costs. Because this group is
bearing all of the marginal costs of continuing the action but receiving only a portion of the marginal
revenues therefrom, however, they could rationally decide to settle the action, although the entire
plaintiffs' team as a unit would wish to continue it. For example, if they had struck a bargain under
which they would receive 50% of all fees awarded and another year's effort would increase the
settlement fund by $800,000 at a cost of $500,000, the incoming team should prefer to settle
immediately, because they would experience a marginal loss of $100,000 from continuing the action
(i.e., 50% of $800,000 is $100,000 less than the $500,000 expected cost).
183. It was precisely this equal sharing provision that was deleted by the parties to the internal
management agreement after Judge Weinstein expressed his initial skepticism about the agreement.
See Agent Orange I, slip op. at 60, 112.
184. This danger is essentially the same "separation of ownership and control" problem as that
described in another context by Berle & Means. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (arguing that corporate managers had achieved
dominance over shareholders in the publicly held corporation). For a modern restatement of this
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of either the assigning attorney seeking to enter into a premature settlement
(if he had little continuing equity in the action but would be forced to incur
some further out-of-pocket or opportunity costs) or rejecting an adequate
settlement (if he could profit only by seeking to beat the litigation odds at
trial). In the vocabulary of modern financial economics, an incentive may
arise either to "shirk" or to accept high-risk gambles that the client would
decline, because the attorney has nothing to lose.' 8 5 Either way, once the
attorney's interests are subdivided between those of creditor attorneys and
debtor attorneys, the possibility of a misalignment between the interests of
attorney and client is increased.
These problems are at least partially solvable. To the extent that the
attorneys financing the action also assume control of it (as they did in Agent
Orange), the problems associated with a separation of ownership and control
fade somewhat in significance, because the debtor group will not be in a
position to delay the action or accept an imprudent gamble. When control
passes, the practical danger is that creditor attorneys (who have received a
partial assignment of other attorneys' interests in the action in return for their
agreement to fund expected expenses) might favor a premature settlement in
order to minimize their costs. 186 Still, the formula ultimately adopted by the
parties in Agent Orange (in effect, an agreement to pay interest on the funds
actually so advanced) only compensates the creditor attorney to the extent he
reasonably expends funds on actual litigation expenses; it thereby creates
little incentive for premature settlement. Indeed, at some high enough
interest rate, it could even create an incentive for overinvestment and delay.
Thus, the one aspect of the fee redistribution agreement that was upheld by
Judge Weinstein (namely, the interest rate provision) does seem the least
problematic. 187  Conversely, those provisions that he indicated an
unwillingness to accept can be said at least to intensify the pressures for
premature settlements. '8 8
problem in the vocabulary of financial economics, see Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. & ECON. 305 (1976). Although many
economists dismiss the problems associated with the separation of ownership and control in large
public corporations because of the existence of efficient capital markets, there is no such market with
respect to investments in litigation.
185. Whatever the fee formula used, a "moral hazard" problem arises once those in control of
the action stand to benefit only if there is an extremely large recovery. This would be the case if the
attorneys had assigned, for example, 95% of their interest in the action to creditors who had funded
the action in return for such an interest. Economic theory suggests that the smaller the percentage
of the expected fee award retained by a debtor attorney (who is not otherwise personally liable), the
greater will be his willingness to gamble. Such an attorney is in the same position as the equity
shareholders of a corporation that is capitalized 99% by debt and only 1% by equity. Standard
financial theory suggests that the equity shareholders of a thinly capitalized firm would adopt a risk-
preferring approach to corporate decisionmaking because they have little to lose and much to gain.
That is, the downside risk falls primarily on their creditors, while they receive any upside gain. See
generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 184.
186. See supra note 182.
187. Indeed, rather than seeming suspicious, this form of arrangement may counteract the
pressures that otherwise exist for early settlement.
188. Although Judge Weinstein did not invalidate the original agreement, his indicated
unwillingness to accept that portion of it under which the incoming attorneys acquired the right to
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A case can thus be made for limited judicial review of fee sharing
agreements, but not because of any danger that "usurious" interest rates will
be exacted. Rather, the argument, founded on economic theory, is for some
regulation of the capital structure of the ad hoc plaintiffs' law firm. If this
capital structure becomes overly leveraged (in the sense that the attorneys
principally handling the action assign or pledge too high a proportion of the
expected return), an attorney may have an incentive either to shirk or to
gamble imprudently, but he will have little reason to behave as his clients
would want.' 89 Nonetheless, the remedy for this problem is not judicial
regulation of the "reasonableness" of the rate of return received by the
creditor attorneys on an ex post basis, because this will only deny credit and
produce an underfunded action. Instead, the court should function like a
bankruptcy court dealing with the management of an insolvent corporation
and replace lead counsel when his minimal remaining interest in the action
would give rise to a likely moral hazard problem. In particular, the court
should examine the finances of the plaintiffs' team at the settlement hearing.
If they appear to be financially strained and unable to carry the action much
further, there is considerable reason for the court to be skeptical of the
settlement; in such a case, it should determine if other attorneys are willing to
intervene and then require that the plaintiffs' team be reconstituted if they
are. Such a compelled restructuring is justified because the economic self-
interest of the original plaintiffs' team is more likely to point toward a cheap
settlement with the defendants than a voluntary sale of the action to a new
plaintiffs' team. Inherently, the defendants would rationally pay more for a
cheap settlement than other plaintiffs' attorneys would pay for the right to
take over the action, because the potential loss to be averted by the
defendants exceeds the potential gain to the plaintiffs' attorneys (whose fee is
typically a modest percentage of that loss).190
Similarly, the court should assure itself that any group assuming control of
the action has not struck a bargain under which it has an immediate incentive
to settle in order to avoid funding the litigation's expenses. In all likelihood,
the parties to any such fee splitting arrangement will be sufficiently
sophisticated so as to strike a bargain that minimizes these misincentives,
which invariably injure one or the other; thus judicial review will need to focus
intensively only on the unusual or aberrant agreement that seems to create
share equally in legal fees attributable to the time expended by the former lead counsel group
resulted in the parties deleting this portion of the agreement. See supra note 182.
189. In all likelihood, the typical outcome in these circumstances will be that the creditor
attorneys will assume control of the case (if the court permits) at the time they advance funds. Yet,
this transition, while probably desirable, could sometimes simply change one set of perverse
incentives for another, if the incoming attorneys have an incentive to settle prematurely in order to
minimize their costs.
190. For example, assume that an action has an expected recovery of $2,000,000 and that,
however the fee is computed, it will range between $200,000 and $400,000. Obviously, the value of
this action cannot exceed $400,000 to either team of plaintiffs' attorneys, but the defendants would
gladly offer a $500,000 fee for a nonpecuniary settlement. This analysis means that even if a sale of
the action between attorneys could be made, outcomes like that in Good v. Texaco, No. 84-7051 (Del.
Ch. May 14, 1984), should persist.
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such a misincentive. Procedurally, the soundest rule is that of Judge
Weinstein: namely, the prospective judicial approval of fee sharing
agreements before funds are advanced pursuant to them. This procedure
both protects the creditor attorneys and forces the court to recognize that the
grim alternative, if it rejects the financing arrangements, might be an
underfinanced action. Once such an agreement was approved, it would then
be possible later to award the fees directly to the plaintiffs' management
committee based on a master fee petition submitted by the committee.
C. Legal Ethics Versus the Need for Diversification
The point has been earlier made that both the solo practitioner and the
attorney in a small firm face considerable risk when they undertake to
represent plaintiffs in a complex case on a contingent fee basis. Each is
investing a significant proportion of his time in a risky gamble, especially in
the case of the derivative action where the litigation odds appear to be
forbiddingly adverse to the plaintiffs.' 9' Unless the attorney is the unusual
soul who is actually a risk preferer (or one who sees a strategic advantage in
winning a highly publicized verdict in order to gain a reputation he can later
trade on),1 92 the small size of the typical plaintiffs attorney's firm implies that
the attorney is likely to be more risk averse than his colleagues in larger firms
and thus logically more inclined to accept an inadequate settlement that his
clients would prefer to reject. Even when dozens of plaintiffs' lawyers
cooperate on a single case and in effect form an ad hoc law firm that spreads
the risk, this analysis holds true at least for those attorneys who remain
disproportionately dependent on the results of a single case.
The theoretical answer to this problem is simple: to lower the attorney's
level of risk aversion, a means must be found to allow him to hedge his bets-
in effect, to diversify his portfolio. The attorney practicing in a large firm
obtains this benefit automatically, because (at least over the short run) any
decline in one department's business may be offset by an increase in
another's. In principle, plaintiffs' attorneys could achieve diversification
simply by trading participations in each other's cases. Such trading would
likely occur only among attorneys who were known to each other, and to a
limited extent such trading may already occur through reciprocal work
assignments. That is, if Attorney X is lead counsel in a large securities class
action and Attorney Y is lead counsel in an antitrust class action, each may
invite the other (or his firm) to participate in his case. The principal motive is
probably not to achieve risk spreading, but rather that lead counsel in a large
class action typically needs more manpower for discovery and related tasks
than his own firm can supply and presumably would prefer to obtain
191. See supra note 35 (noting that rate of litigated victories for plaintiffs in derivative actions is
under one percent).
192. This is widely believed to be the litigation strategy many plaintiffs' attorneys follow. Cf
Ross, supra note 44; Rosenthal, supra note 117.
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assistance from other attorneys whose work he knows and respects.
Nevertheless, risk spreading is a desirable side effect of these arrangements.
Still, this technique for achieving diversification encounters a substantial
legal obstacle. If, for example, two attorneys were simply to swap twenty-five
percent shares in each other's cases, a serious question of legal ethics would
arise. Under the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility (which is still the
source of the disciplinary rules in force today in most states), fee splitting
among attorneys is only permitted to the extent that the division of fees "is
made in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by
each" attorney.193 Thus, if an attorney who was not active in a case reaches an
agreement with another who was active, under which he will receive a quarter
of the fees awarded to the other, the agreement appears to offend this rule. In
fact, courts are divided over this rule's interpretation. Some have been quite
relaxed about its enforcement, focusing only on the totality of the fee in
relation to the services rendered and results obtained, and have not objected
to a redistribution of the fee by private contract among the attorneys. 194
Other decisions have questioned this "doctrine of judicial indifference" to
attorney fee sharing arrangements. 195
Viewed from a distance, one may sensibly ask: What is the harm
threatened by private fee sharing arrangements that reallocate fees earned by
one attorney to another? One plausible answer involves the danger that the
attorney selling his interest will lose his incentive to pursue the action
vigorously. For example, if the attorney syndicated away all of his interest, he
would have no incentive to pursue the action; instead, it might be abandoned
or settled cheaply. This problem is essentially the same "moral hazard"
problem discussed earlier with respect to the creditor attorney. Concededly,
it is unlikely to arise if those engaging in the exchange had accurate
information as to the total percentage of the attorney's interest being sold.
Because no rational purchaser would acquire an interest in any asset if the
effect of doing so would deprive the manager of the asset of his incentive (and
thus the purchased interest of its value), informed investors should not permit
the lead plaintiff's attorney to reduce his residual interest in the action below
some minimal level. At most, this danger justifies an upper boundary on fee
sharing arrangements and probably their disclosure to the court, but not their
prohibition.
The historical, but less forceful, justification for the rule against fee
sharing is that it appears unseemly: fee splitting conflicts with one's sense of
193. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A)(2) (1971). Although the Code
of Professional Responsibility has been superseded by the ABA's MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, which was adopted by ABA's House of Delegates in 1983, the Code of Professional
Responsibility remains the body of law currently in force in most states, pending eventual revision.
194. See Del Noce v. Delyar Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Valente v. Pepsico,
1979 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,116 (E.D. PA. 1979); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D.
395, 400 (D.D.C. 1978); cf Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1105, 1111 (3d Cir. 1979); see also supra
note 180.
195. Kamens v. Horizon Corp., 1981 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,007 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Agent
Orange I, slip op. at 61-63.
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the lawyer as a professional, as a fiduciary to his client who should never
consider his self-interest in determining when to settle or litigate an action.
The recognition that law is a form of commerce is distasteful to many.' 96
Others may feel that fee splitting tends to increase the total fee that the client
will bear. Yet, the irony is that these considerations do not apply with much
force to the context of class and derivative actions. By permitting fee sharing
(within limits), one actually makes the lawyer a better servant of the client by
reducing his dependence on a single case, thereby decreasing his level of
likely risk aversion and dampening the incentives for early settlement. Also,
so long as fees are awarded on a percentage-of-the-recovery basis, the total
fee is increased only to the extent the client's recovery is enhanced.
Nonetheless, a strict interpretation of existing disciplinary rules would
preclude not only efficient diversification of the lawyer/entrepreneur's
portfolio but would also bar any financing arrangements (such as those
present in Agent Orange) that have the effect of distributing the fee award in a
manner that is not proportional to the time actually expended by the
individual attorney. 19 7
Viewed from the client's perspective, even a "forwarding" fee, under
which the attorney who is handling the case compensates an attorney who
refers an eligible plaintiff to him, seems largely unobjectionable when the
court awards the fee, because such an arrangement between attorneys does
not expose the client to any increase in the fee, but simply redistributes it
among the attorneys. Although such fees are today sometimes invalidated
when discovered, they appear to be relatively common in class and derivative
actions.' 98 Tacky as such forwarding fee practices may appear, they may have
considerable utility, because, absent such a compensation system, the local
attorney would have little incentive to identify an attorney able to handle a
complex securities or antitrust case and refer the client to him. Such fees in
effect grease the rails of the underground railroad that directs eligible
plaintiffs to specialized attorneys.
Given, on the one hand, that an ability to spread their risks would increase
the plaintiffs' attorneys' fidelity to their clients' interests and, on the other,
that a tradition of hostility to fee splitting is deeply ingrained in our legal
culture and legal ethics, what compromise appears feasible? Realistically, the
196. Nonetheless, courts are increasingly recognizing that law is inevitably a business. SeeJudge
Weinstein's comments, supra note 72.
197. Although Judge Weinstein's final opinion in the Agent Orange litigation accepted the
agreement to treble the incoming attorneys' cash contributions out of the fee awards received by the
other attorneys, see supra notes 169-88 and accompanying text, a strict interpretation of Disciplinary
Rule 2-107 could lead to a contrary conclusion because the attorneys are not associated within a
single firm in the usual sense, and their reallocation of fees is not proportional to the work actually
performed.
198. See Kamens v. Horizon Corp., 1981 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,007 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Lewis v. Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11, 17-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Also apparently common are fee
splitting agreements across different cases. This was the substance of much of the charges raised in
the Fine Paper litigation, where it was alleged that firms engaged in reciprocal trading of work
assignments across cases. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 48 F.R.D. 48, 78-79, & n.15 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (noting "buddy system" among plaintiffs' attorneys).
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prospect appears remote that true "fee swapping" agreements will be soon
accepted or upheld under which participations were exchanged between two
attorneys not involved in the same case. If the efficient answer is not within
reach, however, a second best approximation appears achievable. Courts are
accepting the idea of a master fee petition submitted by the plaintiffs'
management or steering committee; 199 this approach obviates any need for
the court to make a distribution of the aggregate fee among the individual
attorneys. The allocation of the fees can then be specified by private contract
(such as the one upheld in Agent Orange). The effect of this procedure should
be to remove the court from a direct monitoring responsibility over fee
sharing arrangements, and for the reasons already indicated a policy of
benign neglect may be the best compromise.
Of course, disciplinary rules still remain an uncertain obstacle. The
federal judge has more discretion than his state counterpart, however,
because the validity of fee sharing agreements will be controlled by federal
procedural law and state disciplinary rules can only indirectly influence his
discretion.2 00 Moreover, the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
adopted in 1983, have modified their prior requirement that any fees received
be in proportion to the services performed by each attorney. Instead, Rule
1.5 now states alternative tests governing any "division of fees between
lawyers who are not in the same firm"; under Rule 1.5(e), fee splitting is
permitted either when the division is in proportion to the services performed
by each lawyer or when "by written agreement with the client, each lawyer
assumes joint responsibility for the representation.- 20 1 Commentary to the
rule adds that the disclosure to the client need not indicate the share each
lawyer is to receive. 20 2 Arguably, this language (if adopted by individual
states) could permit, for example, two attorneys to undertake joint
199. See comments of Professor Arthur Miller in Moore, supra note 169, at 7 (noting recent
instances of use of master fee petitions).
200. See Dunn v. H.R. Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1805, at 1110 n.8; Agent Orange I, slip op. at 62
(federal law should govern court's analysis of internal redistribution agreements among plaintiffs'
attorneys). Presumably, the source of federal law would be FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) and the inherent
supervisory power of federal courts. Courts have on occasion applied local bar association
disciplinary rules to issues of fee disputes, see Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1018 (3d
Cir. 1977), but in such instances they have in effect assimilated those rules as a guide to the exercise
of their general supervisory power.
201. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1983). In relevant part, the Rule
reads:
(e) a division of fees between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written
agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers
involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
Id.
202. Comment (4) to Rule 1.5 states that Paragraph (e) "does not require disclosure to the
client of the share that each lawyer is to receive." It also states that a fee division "most often is used
when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 comment (4). Although the commentary appears
to cover forwarding or referral fees, it is obscure in its application to class actions.
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representation in two actions; one attorney could remain relatively inactive in
one case and the other relatively inactive in the other. The net effect would be
reciprocal fee sharing across two cases, although each attorney would have to
acknowledge that he had undertaken representation in each action.
Substantial issues remain even under Rule 1.5(e) (particularly because it is not
clear how the client can consent in a class action);20 3 however, at least the
prior roadblock in Disciplinary Rule 2-107 may soon be substantially lifted.
In the last analysis, toleration for fee sharing arrangements both benefits
the clients and ends an arbitrary disparity between attorneys in large firms
and those in small firms or solo practice. No rule is today offended when a tax
partner in a large firm shares in the fee award obtained by his litigation
partner. Yet, two full-time litigators who are not affiliated in a firm cannot in
theory share fees across cases, unless the court blinks at the rule or the
foregoing interpretation of Rule 1.5(e) is accepted. Nothing justifies this
difference in treatment, although deference to the interests of large firms may
explain it. Particularly if a percentage-of-the-recovery approach is utilized,
fee sharing should not increase the aggregate fees charged against the
settlement fund. To put it bluntly, hostility toward fee sharing is an
anachronism that prejudices both plaintiffs' attorneys and their clients in
order to maintain a polite image of the attorney as a faithful servent. The
legitimate interests of society can be protected by narrower, more carefully
focused rules.
V
TOWARD REFORM: A CHECKLIST OF NECESSARY STEPS
Proponents of corporate law reform regularly encounter the refrain, "If it
ain't broke, don't fix it." Whatever the merits of this argument, it nowhere
has less applicability than to the context of shareholder litigation. Viewed
from any perspective, the derivative action is not performing as it should.
Plaintiffs' attorneys complain that the advent of the special litigation
committee has made derivative suits an endangered species. Defense counsel
proclaim that strike suits filed only for their nuisance value abound. The
contention of this article has been that both sides could be correct, in large
measure because the two trends are logically linked.
In general, as changes in the law reduce the expected return from an
action to the plaintiffs attorney, it is predictable that he will reduce his
203. The rule requires a "written agreement with the client" authorizing any fee division that is
not in proportion to work actually performed. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e).
It seems unlikely that a written agreement among the attorneys and the lead plaintiff, who is the
nominal representative of the class, would suffice. Certainly, a lead plaintiff could not agree to pay a
50% percentage of the recovery on behalf of the other unrepresented class members, and his power
appears similarly limited in this context. Judge Weinstein's final decision in the Agent Orange
litigation surmounted this hurdle, however, by finding that the court's approval could substitute for
that of the class. See supra note 180. Still, each attorney must accept joint responsibility for the action
if he is to share in such a fee redistribution. Comment (4) to the Rule adds that acceptance of joint
responsibility "entails the obligations stated in Rule 1.5 for purposes of the matter involved." This
would appear to preclude inactive participation in the case.
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investment in such actions. One logical adaptive response is the shotgun
approach to litigation: file numerous actions, invest neither time nor money
significantly in any single action, and pursue early settlements. Not all or even
most plaintiffs' attorneys will necessarily operate in this fashion, but few can
afford to litigate a case zealously when the prospects for a favorable payoff are
poor and the alternative of a cheap settlement coupled with a generous fee
award remains seductively attractive. Prior to the advent of the special
litigation committee, the plaintiffs attorney could at least hope to enhance the
expected return from a derivative action by screening potential cases and
pursuing only those that appeared meritorious. But this distinction between
"strong" cases and "weak" ones becomes less relevant once a litigation
committee of the board is empowered to dismiss either. In consequence, the
plaintiff's attorney can seek to outflank this doctrine either by suing only when
there is a reasonable prospect that demand would be excused 20 4 or by
underbidding the cost of the dismissal process by offering a cheap settlement.
Thus, if one would prefer the plaintiffs attorney to focus on a few cases
intensively, the most logical prescription is to reestablish the relevance of the
litigation's merits by generalizing the power of the court to review the board's
justification for dismissal. This prescription is, of course, precisely the
recommendation of the proposals now pending before the American Law
Institute. 205
What else should be done? Earlier, this article stated a case for the
following changes: (1) a return to a variable percentage-of-the-recovery
formula for fee awards; (2) a stricter standard ofjudicial review with respect to
nonpecuniary settlements (and as to the value of nonpecuniary relief in any
settlement); (3) greater judicial tolerance for fee redistribution agreements
among plaintiffs' attorneys; and (4) the use of a master fee petition filed by the
plaintiffs' steering committee on behalf of all plaintiffs' attorneys in the action.
This last step would achieve a variety of objectives by (1) economizing on the
judicial time involved in reviewing individual fee petitions; (2) eliminating the
need for judicial involvement in the distribution of the aggregate fee award,
thereby facilitating private fee sharing agreements that help to finance the
action and spread the risk; and (3) centralizing the control of the lead counsel
over the action in order to reduce the "free rider" problem that arises when a
horde of plaintiffs' attorneys become involved in the large case.
204. Under Delaware law, on a motion to dismiss by a litigation committee, the court may
review the substantive justifications for dismissal only when demand is excused. See Aronson v.
Lewis, 475 A.3d 805 (Del. 1984). Nonetheless, some subsequent decisions in Delaware, most
notably Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984), still appear to require that the court
determine in all circumstances that the justifications advanced for dismissal were reasonable.
205. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.08
(Discussion Draft No. l,June 3, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Discussion Draft No. 1 ]. In December of
1984, the Council of the American Law Institute approved Discussion Draft No. I for publication. It
should be emphasized (a) that the membership of the Institute has not yet reviewed these proposals
of the American Law Institute, and (b) the author is serving as Reporter for this aspect of the
American Law Institute's Project.
[Vol. 48: No. 3
Page 5: Summer 1985]
One additional step is also essential. If collusive settlements rob the
derivative action of its deterrent threat, none of the foregoing steps alone
precludes collusion. A prophylactic rule is therefore needed: adversaries
should not be permitted to negotiate the fee award until after the settlement
has been judicially approved. 20 6 A rule against contemporaneous negotiation
of the fee award and the settlement shifts discretion from the parties to the
court. Existing precedents in some jurisdictions support this rule,20 7 as have
commentators. 208 Moreover, the usual counterargument against it-namely,
that it would deny the defendant the opportunity to know his total
liability 2 09 -is simply inapplicable in the case of the derivative action.
Because the corporation and not the defendant pays the fee award in
derivative actions, it is irrelevant that the fee award will not be known by the
defendant at the time he accepts the settlement.
In reality, opposition to such a rule is based largely upon a different
consideration. Litigators for both plaintiffs and defendants recoil at any
proposal that restricts their ability to settle a case. When the
counterargument is advanced to them that such a rule would, over the long-
run, discourage frivolous actions because the plaintiffs attorney could not
expect to receive a substantial fee award from the court in return for a cheap
settlement, their consistent response has been that they are not counsel to the
long-run, but only the individual case involving their clients.2 10 This response
once again illustrates the centrality of the ex ante/ex post distinction. If one
looks only ex post (that is, after the action is begun), the defendant's interest
may seem to lie in obtaining the cheapest possible settlement. Examining the
same issue ex ante (before an action is brought), the client's legitimate
interest lies in reducing the incidence of frivolous actions. The prospect of
collusive settlements maximizes the likelihood of nuisance actions, and a
206. For a fuller statement of how this rule could be implemented, see PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.07(b) (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 1]. See also Discussion Draft No. 1, supra note 205, at
232-37.
207. See Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977); Mendosa v. United
States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Regalado v.
Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 451 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Lisa F. v. State of Arizona, 80 F.R.D. 665, 669 (D. Ariz.
1978); Munoz v. Arizona State Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670, 672 (D. Ariz. 1978).
208. See Wolfram, The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limits of Professional
Discipline, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 293, 314; Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34
STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982). See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46 (1977) (noting inherent
conflict of interest).
209. This argument was relied upon by the Supreme Court in White v. New Hampshire Dep't of
Social Servs., 455 U.S. 445 (1982). Even there, the Court acknowledged that simultaneous
negotiation "may raise difficult ethical issues." Id. at 454 n.19. In White and in most nonderivative
actions, the fee recovery will deplete the settlement fund; this is not the case, however, in a derivative
action where the corporation pays the fee award. See supra notes 41, 54-59, and accompanying text.
210. The substance of this argument has been repeatedly made to this author by attorneys
opposed to any proposed prohibition on contemporaneous negotiation. Indeed, no other proposal
made in the A.L.I. Project on Corporate Governance has yet encountered the same degree of
opposition from litigators, many of whom are quite sympathetic to other provisions requiring judicial
review of litigation committee justifications for dismissal.
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prophylactic rule barring contemporaneous fee and settlement negotiations
minimizes this likelihood.
Of course, one can debate whether such a reform is practical. To the
extent that one doubts that it can be enforced, the case is strengthened for a
return to a variable percentage-of-the-recovery fee formula, which, unlike the
lodestar or any hybrid formula that gives substantial weight to a time
component, cannot be easily manipulated by the parties.2 1' Still, even an
imperfectly implemented reform can yield significant marginal improvements.
If such a prohibition were backstopped by a certification requirement under
which counsel would be required to affirm to the court that they had not
engaged in prohibited fee discussions, it seems likely that the exchange of
generous fees for low settlements would be impeded. 212 In particular,
because the corporation itself is a third player in the game, it is unrealistic to
expect it to accept placidly a plaintiff's request for a generous fee that will
disproportionately deplete the recovery it has received. So long as the
corporation's discretion is preserved by a ban on contemporaneous fee and
settlement negotiation, the plaintiff must fear that the corporation will oppose
an excessive fee award. Although we cannot assume that the corporation will
take a long-term perspective and resist the extortion implicit in nuisance
actions (because it is not a repeat player), we can make its short-term
perspective approach a similar result by severing the settlement and fee
determination issues. The real obstacle in preventing collusion is the
interests of the professionals-the attorneys on both sides-who have little
interest in minimizing the incidence of litigation but considerable interest in
avoiding the prospect of defeat inherent in a litigated outcome.
Ironically, any proposal that effectively precluded collusive settlements
might well spell the end of the derivative action today. The advent of the
special litigation committee and the judicial deference that has been given to
its decision have chiefly served to erode the expected return on meritorious
actions. Thus, if cosmetic settlements were chilled, the expected return on an
action might justify its commencement only in the limited set of circumstances
when demand was excused. 213 In this light, any proposal to restrict collusive
settlements represents an unbalanced reform package, unless it is
accompanied by standards that generalize the court's obligation to review the
substantive justifications advanced for dismissal by the committee and thereby
reject the "demand required/demand excused" distinction. This position is
211. Some manipulation is still possible to the extent that the adversaries could agree on the
specific percentage of the recovery that the court should award. If, for example, the court typically
awarded a percentage between 15% and 25% of the recovery in derivative actions, the plaintiffs
attorney might be willing to discount the settlement in return for the defendant's agreement not to
object to a 25% fee award.
212. 1 believe that it is unrealistic to think that counsel would normally be prepared to certify
the nonexistence of discussions when they had in fact occurred. Not only would this represent
perjury, but in multiparty actions involving numerous counsel there are simply too many persons
involved for any secret to be safely kept. Counsel are also repeat players who will not rationally risk
their professional reputations on success in one action. For a similar conclusion, see Wolfram, supra
note 208, at 314.
213. See supra note 204.
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in essence that taken in the various ALl drafts 2 14 and its defense is beyond the
scope of this article.
Still, from an academic perspective, it is worth asking why the law should
not simply disregard the special litigation committee and thereby treat the
derivative action like any other civil suit. What justification exists for ever
dismissing a legally sufficient action other than on the merits? One possible
response is that the special litigation committee could be a preferable
screening device to currently existing mechanisms, such as the security for
expenses bond. If one starts with the assumption recognized at the outset of
this article that the American rule on fee shifting encourages weak cases to be
filed that the English rule would preclude,21 5 then the traditional security for
expenses bond becomes comprehensible as a partial substitute for the English
rule requiring fee shifting. Because outside directors should be uniquely risk
averse, given their nominal investment in the corporation, a bond
requirement that discourages nonmeritorious actions can be more
convincingly justified in this context than in that of civil litigation generally.216
However, the security for expenses bond is an overbroad remedy that is in the
process of being abandoned. 21 7 In terms of this article's analysis, its leading
defect is that it can chill plaintiffs' attorneys who are undercapitalized or
otherwise unwilling to accept the risk of loss inherent in fee shifting. It adds
to the attorney's downside risk and thus compounds the problem of his likely
risk aversion. In contrast, the special litigation committee device may reduce
the settlement value of a case, but it does not add to the downside risk.
Potentially, it could be structured to provide a superior screening mechanism
by which to filter out weak cases, because it could have a lesser chilling effect
on the plaintiffs attorney.
To be sure, the litigation committee will be an imperfect screening
mechanism, however designed, and errors will occur. But the focus should be
less on the possibility of error than on the relative error rate. From the latter
perspective, the advantage of the special litigation committee procedure (in
comparison with the security for expenses bond requirement) is that the
filtering principle becomes not the attorney's ability to accept the contingency
of a financial sanction (i.e., fee shifting), but rather the court's estimate of the
action's probable merit. 218 In addition, an important timing difference
214. See supra note 205.
215. See supra notes 41-42.
216. See supra, text accompanying notes 43-46, regarding the argument that outside directors,
typically having only a small stake in the corporation, should be more risk averse than other
defendants.
217. Section 49 of the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT was revised in 1982 to delete its
former provision authorizing a security for expenses bond when the plaintiffs shareholdings in the
corporation were small. Delaware law has never provided for a security for expenses bond, and
commentators have generally found that its application could be evaded by a variety of stratagems.
See generally Note, supra note 33. For a survey of state statutes finding that the majority of
jurisdictions do not authorize a special security for expenses bond in the case of derivative actions,
see Discussion Draft No. 1, supra note 205, at 71-74, 75-76.
218. Of course, the attorney's willingness to accept the risk of fee shifting against him will
depend in substantial part on his evaluation of the action's merit. Thus, Professor Shavell argues
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distinguishes the special litigation committee as a screening device. Because
the critical threshold comes at a relatively early point in the litigation (i.e.,
when the litigation committee makes its motion), the plaintiff's attorney who
survives this juncture thereafter has considerable incentive to invest in case
preparation and pursue a litigated outcome. Conversely, the plaintiff's
attorney who is required to post a security for expenses bond faces a
downside risk of a financial loss (in addition to his own out-of-pocket costs)
until the resolution of the case. Of these two alternatives, the security for
expenses bond maintains the attorney in a state of continuing uncertainty,
whereas the committee procedure could be structured so as to signal the
court's determination that the action had potential merit. This signal, which
would be implicit in the court's rejection of the committee's motion, could
encourage investment in the action, while the bond requirement will always
discourage investment.
At present, however, this asserted timing difference is more illusory than
real. The introduction of the special litigation committee procedure has in
fact enormously complicated derivative litigation and added a trial within a
trial. Chancellor Brown's analysis in Kaplan v. Wyatt 2 19 of the current
Delaware practice is in this regard devastating. As he points out, the special
committee review process today "sidetracks derivative litigation as we have
heretofore known it for approximately two years at a minimum . . . while the
plaintiff passively awaits his chance ...... 220 Faced with a substantial delay
before he can even obtain significant discovery, the plaintiff's attorney has an
obvious incentive to settle early. The only answer to this problem is tighter
judicial control over the period during which the committee conducts its
inquiry. A two or three month delay for a study may be justifiable, but an
average delay of two years means that justice has been both delayed and
denied. That a sensible pretrial screening mechanism could be designed does
not imply that any existing procedure today approximates this goal. 22 '
that fee shifting filters out less promising actions in terms of their likelihood of success. See Shavell,
supra note 40. But, under a contingent fee system involving plaintiffs with a nominal investment in
the corporation, the only person against whom fees can be shifted on the plaintiff's side (without
discouraging all small shareholders from bringing suit) is the plaintiff's attorney. Because he
receives only a percentage of the total recovery (typically around 20% historically), he should be
more chilled than the defendant by a system of fee shifting, given his different risk/return ratio.
Also, if the costs of the litigation are asymmetric, with the defendant incurring higher costs than the
plaintiff, see supra text accompanying notes 43-44, fee shifting would have an unequal and prejudicial
effect on the plaintiff's attorney, which the more limited security for expenses bond did not have
because the typical bond (for, say, $20,000) limited the maximum exposure.
219. See supra note 62.
220. Id. (quoting opinion). Chancellor Brown reached this estimate after noting that there are
today typically three contested hearings before the plaintiff can begin preparing his case for trial:
First, the defendants move to stay discovery by the plaintiff pending the litigation committee's
report: second, there is a motion made by plaintiff seeking limited discovery as to the report and the
process of its preparation; finally, there is the motion to dismiss made by the defendants based on the
report. Only if this motion is denied does the plaintiff then receive an opportunity after much delay
to begin seeking discovery.
221. A variety of proposals have been recently made to establish a prescreening requirement
with respect to class actions. See, e.g., Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for
Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 314, 334-39 (1980);
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VI
CONCLUSION
To some, the perspective that this article has taken will seem cynical. They
will respond that attorneys are far from naked utility maximizers who seek
only opportunities to subordinate the client's interests to their own. To be
sure, any description that so characterizes them would be overdrawn and
simplistic. Human motives in any actual case are always more complex and
few attorneys are wholly insensitive to professional values. But any sensible
attempt at reform should begin by identifying the self-interest of the actors in
question and then assessing the marginal impact on them of alternative legal
rules. In that light, this article has sought not to present a biography of the
typical plaintiffs' attorney, but to model the marginal impact that altered legal
rules would have. Because shareholder litigation presents the extreme case
where the attorney is able to behave opportunistically, the potential of the
private attorney general as a monitoring force is limited, unless and until the
law faces more candidly and systematically the conflicts of interest that today
pervade class and derivative litigation.
The problem is not simply that professional ethics has ignored these
conflicts, but rather that its narrow focus on how a fiduciary should ideally
behave tilts the balance of advantage in shareholder litigation against the
plaintiff. An exclusively normative perspective blinds one to the obvious
truths that (1) plaintiff's litigation, as with most other forms of extended
profit-seeking endeavor, must be financed, and (2) the plaintiffs attorney has
the same legitimate need to spread his risks as the defense counsel satisfies
through his participation in a large firm. Thus, so long as codes of
professional responsibility continue to insist that legal fees must be shared
only on the basis of the work actually performed, 222 the plantifFs attorney will
be disadvantaged. In effect, such a rule views the firm as consisting only of
one factor of production: labor. Modern financial theory, however, views the
firm as composed of multiple participants who supply the other necessary
factors of production as well-in particular, credit and the ability to bear the
residual risk. 22 3 Arguably, there may be reasons why the plaintiffs firm
should not have the same internal arrangements allocating risk and control as
Committee on Class Actions of the ABA Section of Corporate, Banking and Business Law.
Recommendations Regarding Consumer Class Actions for Monetar
, 
Relief, 29 Bus. LAw 957, 965-67 (1974).
The feasibility of these proposals is not here assessed, but it is suggested that the litigation
committee procedure should be viewed in similar terms as a prescreening mechanism whose purpose
is to assist the court in filtering out weak cases at an early stage.
222. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
223. Those examining the firm from the perspective of classical economics see it as a "nexus of
contracts" or "series of bargains" in which the various participants-i.e., the suppliers of capital,
labor, management, and supplies-reach an equilibrium position. No one interest is seen as
dominant, and the stockholder is simply viewed as the party willling to bear the "residual risk" of
success or failure, rather than simply as the owner. For the major statements of this view, see Jensen
& Mecklin, supra note 184; Alchian & Demsetz, Production, lnfornation Costs, and Economic Organization,
62 AM. EcoN. REv. 777 (1972); Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288
(1980).
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the modem corporation. Some may believe that such a structure would only
compound the "agency cost" problems that already complicate the
relationship between attorney and client in class and derivative actions, or
they may fear that the existence of shareholders would only intensify the
pressure on the lead counsel to maximize profits over the short-run by
accepting an inadequate settlement. 224 Even if these concerns are valid,
however, an insistence that fee awards be apportioned exclusively in terms of
work actually performed denies the ad hoc plaintiffs' firm of one hundred odd
lawyers who assemble to litigate a large class action the ability to organize
themselves in a manner that permits some of the participants to occupy the
specialized roles of creditor and residual risk bearer. In contrast, the large
law firm with its highly leveraged ratio of few partners to many associates
comes closer to resembling an economic firm, because it has a class (the
partners) who approximate the role of the residual risk bearer.225 This more
complex structure implies a greater ability to handle risk.
To sum up, although courts have a legitimate, if limited, role in overseeing
the internal bargains struck within the plaintiffs' firm, courts misconceive that
role when they become preoccupied with the "usurious" terms of credit; in so
doing, they betray an attitude that seems more theological than economical.
The proper focus should be on the interests of the client and the classic
problems that arise when the client, as principal, cannot closely control the
attorney, his agent. In fairness, both courts and the ABA's Model Rules have
made considerable progress toward recognizing that the plaintiff's attorney is
an entrepreneur. 226 Yet, although they have come to understand that the
224. It is far from self-evident that the behavior of the plaintiffs attorney should change if he
were permitted to sell participations in the action to stockholders or other quasi-creditors (whether
composed of other attorneys or ordinary investors). To show that the presence of such investors
would produce a greater conflict between the interests of attorney and client, one needs to
demonstrate that these investors would have a different discount rate at which they discounted the
value of a deferred and contingent recovery than the attorney's clients. Yet, it is equally possible that
investor attitudes might more closely resemble those of the client than would the attorney's own
preferences. Under the lodestar system, it is arguable that such investors might pressure the
attorney to maximize the fee recovery through dilatory, fee-generating tactics, but the attorney's own
incentives already point him in this direction. Thus, particularly if only other attorneys were eligible
to be shareholders in an ad hoc firm, it is not clear why there would be any incremental pressure
toward so maximizing the fee. Conversely, attorney/investors might prove to be better monitors
than the client or the court, and they could remove incompetent or shirking counsel. In short, the
trade-offs are indeterminate.
225. The partner is, of course, more than a passive residual risk bearer; unlike the stockholder,
he is an entrepreneur, able to both manage and control. In this light, perhaps the strongest
argument for prohibiting nonlawyer equity investments in litigation is shown by the evolution of the
modern law firm. It suggests that the structure of owner-managers is highly efficient and courts
should not deviate from it in regulating the ad hoc plaintiffs' firm that organizes to litigate a single
case. Yet, if the modern firm is to be the model, it must be recognized that fee splitting occurs within
that firm, as "rainmakers" receive a return that is not directly correlated to their "work" for any
specific client. By analogy, recognition of the forwarding fee seems equally appropriate.
226. For example, Rule 1.5 of the Model Rules does permit a forwarding fee to be paid with the
client's consent. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 comment e (1983). Similarly,
the Model Rules no longer require that the client be liable (at least in theory) for the expenses of the
attorney who is to be compensated on a contingent fee basis when the action is unsuccessful.
Previously, the client had to agree to repay these expenses in order to counter the impression that
the attorney was impermissibly investing in the action (although instances of this rule's enforcement
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plaintiff's attorney must be assured an adequate expected return if he is to
perform effectively, they still lack an understanding of the relationship
between risk and diversification.
The prescriptions offered by this article ultimately involve only marginal
institutional adjustments: chiefly, a return to the former salvage value
formula for fee awards and greater tolerance for private arrangements among
plaintiff's counsel that spread risk or attract capital. The very modesty of
these proposals, however, raises two basic questions: (1) Is there a more
radical alternative suggested by economic theory that this article considered
and rejected?; and (2) If the foregoing proposals were adopted, how
significant a change in the performance of the attorney as monitor should we
expect? The answer to the first of the these questions is "yes," while to the
second, only a very qualified response can be given.
A. The Auction Alternative: The Road Not Taken
From the standpoint of economic theory, an obvious answer to many of
the problems discussed in this article would be to auction off the right to
bring the suit. The winner in such an auction would have an exclusive
property right, would not be required to share the expected return with the
horde of plaintiffs' attorneys who today often appear out of the woodwork
once the initial action is filed, and would accordingly have a greater incentive
to invest in case preparation. However, the drawbacks in any form of auction
procedure are also considerable. If, for example, the simplest form of auction
were used and the court awarded the case to the attorney who agreed to
accept the lowest fee award (i.e., five percent of the recovery when everyone
else demanded at least six percent), the perverse consequence of such an
auction might be to award the action to the least competent counsel, who
having the lowest opportunity cost, could afford to make the lowest bid. 22 7
Given that lawyers are not fungible, it is hardly a desirable characteristic of a
market-driven selection process that it tilts the contest toward the counsel
least able to command a high premium for his time. Moreover, such an action
would also aggravate the earlier noted tendency toward premature or cheap
settlements, because, other things being equal, the lowest bidder (in terms of
were conspiciously lacking). See Findlater, The Proposed Revision of DR 5-103(B)." Champe'tv and Class
Actions, 36 Bus. LAw. 1667, 1669-70 (1981).
According to Professor Leubsdorf, courts in applying the lodestar formula now reveal a "view of
the lawyer as a calculating entrepreneur regulated by calculating judges." See Leubsdorf, supra note
93, at 481. Although it can be debated whether courts do act in quite this way when employing the
lodestar formula, it represents some progress that they give any evidence of doing so. FinallyJudge
Weinstein's explicit acceptance of the ad hoc law firm rationale for internal fee redistributions in the
Agent Orange litigation is a major advance in this direction.
227. Other factors would also influence who could make the lowest bid. For example, because
the fee is contingent, a party more confident of his ability to win the case could underbid another
similarly situated bidder who was less confident. This might tilt the auction toward either the most
capable attorney or the most egotistical. The relative confidence of the parties. however, may also
relate to their relative willingness to enter into a "sweetheart settlement." Thus, the lowest bidder
could be the "pilgrim" who intended an immediate settlement.
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a percentage-of-the-recovery formula) would tend to maximize his recovery at
the earliest point. 228
Another more elegant alternative would be to auction off not the right to
represent the clients, but instead the client's actual rights in the action. In this
form of auction, the contestants would offer a cash price to the class in return
for the rights held by the class in the action.229 Unprecedented as this
approach is, it would convert the lawyer and the client into a single economic
entity, thus minimizing some of the prospects for collusion that depend upon
conflicts of interest between the lawyer and client, while also tilting the
contest in favor of those bidders who could pay the highest price, instead of
those who could afford to accept the lowest return. Also, in terms of Exhibit
A, this approach would in theory encourage the winning attorney to settle
only at a later, more efficient point, because once having purchased the
action, he thereafter would litigate until the marginal return on his efforts was
equalled by his marginal costs. 23 0 A key problem still exists with this
approach: if the auction is held only after the first action is filed, the result is
to chill search activity. The attorney who discovers a legal violation that
would support a lucrative action is in the same position as the prospector who
cannot stake out his claim or the inventor who cannot obtain patent
protection. 23 ' Ex ante, he has no incentive to search and, if the plaintiffs
attorney is to perform a monitoring role, this approach eliminates the
incentive society should precisely wish to maximize.
Conceivably, society could respond to this problem by auctioning off not
the rights of the class in a specific action, but the franchise right to file any law
suit asserting a particular cause of action; in effect, society would sell the right
to monitor, discover, and enforce law violations of a specified type within a
specified area for a specified period. This form of auction would have the
advantage of not chilling search activity, but it would invite collusion and a
228. This point can be seen by referring to Exhibit A, supra p. 42. If the o' line is held constant
as between different bidders, the winning bidder would have the smallestf' curve, and this implies
that Point Y, which is the point of maximum distance between thef' curve and the o' line, would shift
leftward toward the axis. The consequence is both a smaller recovery and less deterrence.
229. This approach has been suggested to the author by Professor Frank Easterbrook of the
University of Chicago Law School.
230. Of course, the o' line on Exhibit A would shift upward under this approach because the
attorney would invest a substantial amount at the outset in purchasing the rights held by the class
and probably would incur significant interest expenses in so doing. Still, the attorney would
rationally settle at the point where the vertical distance between this higher o' line and the s' curve
was greater, and this distance will continue to be maximized at Point Z on Exhibit A.
231. Other problems also exist with this approach. Unless there was perfect competition among
attorneys, the class might receive inadequate compensation for the rights they assigned, because
(1) the ordinary class member could not evaluate the fair market value of the action; (2) some class
members might rationally seek to opt out of the class and "free ride" on the winning bidder's efforts;
and (3) there would be a significant danger that rival law firms would collude to reduce competitive
bidding. Alternatively, rival firms might merge and form an ad hoc plaintiffs' law firm for purposes of
the case in order to reduce competitive bidding. The irony is that society would have to enforce the
antitrust laws against plaintiffs' attorneys on whom it, in turn, relied to enforce the antitrust laws
through private actions. Regulatory oversight would therefore remain necessary.
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variety of other hazards. 23 2 Above all, it abandons the compensatory goal of
the law because it sells the potential recovery before the wrong even occurs or
the victims are identified. Nor could one know the total number of victims
entitled to compensation until the end of the franchise period. Although still
further variations could be imagined, 23 3 the bottom line is that whatever
technique of auction is employed-that is, whether society sells the right to
represent the class, the right to the recovery belonging to the class, or the
franchise right to enforce a particular law-a need for regulatory oversight
will persist. Courts will and must remain in the business of regulating the
private attorney general; the real issue is the appropriate scope of regulation.
B. The Plaintiff as Monitor: Some Realism about the Limits of Litigation
This article has focused essentially on the weaknesses in the contemporary
system of private enforcement through shareholder litigation. There are also
countervailing strengths. In particular, search costs are low for the plaintiff's
attorney in shareholder litigation, because he is subsidized by the mandatory
disclosure system created by the federal securities laws. 2 34 This subsidy
partially compensates for the fact that the plaintiff's attorney receives only a
small portion of the total recovery and thus in terms of the optimal level of
social investment should underinvest in litigation expenditures.
235
232. Collusion could be avoided if the attorney also acquired the rights of the class in the action,
because then he could not be bought off by a cheap settlement that exchanged high fees for a low
recovery. But this solution does not leave anyone to whom to direct the proceeds of the auction at
the time the franchise is sold because no one yet has been injured. Nor is it known how many will be
injured over the franchise period that has been auctioned off until after this period has ended. In
short, the goal of compensation to victims is abandoned by this approach. The idea of auctioning off
a franchise to enforce the law thus seems particularly fanciful.
233. One could imagine a franchise contract for a limited period to monitor a particular type of
violation (say, antitrust violations) with respect to a given number of companies or industries under
which the plaintiffs attorney agreed to split the recovery on a percentage basis with the class. This
approach could encourage search and specialization, but it reintroduces the problem of premature
settlements because it is essentially a percentage-of-the-recovery fee formula. Also, because a
franchise is by definition a monopoly, there is the problem that monopolists tend to restrict output
and thus produce less total deterrence and compensation than under competitive conditions.
Moreover, defendants would have an incentive to bribe such a monopolist. For a general economic
critique of franchise bidding in another context as a substitute for regulation, see Williamson,
Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-In General and with Respect to CA TV, 7 BELLJ. EcoN. 73 (1976).
234. One empirical study of class and derivative suits has noted their marked tendency to follow
on the heels of "dramatic events," typically either SEC or bankruptcy proceedings. See Kennedy,
supra note 19, at 809, 824 (finding that nearly 50% of the actions surveyed had piggybacked on prior
SEC or bankruptcy proceedings). This statistic has a double-edge significance: it shows both that
the private plaintiff in derivative actions is substantially subsidized by the SEC's enforcement efforts
and that he is not totally dependent on them (as the private antitrust plaintiffs' bar seems to depend
on the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department). For a discussion of this piggybacking
phenomenon in securities and antitrust litigations, see Coffee, supra note 19, at 221-26, 248-52.
235. For example, assume that on average only 20% of the recovery in a class or derivative
action is awarded as a fee to the plaintiffs attorney. This ceiling limits what he will spend on search
activity, since he will obviously not invest 21% of the recovery to earn 20%. In contrast, if
shareholders could coordinate their actions, the plaintiff class would invest much greater amounts on
search and case preparation, because from their perspective it is rational to spend 99% of the
recovery to earn the remaining 1%. Still, because the class members cannot coordinate their actions
and free riding will occur, there should be inadequate investment in such litigation from a social
perspective.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Nonetheless, even if the proposal recommended in this article were adopted,
it remains difficult to assess the degree to which shareholder litigation can
reduce the agency costs associated with the manager/shareholder
relationship. Those economists who doubt that management's interests are
closely aligned with those of the shareholders have advanced various
behavioral models of the firm, under which management is typically seen as
biased toward an inefficient growth-maximizing policy that expends corporate
funds wastefully on expanded staff, acquisitions, and other perquisites.23 6
Inefficient as such behavior may be, realism suggests that it is largely
protected by the business judgment rule. The problem is not only that the
substantive law of fiduciary duties cannot be stretched to recognize the
implicit conflict of interest in these seemingly arm's length decisions, but also
that inefficiency of this character does not necessarily take the form of highly
visible transactions that the plaintiff can monitor at low cost. Accordingly,
even if one adopts the premise that there are high "agency costs" associated
with corporate governance, 237 one may still be skeptical about whether
litigation remedies can offer more than a marginally effective solution, one
capable at best of deterring significant, highly visible transactions, but not the
more common departures from the goal of shareholder wealth maximization.
This analysis then tends to support the conventional view that litigation is
more effective at enforcing what lawyers term the duty of loyalty than the duty
of due care.
This evaluation neither implies that shareholder litigation lacks utility nor
that it is more imperfect than other modes of accountability. Other
monitors-the independent director and the hostile bidder-can also be
compromised in similar fashion. 238 The relevant issue should therefore
become their comparative monitoring ability. A case can be made that
shareholder litigation does have comparative advantages over the other
236. Among the principal works in this "behavioral" theory of the firm are: W. BAUMOL,
BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM ( 1964); Williamson, Managerial
Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 1032 (1963); Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency v. "X-
Efficiency, " 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392 (1966).
Williamson introduced the concept of "expense preference"- the idea that management seeks to
expend funds on staffand perquisites that it dare not distribute to itself in direct compensation. The
theme that management will fail to cost minimize also underlies Leibenstein's "X-Efficiency" concept
and is consistent with those theorists, such as Herbert Simon, who argue that managers in complex
organizations only "profit satisfice," rather than "profit maximize."
237. Currently, the high premiums paid in leveraged buyouts by managements approximate the
level of the premiums paid in hostile takeover contests. See DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Rice, Going
Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27 J. LAw & ECON. 367 (1984). One inference that
can be drawn from these high premiums is that the agency costs associated with corporate
governance are high. Because relatively little increased efficiency seems likely to result from the
elimination of public shareholders (and the dominant motive for the buyout is often fear of a hostile
takeover), these premiums imply that management places a high value on their position in control of
the corporation.
238. "Greenmail" is the obvious analogue of the collusive settlement of a derivative action. In
greenmail, the bidder challenges management's control and is bought off by payment of a premium
over the market price for his shares, thereby leaving shareholders typically worse off insofar as
corporate funds have been wasted on the repurchase. Collusion then may frustrate corporate
control contests as easily as it can undercut the end purposes of litigation.
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monitoring forces over at least a significant range of potential violations, 23 9
but this comparison is a topic for a different article. All that can be sensibly
concluded at this point is the following:
(1) Our contemporary system of private enforcement could easily be made
more effective if there were a will to do so; and
(2) What is best for the litigators is not necessarily best for shareholders or
society.
239. Professor Cox has argued in a recent article that litigation will be relatively more effective
than market remedies in dealing with "one shot" transactions involving managerial conflicts of
interest. See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries of Derivative Suit Proceedings, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745, 753-54 (1984). His theory, which seems plausible, is that the market will
react significantly only to transactions that seem likely to recur in the future. Also, to the extent
management does not see itself as a "repeat player" (as it probably does not in the buyout context),
reputational interests are a less effective deterrent.
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